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ABSTRACT
PERESTROIKA AND THE POLITICS OF
THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 1991
STEPHEN R. PELLETIER, B.A., MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Howard Wiarda
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the
impact of Soviet perestroika and foreign policy "new
thinking" on the Revolutionary Left in Cuba, Nicaragua
and El Salvador. Chapters on each of these nations
examine the response of the Cuban Communist Party, the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
,
and the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
,
respectively, to the changes in the Soviet Union and the
socialist world. Moreover, the question of what the
"demise of communism" means for these actors is
addressed in detail. The concluding chapter widens the
discussion by asking if Soviet perestroika and the
momentous changes it has ushered in signal the decline
of the "revolutionary paradigm" in Latin America.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A recently published popular biography of Mikhail
Gorbachev describes the Soviet leader as "the man who
changed the world." 1 Anointing Gorbachev in this way
is not pure hyperbole, as his policies of perestroika
,
glasnost and foreign policy "new thinking" have altered
the course of world history. The reforms initiated by
Gorbachev, which many argue have engendered the global
"demise of Communism," are a topic of debate among the
Latin American Left. One can find both pro and anti-
perestroika viewpoints held by Latin American
leftists
.
2
xGail Sheehy, The Man Who Changed the World: The
Lives of Mikhail S. Gorbachev
,
(New York: Harper
Collins
,
1990 ) .
2Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, General Secretary of the
Mexican Communist Party from 1963 to 1981, when the
party became part of the Unified Socialist Party of
Mexico says: "People ask me, 'What does Gorbachev's
perestroika signify for Latin America? ' My answer is
nothing, and this is very good." "In Third World, The
Legacy of Marx Takes Many Shapes," New York Times ,
24 January 1989, p. 11.
Conversely, Jose Riva, member of the Central
Committee Political Commission and Central Committee
secretary for international relations of the Dominican
Communist Party posits that "some in the democratic
movement view the change underway in the USSR with a
considerable degree of skepticism. They believe that
this change may end up weakening the revolutionary
militancy of the Soviet Communists. This is a
pessimistic attitude. At the same time, the conviction
is widespread in the Left, democratic movement that
perestroika in the Soviet Union will increase its
1
This study focuses on the impact of perestroika and
"new thinking" in foreign policy on the revolutionary
Left in Latin America. Specifically, it examines Soviet
President Gorbachev's reforms, which have concrete
foreign policy implications, and the effects of these
changes on Marxist-Leninist movements in Cuba,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador. This study will examine the
receptivity to the new thinking of the Soviet Union on
the part of these movements; the impact of "the demise
of Communism" on the goals and tactics of the
revolutionary Left; and the implications of Soviet
reforms for the future of the revolutionary Left in
Latin America.
Gorbachev, Perestroika and Foreign Policy "New Thinking"
Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev the
Soviet Union has embarked on major domestic reforms and
proclaimed the need for new political thinking in
international relations. A few years ago only the most
serious specialists and scholars of Soviet affairs
speculated about the prospects of internal reform in the
Soviet Union. Today western policymakers in government
and business, journalists, commentators, and the public
economic potential and enable it . . . to step up
assistance to the world's revolutionary forces." Jose
Riva, "Perestroika in the USSR and the International
Communist Movement," World Marxist Review 31
(September 1988): 92-109.
2
at large are interested in the incessant Soviet
discussions of imminent domestic reform and foreign
policy "new thinking." 3 Gorbachev's perestroika
(restructuring), glasnost (speaking out publicly), and
novoye myshleniye (new thinking) have prompted
unprecedented debate about the present state of the
Soviet economy, party leadership and foreign policy. 4
3William E. Odom posits that while the change is
being attributed to General Secretary Gorbachev, the new
course was actually initiated under his predecessor
Yuriy Andropov, temporarily set aside by Konstantin
Chernenko, and reasserted by Gorbachev. However,
Andropov's anti-corruption and anti-alcoholism
campaigns, he asserts, did not signal so clearly the
extent of the intended transformation as have
Gorbachev's glasnost
,
perestroika
,
and novoye
myshleniye . See William E. Odom, "How Far Can Reform
Go?" Problems of Communism 36 (November /December 1987):
18-33. Similarly, Jerry Hough argues that the extent to
which Andropov was willing to support radical domestic
reforms is unclear. Andropov did attack the social
policy that Brezhnev had followed, calling for increased
"discipline." " [ D] iscipline meant not an unconditional
right to a job, but a 'right' to lose a job if a person
was not productive." Further, Andropov wrote about the
need for prices to correspond to costs and hinted at the
need to raise subsidized meat prices. These concerns
will be shared by Gorbachev. In his foreign policy
pronouncements "Andropov had been more urgent ... in
pushing for improved relations with the West" and his
international policy moved away from "Brezhnev's
American-centered policy in the direction of a
multipolar one." This desire to engage in a multi-polar
foreign policy will also be shared by Gorbachev. See
Jerry Hough, Russia and the West , (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1988), pp. 148-152.
4There exists, of course, a range of
interpretations of what is happening in the Soviet
Union. Some think little is changing, except, perhaps
in the "tone" of Soviet politics. See Adam Ulam, Alain
Besancon, and Francoise Thom in "What's Happening in
Moscow?" The National Interest , no. 8 (Summer 1987),
pp. 11-13 and 27-30. Others see change —albeit
3
Gorbachev defines perestroika as a revolutionary
and radical "elimination of obstacles hindering social
and economic development, of outdated methods of
managing the economy and of dogmatic stereotype
mentality." 5 Scholars of the Soviet Union, as well as
Gorbachev himself, argue that perestroika is a
"revolution" born of necessity. The Stalinist system in
the Soviet Union was in crisis by the mid-1980s. The
Soviet Union was, and still is, suffering from serious
economic stagnation. Rates of economic growth are
declining, the economy is increasingly squeezed
financially, and the government is increasingly unable
to meet the nation's growing needs in housing.
reversible—in the political but little meaningful
change in the economic realm. See Marshall I. Goldman,
Gorbachev's Challenge
.
(New York: Norton, 1987). Still
others see much potential for change but claim it is too
early to speak about major change. See Seweryn Bialer,
Dissent
.
(Spring 1987), p. 188; William E. Odom, "The
Future of the Soviet Political System," PS: Political
Science and Politics 21 (June 1989). Finally, Jerry
Hough ( Russia and the West ) and Archie Brown ("What's
Happening in Moscow?" The National Interest , no. 8
[Summer 1987]: 6-10) argue that Gorbachev is committed
to significant economic and political reform. Gorbachev
is, however, working under considerable constraints and
thus it is irresponsible to expect the USSR to transform
itself into a Western-type pluralist democracy (or to
assume that Gorbachev's reforms mean nothing because
they have not engendered such a transformation) . The
changes begun by Gorbachev, they argue, could stimulate
in time demands for a more thorough pluralization of the
political and economic
systems
.
5Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for
our Country and the World , (New York: Harper and Row,
1988), p. 38.
4
foodstuffs
,
transportation, health services, and
education. 6
Soviet economic problems had a ripple effect in
society at large. On the ideological plane, economic
stagnation, coupled with the "ossified social thought
. . . divorced from reality . . . typical of the period
of the personality cult" 7 brought about greater
resistance to the attempts to scrutinize constructively
the problems that were emerging. New ideas were
rejected as "the needs and opinions of ordinary working
people, of the public at large, were ignored." 8
Moreover, a "credibility gap" grew within Soviet society
as the propaganda emanating from the party leadership,
which presented a trouble-free reality, did not match
the reality experienced by Soviet citizens.
" [Everything that was proclaimed from the rostrums and
printed in newspapers and textbooks was put in question.
Decay began in public morals; . . . alcoholism, drug
addiction and crime were growing; and the penetration of
6Abel Aganbegyan, Head of the Economics Department
of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chief economic
advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev describes the USSR's
immediate economic concerns (housing, food and
agriculture, health services) and the nation's more
fundamental or structural economic problems in "The
Economics of Perestroika," International Affairs
(London) 64 (Spring 1988): 179-185.
7Gorbachev, p. 34.
8Ibid.
,
p. 7
.
5
the stereotypes of mass culture alien to us, which bred
vulgarity and low tastes and brought about ideological
barrenness, increased." 9
At the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Central
Committee the basic principles of the new strategy of
perestroika were announced. These were more clearly
defined at the Conference of the CPSU Central Committee
in June 1985, the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in
February 1986, and at the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of
the CPSU Central Committee. The Soviet leadership's
first priority was to reverse the nation's economic and
social problems which were the most obvious signs of a
crisis in the Stalinist system by which the USSR has
been ruled for sixty years.
Lenin is turned to as the ideological source of
Soviet restructuring. Gorbachev attempts to replace the
Stalino-Brezhnevite system with a more efficient and
more open model of socialism based on the work of Lenin.
According to Lenin, socialism is the living creativity
of the masses. Moreover, Lenin views socialism and
democracy as indivisible. Therefore, as Gorbachev
writes in Perestroika , Soviet reform must "activate the
human factor," it must take into consideration the
diverse interests of people, work collectives, public
bodies and various social groups. Gorbachev claims that
9Ibid.
,
p. 8
.
6
only by abandoning the "ossified social thought"
identified with the "period of the personality cult" and
launching a broad democratization of all aspects of
society, which will lead to the full utilization of the
human factor, will the Soviet economy and Soviet society
advance
.
10
The domestic manifestations of the crisis in the
Stalinist system have necessarily affected Gorbachev's
foreign policy. The needs of domestic policy have
merged with the failures of Brezhnev's foreign policy to
impel the Soviet Union to look for new approaches to
foreign and military policy. 11 Foreign Minister Eduard
10Gorbachev ' s plan for reform is, as Seweryn Bialer
posits, multifaceted. First, Gorbachev plans to use
exhortation and appeals to national pride as well as
greater openness within society in order to spur
economic growth. Second, Gorbachev will argue in favor
of increased domestic investment and growth in the
domestic economy even at the expense of increased
military spending or increased social payments to
workers and peasants. Third, Gorbachev will stress
"discipline" and "order," which, despite their Stalinist
connotations, are code words for the introduction of
market mechanisms into the Soviet economy. Finally,
Gorbachev's plans for reform necessitate the replacement
of aging members of the Central Committee with younger,
more energetic officials who do not share the "ossified
social thought" of their predecessors. See Seweryn
Bialer, The Soviet Paradox; External Expansion, Internal
Decline, (New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 150-153.
“Peter Zwick argues that new thinking, perestroika
and glasnost are integral and mutually supportive
elements of reform. "New Thinking in foreign policy
contributes to the restructuring of the Soviet economy,
and domestic economic reform and political openness
influence the implementation and direction of Soviet
foreign policy. Therefore new thinking in foreign
policy must be understood in the larger context of
7
Shevardnadze has said that the main requirement in
foreign policy
is that our country should not bear additional
expenditures in connection with the necessity
of supporting our defense capability and the
defense of our legitimate foreign policy
interests. That means that we must seek paths
to the limitation and reduction of military
rivalry, to the removal of confrontational
moments in relations with other states, to the
clamping down of conflicts and crises. 12
Gorbachev's "new thinking" also looks to Lenin for
inspiration. In October 1986, in response to a question
asking if a potential conflict should exist between
peace and socialism, which should the USSR pursue,
Gorbachev said that "Lenin in his time expressed an idea
of colossal depth—concerning the priority of the
interests of social development, of all human values,
over the interests of one or another class." Gorbachev
went on to speak of the importance in the nuclear age of
Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of the Soviet future, rather
than merely as a revision of certain aspects of Soviet
international behavior." Peter Zwick, "New Thinking and
New Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev," PS: Political
Science and Politics 21 (June 1989): 215. Also see
David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," Foreign
Affairs 68, (Winter 1988/Spring 1989): 66-81 for a
discussion of the failures of Brezhnev's foreign policy.
12Quoted in Holloway, p. 78. According to Yuri
Maslyukov, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, the
Soviet Union's national debt is approaching $500 billion
and is growing faster than that of the United States.
The Soviet deficit equals 13.8 percent of the annual
production of the country's goods and services. See
"Top Soviet Planner Sees Debt of $500 Billion," Boston
Globe
.
6 August 1989, p. 2.
8
the "thesis of the priority of the all-human value of
peace over all others to which different people are
attached." 13 As David Holloway points out,
taken by itself this proposition may seen
banal, but it is significant in the Soviet
context because it implies that the goals of
peace and socialism may come into conflict,
and further it provides justification for
giving priority to the pursuit of cooperation
with the West over search for unilateral
advantage
.
14
Soviet new thinking, which Gorbachev set out most
recently in his December 1988 speech at the United
Nations, embraces a number of propositions about the
nature of international relations in the modern world:
human interests take precedence over the interests of
any particular class; the world is becoming increasingly
interdependent; there can be no victors in a nuclear
war; security has to be based increasingly on political
rather than military instruments; and security must be
mutual, especially in the context of U.S. -Soviet
relations, since insecurity on one side leads to
insecurity on the other side too. 15 This new thinking
“Quoted in Holloway, p. 70.
14Ibid.
“See Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach
to Security," World Policy Journal 3 (Fall 1986): 561-
599 for a discussion of new thinking and Soviet
security, nuclear weapons and disarmament. Also see
Gerhard Wetting, "New Thinking on Security and East-West
Relations," Problems of Communism 37 (March-April 1988):
1-14.
9
rejects many basic assumptions of earlier Soviet policy
and should be understood as a response to the crisis in
relations to which Leonid I. Brezhnev ; s policies
had brought the Soviet Union by the early 1980s as well
as the need for domestic reform. 16
The USSR and Latin America
In the last twenty years as the Soviets'
understanding and knowledge of Latin America has
increased the Soviet Union has become a significant
actor in the region. 17 The Soviet military presence
has increased considerably in nations like Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Peru; Soviet trade with the area,
especially Argentina, has expanded; and Soviet
diplomatic ties and normal state-to-state relations now
encompass virtually all the countries in the area. 18
16Jerry Hough argues that Brezhnev's foreign policy
was too reliant on a bipolar relationship with the U.S.
which led the Soviet Union to accept the status quo in
U.S. foreign policy. Gorbachev, however, desires to
move beyond this bipolar foreign policy and he initiates
a multipolar policy which plays upon the "contradictions
between the three centers of Capitalism—the U.S.,
Western Europe and Japan." Jerry Hough, Russia and the
West, p. 223. Gorbachev's call for a "common European
home" is one manifestation of this shift in foreign
policy, and it has had the effect of challenging the
traditional U.S. position in Western Europe. See, for
example, "U.S. Voicing Fears of Effect on West from
Gorbachev," The New York Times , 16 September 1989, p. 1.
17Howard Wiarda, "The Rising Soviet Presence in
Latin America," World Affairs 149 (Fall 1986): 59.
18Ibid.
10
Not surprisingly, the Soviets have also adapted a wider
range of strategies for the region, 19
they seek to influence democratic governments
as well as gain control of the opposition to
repressive ones, and they have adapted their
policies to the individual situations of the
distinct Latin American countries. 20
At the same time there exist limits on the Soviets
increasing their role in the region. "Latin America is
far away from the Soviet Union geographically, there are
not many vital Soviet interests there, and Latin America
ranks low on the Soviet list of priority areas." 21 The
Soviets are also cognizant of the overwhelming local
advantage of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, and
their domestic economic priorities and reorganization
plans may limit their playing a significant role in the
future. This latter point is discussed in considerable
detail by Costa Rican political scientist Rodolfo Cerdas
Cruz, who argues that:
We are witnessing the dawn of a new era in
which the internal priorities of Soviet
politics are acquiring an unprecedented degree
of importance in the political life of the
country. The demands of the various sectors
for substantial improvements in public
services, supply of consumer goods,
improvements in the educational system,
19See Robert Wesson, "The Soviet Way in Latin
America," World Affairs 149 (Fall 1986): 67-75. This
issue of World Affairs is devoted to the Soviet Union
and Latin America.
20Wiarda, p. 59.
21 Ibid.
11
housing and health, etc., are beginning to
occupy a position of priority in the
institutional life of the Soviet Union. Such
demands, previously controlled by the
dictatorial grasp of the party over various
channels for expressing social grievances, are
being made even more vociferously and are
facing the CPSU leadership, no longer in a
position to decide on the convenience or
inconvenience of resolving these problems,
with the urgent necessity to respond to
concrete petitions and protests which cannot,
as hitherto, be postponed indefinitely without
doing serious damage to the legitimacy of the
system. 22
All this may lead to a more limited scope for action by
the Soviet Union, fewer possibilities for adventurism
and less favorable conditions for undertaking risky
commitments in Third World countries and more
particularly in Latin America.
Under these conditions, one can forecast the
following political result: a contraction in
the funds allocated to international
solidarity. Although these will not disappear
completely and will maintain sizable levels,
primarily for reasons to do with the global
interests of the USSR, for the first time
sufficient and explicit political, moral and
economic justifications will need to be found,
in a social climate where greater controls are
operating, disputes over better distribution
of resources becoming more acute and internal
pressures for expenditure becoming more openly
apparent. 23
22Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, "New Directions in Soviet
Policy in Latin America," Journal of Latin American
Studies 21 (February 1989): 2.
23Ibid., p. 4. W. Raymond Duncan posits that for
the first time complaints about poor management of the
Cuban economy or turmoil in the Nicaraguan economy may
create currents of opinion and social pressures for a
change of policy. See The Soviet Union and Cuba.
Interests and Influence, (New York: Praeger, 1985),
12
The changes taking place in the USSR and the Soviet
bloc are tending to strengthen national responses to
local problems and to lessen the weight and significance
of demands coming from the international arena,
especially from the Third World countries in general and
Latin America in particular. 24 To this may be added
the new position of Latin America in the global strategy
of the USSR:
The ideological tendencies which wanted to see
a shift of the world revolutionary axis to the
Third World and to convert it into a forum for
confrontation with imperialism have suffered
an irreparable defeat with the new
orientations of perestroika . 25
The Soviet debate on the Third World has ranged
widely over the nature of its revolution, regional and
national differentiation, stages of development, the
possibilities of non-capitalist means of development,
and other issues, however during the period from 1978
p. 193. Edward Gonzales writes: "For Castro,
Gorbachev's new priorities will probably mean not only
more limited largess for the Cuban economy but also
renewed Soviet pressure for Havana to put its own
economic house in order. . . . Castro may find Soviet
support for an activist Cuban foreign policy in the
Third World less forthcoming, not only because of
Gorbachev's domestic priorities but also because of
Soviet attempts to stabilize the more important
strategic relationship with the U.S." Edward Gonzalez,
"Cuba, the Third World, and the Soviet Union," in The
Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three
Decades, eds. Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 67-81.
24Cruz, p. 5.
“Ibid.
,
p. 6
.
13
(shortly before the Sandinista revolution) until 1985
(which saw the infancy of perestroika) the Soviet Union
sought to heighten regional conflicts and saw in the
politico-military instability of the region confirmation
of the increasing weakness of imperialism. 26
In 1982
,
the Communist Party Conference in Havana
declared that the center of gravity of the Latin
American revolution had shifted to Central America and
the Caribbean. 27 Revolution there was not simply
democratic revolution aimed at overthrowing the military
dictatorships allied to imperialism, but also a struggle
to establish by a continuous process a socialist system.
Writing before the victory of the Sandinistas, Mi jail
Gornov and Yuri Koroliov28 argued that the foundations
had already been laid for socialist and democratic
revolution in Latin America, and especially in Central
26See Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third
World; Soviet Debates and American Options , (Washington
DC: Brookings, 1986) and Joseph G. Whelan and Michael J.
Dixon, The Soviet Union in the Third World: Threat to
World Peace?
,
(Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey ' s , 1986).
27Cruz, p. 7.
28According to Jerry Hough, "M. F. Gornov" is the
pseudonym of M.F. Kudachin, Head of the Latin American
Sector of the Central Committee. Struggle . . . ,
p. 173, note 90. America Latina describes Yuri Koroliov
as a Doctor of Historical Science who works with the
Latin American Institute of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences
.
14
America. 29 Therefore the reformist tendencies seeking
to resolve the transition to democracy had to be
countered in order to open the way for the revolutionary
designs of the masses and of the working class. 30
Following the Sandinista success in 1979, it became
clear that the armed struggle was the preferred road to
success. It was this alone that had resulted in victory
for the socialist revolutions in Latin America. 31 This
reading of the political processes in Latin America in
general and Central America in particular "was in line
with Soviet global strategies for the Third World in its
confrontation with the West and especially the United
States." 32 However, it did not correspond, as
perestroika itself came to demonstrate, with any real
economic, financial or technological capacity on the
part of the USSR to sustain the changing socialist
trends being imminently proclaimed throughout Latin
America and especially in Central America.
29Mijail Gornov and Yuri Koroliov, "El Torbellino
Centroamericano , " America Latina (Moscow), no. 6,
(1978): 7.
30Ibid.
,
p. 19
.
31Sergo Mikoyan, "Las Particularidades de la
Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el punto de
Vista de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina (Moscow), no. 3 (1980): 103.
32Cruz, p. 8.
15
When Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary and
perestroika was initiated, it was obvious that a
realistic survey of the Soviet Union's own economic
position and the socialist struggle had to be made, and
that the impossibility of pursuing the internationalist
line advocated by the Brezhnev administration would be
recognized. Soviet "new thinking" is therefore of
particular significance for Latin America and more
specifically for Central America. Yuri Koroliov, who in
1978 emphasized the taking up of arms in order to hasten
the revolution, had, by 1988, changed his tune. The
struggle now proposed is not class struggle, but rather
it is a struggle for national resurgence.
As Koroliov argues in "Metamorfosis de la
Interdependencia: Aspecto Regional , " the struggle for
socialism is postponed. It is evident now that in many
Latin American countries the right conditions for
"bourgeois" democracy have been created, and
sufficiently stable social structures have been erected
to enable such a "bourgeois democracy" to function. In
practical political terms any attempt to change this
state of affairs will require lengthy preparation. The
hour of revolution is no longer nigh—it is in fact
postponed indefinitely. These are countries that no
longer belong to the group of underdeveloped states that
are fertile ground for revolution, for they have now
16
joined that group where the conditions only ripen after
long and complex preparation. 33 Such a change in
conception is in keeping with the thinking of Leonid
Medvedko, who, in the New Times of Moscow, wrote:
The present global parity of forces is a
"balance of impotence" in regional conflicts.
None of the belligerents is able to achieve
convincing superiority, let alone victory.
Now, it is, of course, immoral to stir up
conflicts and unleash wars in the hope of
winning an easy victory, by taking advantage
of the difficulties experienced by one or the
other country. But to add fuel to the flames
of war in the hope of deriving somewhat
dubious benefits is even more immoral.
History has amended the classic definition of
war. More often than not, it is a
continuation of immoral policy. Hence it is
necessary to change policy in order to put a
stop to wars. 34
This view is shared by Radomir Bogdanov, in an
article published in the official organ of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, in which he clearly states the
"nuclear arms have actually equated the destinies of
capitalism and socialism in the face of military
confrontation, have made them equally vulnerable, and
have posed a broader problem than that of choosing a
social system—the problem of the survival of
33Yuri Koroliov, "Metamorfosis de la
Interdependencia : Aspecto Regional," America Latina
(Moscow), no. 4 (1988), p. 11.
34Quoted in Cruz, p. 8.
17
mankind." 35 For this very reason, contrary to prior
political practice and Marxist-Leninist ideological
conception,
international relations must be placed in a
context divorced from the correlation of
forces. The new system of international
relations and its problems must be approached
from a basis of common interests and mutual
compromise, with reciprocal concessions and
without destabilizing the international
situation by taking unilateral action. 36
"This new Soviet focus on the nature and character
of international relations and peaceful coexistence,
divorced from the notion of class, is proving to be a
debate of major political significance." 37 Soviet
leaders have turned to Lenin's claim that "the interests
of social development take precedence over the interests
of the proletariat" in order to justify the new less
radical emphasis. It is being argued that there is a
global interest to which the particular must be
sacrificed, whether it be class based, national or
regional. It is not a question of renouncing class
struggle in an antagonistic society, but of the form
that it takes in the nuclear age, when the future of
humanity is at stake; it is a question of identifying
35Radomir Bogdanov, "From the Balance of Forces to
a Balance of Interests," International Affairs (Moscow),
no. 4 ( 1988 ) : 56
.
36 Ibid
.
37Cruz, p. 10.
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the class struggle with the problem of the survival of
mankind. 38 "The Communist parties of Latin America
understand, it is said, the need for creative analysis
of the situation of countries in that continent and of
relating national problems to global ones." 39
Cruz posits that the message being sent by the
Soviet leadership to the revolutionary Left in Latin
America is one of "historical patience." Although there
has been no official renunciation of armed struggle, the
leftist thesis of armed struggle and revolutionary
violence as the midwife of history must be reconsidered.
Pravda on December 14, 1986 had this to say:
Violence on that continent [Latin America] can
easily become transformed from the midwife to
the gravedigger of history. The birth of
socialism may end in the death of socialism.
In the present situation any local conflict
may escalate into regional and even world
conflict. . . . The nuclear age demands of
revolutionary forces the most serious
consideration of decisions over armed struggle
and the definitive rejection of actions
characteristic of leftist extremism. 40
The remainder of this work will examine the
receptiveness of the Latin American revolutionary Left
to the new Soviet policies of perestroika , glasnost and
foreign policy new thinking. Chapter 2 provides a
historical overview of Soviet thinking about revolution
38Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40Quoted in Ibid.
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in the Third World from Lenin to Brezhnev and also
discusses the development of the Communist movement in
Latin America during this period. Chapter 3 focuses on
the changes in Soviet thought ushered in by Mikhail
Gorbachev's rise to power. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine
the receptivity to perestroika and foreign policy "new
thinking" on the part of the Cuban Communist Party, the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
,
respectively. These chapters also examine the impact of
Soviet new thinking on the goals and tactics of each
revolutionary movement. Chapter 7 concludes the study
with a discussion of the implications of perestroika and
foreign policy "new thinking" for the future of the
revolutionary Left in Latin America.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET THINKING
ABOUT THE THIRD WORLD AND LATIN AMERICA
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the
implications of Soviet perestroika and foreign policy
new thinking for the revolutionary Left in Latin
America. This chapter attempts to "set the stage" for
this discussion by providing a historical overview of
Soviet revolutionary strategy and Latin America's
position in it. As Jerry Hough posits, Soviet debates
on revolutionary strategy have focused on two crucial
questions: "What is the nature of the state in foreign
countries and does it have to be overthrown by violent
revolution if there is to be hope for social progress;"
and "What is the natural tendency of historical
development as feudalism . . . begins to disintegrate
with the growth of capitalism. . . . Are major
historical forces leading to socialist revolution in the
near term." 1 These questions will be addressed in this
chapter by focusing on the historical development of
Soviet thought 2 concerning revolution in the Third
1Jerry Hough, The Struggle for the Third World ,
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986),
p. 142.
2Earlier there had been a western belief that there
is no serious debate in the Soviet Union concerning
foreign policy. Hence analysts have been inclined to
write of "the Soviet position" on various issues.
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World 3
,
and by examining the policies and strategies
adopted by Latin American Communists and Communist
Parties in their attempt to engender "social progress"
in the region.
This chapter begins with a discussion of Marx and
the "colonial question" and proceeds to examine Soviet
thinking about revolution in the Third World from Lenin
to Brezhnev. Parallel with this discussion, this
chapter also traces the development of the Communist
movement in Latin America from 1919, when the Comintern
began to pay increased attention to the colonial and
semi-colonial worlds, to 1985 and the ascension to power
by Mikhail Gorbachev. Since 1985, Soviet ideas about
international politics and how the Soviet Union should
However, in the 1980s there was a proliferation of
western studies detailing Soviet foreign policy debates
which all make the point, explicitly or implicitly, that
speaking of "the" Soviet position on any foreign policy
issue is a dubious venture. Probably the best known of
these studies is Hough's The Struggle for the Third
World . However see also Daniel S. Papp, Soviet
Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The
Ideological Basis
,
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985);
Edme Dominguez, "La Vision Academics Sovietica Sobre el
Caribe y Centroamerica (1960-1984) ," in America Latina Y
La Union Sovietica: Una Nueva Relacion , ed. Augusto
Varas, (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano ,
1987); Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International
Relations
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989); and Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of
International Relations , (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1987) .
3In this chapter "Third World" and "developing
nations" will be used interchangeably even though Soviet
writers prefer the latter.
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perforin as a superpower have been in constant flux.
These ideas and their implications for the revolutionary
Left in Latin America will be addressed in subsequent
chapters
.
Marx and the Colonial Question
Classical Marxism provided an analysis of the
contradictions of capitalist society and indicated means
by which its revolutionary overthrow might be
accomplished. It was only peripherally concerned with
the colonial world, and its analysis of the manner in
which the political practice of the working class
movement might take account of developing metropolitan-
colonial economic links is fragmentary and incomplete.
It fell to Lenin to develop the classical Marxist
heritage on the national and colonial question and, in
particular, to specify the nature of the connection
between revolutions in advanced capitalist society and
those in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. He
summed up the tasks now facing socialists in the words,
"Proletarians of all countries and oppressed peoples,
unite 1" Lenin acknowledged that, strictly speaking, no
warrant for such a formulation could be found in any of
Marx's writings; but the Communist Manifesto , he
emphasized, had been written in "completely different
23
circumstances." 4 It was the task of the science of
revolution to adapt itself to such changes in its
environment. 5
Yet, when Marx did address the issue directly, as
in On Colonialism
, it was clear that, in his estimation,
the cruelties of colonialism were justified by its
historical effect of breaking down traditional socio-
economic structures and paving the way for the
universalization of the capitalist system. 6 Yet,
Marx's ideas were sometimes contradictory. While
attributing the political relations among nations to the
needs of their economic "base," Marx, in un-Marxist
fashion, was known to discuss the influence of non-
economic factors in explaining colonialism.
In an article written for the New York Herald
Marx gave an analysis of Persian-Afghan
political antagonisms founded on diversity of
race, blended with historical reminiscences,
kept alive by frontier quarrels and rival
4Daniel S. Papp posits that Marx himself was rarely
concerned with the colonial question and with the role
that colonies played in the global capitalist system of
his time because "at the time of Marx's writings, the
world had not yet experienced what has been described as
v the second round of empire, ' which occurred during the
last two decades of the nineteenth century" (Papp,
pp. 3-4 ) .
5Stephen White, "Colonial Revolution and the
Communist International, 1919-1924," Science and Society
40 (Summer 1976): 173-193.
6Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, On Colonialism ,
(New York: International Publishers), 1972.
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claims ... sanctioned by religious
antagonism. 7
Just as colonialism was recognized as having the
historical effect of breaking down traditional socio—
economic structures and paving the way for capitalism
and eventually socialism, Marx argued that nationalism
was a powerful tool that revolutionaries could employ
against the established political and social orders in
order to further the movement of history. Despite the
seeming ideological incompatibilities of Marxism and
nationalism, 8 Marx was an ardent advocate of Polish
nationalism directed as it was against Prussian, Russian
and Austrian domination, despite the fact that it was
limited to the Polish upper and middle-classes. 9
Similarly, Marx's writings on the American Civil War
illustrate his support for the bourgeois but progressive
7Allen Lynch, p. 11. A major theme running through
Lynch's work is that Marxist-Leninist ideology and
Soviet thinking about the international system is more
complex, contradictory, and nuanced than often believed
in the West.
According to Walker Connor, "nationalism is
predicated upon the assumption that the most fundamental
divisions of humankind are the many vertical cleavages
that divide people into ethnonational groups.
Marxism . . . rests upon the conviction that the most
fundamental human divisions are horizontal class
distinctions that cut across national groupings" (Walker
Connor
,
The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory
and Strategy , [Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984], p. 5).
9Papp, p. 4.
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regressiveNorth in its struggle against the feudal and
South. 10
Lenin and Stalin: 1917-1951
By Lenin's time, nearly all of Africa and Asia were
controlled by Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal,
Spain, Belgium, Holland, Russia, and the United States.
Great Britain alone governed one-fifth of the world's
land mass and one-fourth of its population. Lenin's
thoughts on the colonial world were more sharply drawn
than Marx's. In 1916 Lenin wrote his most famous
commentary on the colonial world, Imperialism; The
Highest Stage of Capitalism . Adam Ulam argues that this
work provides "the single most important theoretical
treatise" for the study of all Soviet foreign policy,
not just Soviet perceptions of the colonial world. 11
Lenin's argument was derived from earlier works by
J. A. Hobson and Rudolf Hilferding, but his conclusions
were new. Beginning in the 1870s, Lenin argues,
capitalism passed beyond its constructive and largely
peaceful phase and entered the stage of monopoly
capitalism. This stage in the development of capitalism
10Saul K. Padover, ed., On America and the Civil
War
,
(New York; McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 94.
“Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Co-Existence; Soviet
Foreign Policy 1917-1973 , (New York; Praeger, 1974),
p . 27
.
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is characterized by the scarcity of domestic investment
opportunities in the most advanced capitalist countries,
which, in turn, necessitates the search for colonial
territories where both cheap labor and raw materials can
be obtained.
The subsequent imperialist competition for colonies
is significant for two reasons. First, the advanced
capitalist nations were able, through the acquisition of
colonies, to postpone the internal contradictions of
advanced capitalism which, Marx argued, would lead to
its overthrow as nations reached a high level of
industrialization. Lenin posited that the rise in
living standards of the English, French, and German
workers had been purchased through the exploitation of
colonial peoples. Therefore, the good Marxist should
feel no qualms about allying himself with even the
middle or upper classes of the oppressed nationality if
they oppose colonial domination. No matter how
reactionary their social views, their nationalist
opposition to European colonialism make them natural
allies. Second, the capitalist competition for colonies
was bound to turn into political and then military
competition from which there would be no escape short of
27
the destruction of capitalism as an international
system. 12
The implications of Lenin's work were considerable.
First, Marxist analysis was no longer
primarily domestic in nature; it was now
international as well. Second, Marx had
argued that the weakest link in the capitalist
system was the revolutionary resentment
building in the proletariat worker in
developed capitalist societies; Lenin
maintained that capitalism's weakest link was
actually it colonial possessions. Third,
Lenin built on Marx's willingness to side with
the more progressive forces in society to
foment changes and revolution, and argued that
the national bourgeoisie of colonial
countries, that is, those elements in society
that both resented external control of their
homeland and wished to maintain private
ownership of the means of production, should
actually be seen as allies of convenience by
the revolutionary proletariat in their assault
on the global capitalist system. Thus, the
proletariat revolution would be facilitated by
the national bourgeoisie. Finally, the focus
of revolution moved from developed European
societies to underdeveloped colonial
territories. As the weakest link in the
capitalist system, and with indigenous forces
both willing and able to weaken and break that
link, Lenin concluded that the opportunities
for revolution were as great, if not greater,
in the colonies as in Europe. 13
In his "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National
and Colonial Questions," prepared for the Second
Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in
June 1920, Lenin argued that liberation would result
12V . I. Lenin, Imperialism; The Highest Stage of
Capitalism
,
(New York; International Publishers, 1977),
and Ulam, pp. 27-29.
13Papp, p. 5.
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from the joint struggle by the proletariat of the
advanced countries and the subjugated peoples of the
colonial areas. Acknowledging that liberation movements
would usually have a bourgeois-nationalist character
initially
,
Lenin nevertheless endorsed temporary
cooperation with them provided that the proletarian
movement, however rudimentary, maintained its sense of
identity and independence of action. 14 At the Second
Congress Lenin theorized that the colonial territories,
like the developed capitalist states, would experience a
two-stage revolution. The national bourgeoisie would
lead the first stage which would culminate in national
independence and bourgeois democracy for their country.
The second stage of the revolution would be led by
communists and would eventually lead to a dictatorship
of the proletariat. 15
14V. I. Lenin, "Communism and the East: Theses on
the National and Colonial Questions," in The Lenin
Anthology , ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton,
1975), pp. 619-625.
15Papp, pp. 5-6; Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W.
Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World
Conflicts
.
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), p. 181.
Lenin's prescription for colonial revolution met
with strong opposition from the Indian communist M. N.
Roy. He argued that the colonial bourgeoisie, by virtue
of its weakness and its dependent relationship with the
colonial powers, was incapable of leading the first
stage of the revolution. Roy advocated communist
leadership of the first stage of the revolution, as well
as the second, positing that this would hasten the rise
of socialism. The Comintern's solution to the Lenin-Roy
debate was to pass both resolutions, thus postponing an
important theoretical debate.
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Immediately after coming to power, the Bolshevik
government called on Persians, Turks, Arabs, Hindus and
all other peoples of the "East" to overthrow their
imperialist rulers. At Lenin's instigation, a Congress
of the Peoples of the East was convened by the Comintern
in Baku in September 1920 in the hope of hastening anti-
imperialist revolution. At the Baku congress "a holy
war was declared against British imperialism." 16
According to Alvin Z. Rubinstein, the congress:
Called for world revolution and tried to
attract the support of Muslims of the East for
an all-out struggle against the West. At this
time this meant opposition to British and
French power in the Middle East; association
of Soviet Russian and the Bolshevik Revolution
with the aspirations of indigenous peoples
seeking independence; and penetration of
bourgeois-nationalist freedom movements by
pro-Moscow communists. [While the Baku
Congress never fulfilled Lenin's hopes] . . .
its theme became a permanent part of the
Soviet foreign policy outlook. 17
Indeed, though Lenin did not live to see Russia
reap the benefits of decolonization, he anticipated the
demise of colonial empires.
The movement in the Colonies is still regarded
as an insignificant national and completely
peaceful movement. However, that is not the
case. For great changes have taken place in
this respect since the beginning of the
twentieth century, namely, millions and
16Klaus Von Beyme, The Soviet Union in World
Politics, (Brookfield, MA: Gower, 1987), p. 118.
17Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World
Strategy
,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),
p. 16
.
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hundreds of millions—actually the
overwhelming majority of the world's
population—are now coming out as an
independent and revolutionary factor. And it
should be perfectly clear that the coming
decisive battles of the world's revolution,
this movement of the majority of the world's
population, originally aimed at national
liberation, will turn against capitalism and
imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much
more revolutionary role than we have been led
to expect. 18
Similarly, in his last article, written on March 2, 1923
and devoted primarily to the need for improving the
efficiency of the state bureaucracy, Lenin expressed
optimism over the outcome of the Soviet Union's struggle
to defend itself against imperialism by virtue of the
fact that Russia, India, China, and others "account for
the overwhelming majority of the world's population" and
they are engaged in the struggle for liberation, thus
assuring a complete victory for socialism. 19
Lenin's incapacitation and death (1920-1924)
unleashed a power struggle within the Kremlin that
absorbed much of the attention of the Soviet leadership
during the 1924-1928 period. Joseph Stalin "made the
colonial question part of his own program in the
maneuvering to possess Lenin's mantle of legitimacy." 20
18V. I. Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in
the East
,
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1957), pp. 289-290.
19Quoted in Rubinstein, p. 17.
20Rubinstein, p. 17.
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Hence, in a series of lectures entitled The Foundations
of Leninism , which he gave three months after Lenin's
death, Stalin lauded Lenin for illuminating inter-
relationships that exist and affect the future of
revolution in Europe, and for strengthening socialism in
the Soviet Union. Stalin also reiterated Lenin's thesis
that bastions of capitalism can be toppled by depriving
them of the raw materials and markets of the colonies,
declaring that the road to victory lies through the
revolutionary alliance with the liberation movements of
the colonies and dependent countries against
imperialism. 21
After Stalin emerged preeminent from the leadership
struggle, Soviet interest and involvement in the
colonial world occupied, at best, third place in Soviet
priorities, behind institutionalizing Stalin's rule and
building socialism in one country, and coping with the
threat presented by capitalist encirclement. 22
"Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that
Stalin and other Soviet leaders of his era considered
the colonial territories to be unimportant or
insignificant. " 23
21J. V. Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism ,
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975).
22Papp, p. 6.
23Ibid.
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Stalin had been intimately involved with questions
of colonial nationalism and revolution long before he
acquired his ultimate position in the Soviet Union. As
Commissar for Nationality Affairs he had been a leading
Bolshevik theoretician on the nationalities question
within Russia. On external nationalities questions he
implored his fellow revolutionaries shortly after the
revolution that "the East should not be forgotten for a
single moment, if only because it represents the
v inexhaustible ' reserve and v most reliable' rear of
world imperialism." To Stalin, communists had to "break
the age-long sleep of the oppressed peoples of the East"
and "rouse them to fight imperialism," for without the
colonial peoples, "the definite triumph of socialism" is
"unthinkable." Therefore, one duty of the communists
was "to intervene in the growing spontaneous movement in
the East and to develop it further into a conscious
struggle against imperialism." Stalin reiterated these
and similar viewpoints throughout the early and mid-
1920s. 24
Under Stalin, the Soviet policy of alliances with
nationalist movements was refined and reinforced.
Stalin, writing on "The National Question" argued:
This does not mean, of course, that the
proletariat must support every national
24Joseph Stalin, Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1973), pp. 143-154 and 174-176.
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movement, everywhere and always, in every
individual concrete case. It means that
support must be given to such national
movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow
imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve
it. Cases occur when the national movements
in certain oppressed countries come into
conflict with the interests of the development
of the proletariat movement. In such cases
support is . . . entirely out of the
question. ... In the forties of the last
century Marx supported the national movement
of the Poles and Hungarians and was opposed to
the national movement of the Czechs and South
Slavs. Why? Because the Czechs and South
Slavs were then "reactionary nations," . . .
outposts of absolutism, whereas the Poles and
Hungarians were "revolutionary nations,"
fighting against absolutism. . . . The
struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is
waging for the independence of Afghanistan is
objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite
the monarchist views of the Emir and his
associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and
undermines imperialism. . . . For the same
reasons, the struggle that the Egyptian
merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are
waging for the independence of Egypt is
objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite
the bourgeois origin ... of the leaders of
the Egyptian national movement. 25
Unfortunately for Stalin, his efforts to support
revolutionary nationalists in the colonial world between
1924 and 1928 were less than successful. Stalin's
experience with China was especially disastrous.
Even prior to Lenin's death, local Chinese
communists were urged to join the Kuomintang
and in 1933, the Soviets expressed support for
Sun Yat-Sen, while noting that "conditions for
the successful establishment of either
communism or Sovietism" did not exist in
China. In the mid-twenties, Stalin argued
that Chinese communists, waiting for a later
chance to take over the government, could best
25Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism , pp. 76-78.
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advance their own fortunes by collaborating
with the nationalists. Chiang Kai-Shek,
however, successfully out-maneuvered the
communists and in 1927 he nearly annihilated
them all. 26
Whether because of his failures in China, or
because of new perceptions of Soviet domestic political
and economic realities and international threats to
Soviet security, Stalin used the Sixth Comintern
Congress in 1928 to alter many of Lenin's and his own
earlier assessments of the colonial world. While not
abandoning the colonial world, 27 the Soviets at the
Sixth Congress retreated from earlier overly optimistic
evaluations of the colonial national bourgeoisie. The
new "united front from below" strategy adopted at the
Congress urged communists in the developing world to
unmask the deceptions of the national bourgeoisie. If
revolution were to occur, the communists were to lead
it. 28
26Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet-Third
World Relations
,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985),
p. 6
.
27A point made quite clearly by Edward T. Wilson,
"Russia's Historic Stake in Black Africa," in Communism
in Africa , ed. David E. Albright (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 81-83.
28Papp, p. 7; see also Hosmer and Wolfe, pp. 182-
183. The latter argue that the Comintern's abrupt shift
to a more militant line in this period reflected
internal Soviet politics. It was used by Stalin, they
posit, against Bukharin, who was identified with the
previous more moderate line.
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Rubinstein writes that despite the Comintern's new
"ultrarevolutionary line" Stalin, prior to World War II
chose not to incite communist agitation in the
colonies for fear of provoking the already
deeply ingrained suspicions of Britain and
France, the principal colonial powers and his
principal allies against Hitler. Nor in any
event was he in a position to do much: the
ruling colonial powers were firmly in control;
the national liberation movements were still
in the formative stages; the communists were
weak; and the Soviet Union lacked the
capability for direct involvement. 29
World War II precipitated massive changes in the
international system, but brought no major changes in
Soviet policy toward the colonial world. Stalin's
priorities were elsewhere, especially in Europe, and his
resources remained limited.
For Stalin, newly independent states not under
control of communists subservient to Stalin
represented more a threat to be contained than
an opportunity to be exploited. As a result,
Soviet spokesmen and experts on the colonial
and newly independent world decried the
independence of the new nations as a sham and
classified the national bourgeoisie of those
countries as imperialist collaborationists and
counterrevolutionaries. Even notables such as
Gandhi and Nehru were considered little more
29Rubinstein, p. 17. Moreover, Fernando Claudin
argues that Stalin's concern with the creation of
"socialism in one country" meant that Comintern policy
emphasized that class struggles and national liberation
struggles of peoples oppressed by imperialism were
subordinate to the desires and needs of the USSR. In
effect, despite the rhetoric, the building of socialism
in colonial areas was subordinated to the building of
socialism in the Soviet Union. Fernando Claudin, The
Communist Movement , (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1970), pp. 71-91.
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than capitalist stooges during the immediate
postwar period. 30
Similarly
,
the victory of Mao's forces in China in 1949
"did nothing to alter Stalin's view of the national
bourgeoisie in the newly independent countries; for that
was a revolution won by a Communist party against Soviet
advice." 31 The Chinese Revolution's success did,
however, complicate the Soviet position in the
developing world since revolutionaries now had a second
successful model to emulate.
Latin American Communism: Growth and Dissolution
Sheldon B. Liss in his 1984 Marxist Thought in
Latin America
,
points out that while laymen commonly
associate Marx with revolutionary thought and often
erroneously attribute to him theories of imperialism, in
reality Marx and Engels knew little and "never had more
than an indirect and tangential interest in the
30Papp, p. 8.
31Ibid.
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region." 32 Lenin was both more well-read and more
interested in Latin America.
Lenin read A. B. Hart's The Monroe Doctrine
(1916)
,
which heightened his awareness of the
growth of "protectorates" and of the role of
the United States in Latin America. He
referred to the Latin American republics as
"dependent countries;
. . . which officially
are politically independent, but which are in
fact enmeshed in the net of financial and
diplomatic dependence." His thinking formed
the foundations upon which were built the
dependency themes that became popular among
some Marxist and non-Marxist Latin American
scholars in the late 1960s and 1970s. 33
With the ascendence of Lenin and the emergence of
the Third International in 1919, increased attention was
paid to the colonial and semi-colonial worlds. The
Comintern focused its colonial agitation on the Far East
and, as Regis Debray points out, "it came very late to
an interest in Latin America." 34 Part of this was due
to the fact that Latin American nations were hard to
characterize. "The combination of class struggle and
32Sheldon B. Liss, Marxist Thought in Latin
America
,
(Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984), p. 18. Ronaldo Munck argues that "the sheer
ignorance of Marx and Engels about Latin America . . .
led them to support the ('progressive') invasion of
Mexico by the United States in 1847, and to launch an
unfounded diatribe against the leader of the South
American independence struggle, Simon Bolivar" (Ronaldo
Munck, Revolutionary Trends in Latin America , [Montreal:
McGill University Centre for Developing Area Studies,
1984 ] , p. 6 )
.
33Liss, p. 25.
34Regis Debray, A Critique of Arms , (London:
Penguin Books, 1977), p. 41.
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national struggle in Latin America
. . . was not clearly
grasped by the early Comintern." 35 According to Kermit
McKenzie
,
it was not until 1928 that the Comintern
revived Lenin's term "dependent country" (used in
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism , to
characterize Argentina) on the prompting of Ricardo
Parades of Ecuador, to cover those areas which had been
penetrated economically by imperialism but which still
retain a higher degree of political independence than
colonies and semi-colonies. 36 Perhaps most
importantly, however, the Russian leaders of the
Communist International exhibited little interest in
Latin America in the 1920s because Soviet foreign policy
was more concerned with the danger of "encirclement."
Soviet leaders saw the British and the French as the
major threat, and so concentrated their extra-European
activities in the Asiatic and African territories of
those Great Powers. The United States was considered a
minor foe at the time and Latin America was considered
of small importance. 37
35Munck, p. 8.
36Kermit McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution,
1928-1943
.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974),
p. 81
.
37Victor Alba, Historia Del Comunismo En America
Latina, (Mexico: Ediciones Occidentales , 1954), pp. 1-
15.
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Members of the newly formed Latin American
Communist Parties took the initiative to establish links
with the Comintern at this time. 38 Two Argentine
observers attended the First Congress of the Comintern
and there were three Latin American delegates at the
Second Congress, which decided the policy of the
national and colonial questions. In 1924 a Latin
American Secretariat was set up by the Comintern,
however, "it prompted accusations of Eurocentrism when
only one Latin American, Victorio Codovilla of
Argentina, was appointed to it." 39
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928
demonstrated a more sustained interest in Latin America.
It was attended by delegates from Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay. A
special Latin American Commission was established to
elaborate policy which, reflecting events in China,
emphasized the bourgeois-democratic nature of the coming
revolution. Jules Humbert Droz, a Swiss communist made
38Robert J. Alexander, in his influential Communism
in Latin America points out that it was to a very
considerable extent admiration of the Russian Revolution
which led to the founding of the Latin American
Communist parties. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in
Latin America
,
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1960), p. 15. Communist parties
developed in those countries with the most advanced
development of capitalist relations of production.
These included Argentina and Mexico (1919), Uruguay and
Chile (1921), and Brazil (1922).
39Munck, p. 8.
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the Latin Secretary of the Comintern, maintained that
the revolutionary movement in Latin America must be
assimilated to the type of bourgeois-
democratic movement ... in semi-
colonial countries, where the agrarian
problem and the problem of anti-imperialism
form the central focus.
However, "the weakness and the non-revolutionary
character of the bourgeoisie" meant that the bourgeois-
democratic revolution could only by completed "under the
leadership of the proletariat." 40 During this period.
Communist Party leaders "were searching for Latin
American Kuomintangs , " such as the Peruvian Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria (APRA)
,
a nationalist formation
led by Haya de la Torre, in which the proletariat would
find its national bourgeois ally. 41 Moreover, at this
40Quoted in Ibid. The apparent contradiction in
this line regarding the nature of the revolution can be
traced back to the Second Congress of the Comintern in
1920 which endorsed the positions of both Lenin and Roy.
See footnote number 15.
41This tactic was opposed by a number of
independent Marxist thinkers in Latin America, including
Jose Carlos Mariategui of Peru, Julio Antonio Mella, a
leader of Cuba's Communist Party in its early years, and
Chile's Emilio Recabarren. All three opposed any
collaboration with bourgeois nationalists. According to
Mariategui, "the Latin American bourgeoisie ... is
totally unwilling to consider the idea that a second
struggle for independence is necessary . . . the ruling
class has no yearning for a greater degree of national
autonomy" (Jose Carlos Mariategui, "The Anti-Imperialist
Perspective," New Left Review , 70, [November/December
1972], p. 67). See also Munck, pp. 9-15; Liss, pp. 75-
79, 129-138, 243-247; and Harry E. Vanden, "Mariategui:
Marxismo
,
Comunismo, and Other Bibliographic Notes,"
Latin American Research Review 14 (Fall 1979): 61-86.
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time communist parties in the region increasingly came
under the control of Stalinist leaders whose main
characteristic was "their unswerving devotion to the
powerful Soviet bureaucracy, to which they were linked
by innumerable material and political ties." 42
During the years 1929-1935, as the Soviet Union was
making its first great efforts to industrialize and to
destroy the country's independent peasantry, the
Comintern embarked on a policy of building communist
parties free from bourgeois or social democratic
influence, positing that in all the Latin American
countries, "the petty bourgeoisie and the nascent
industrial bourgeoisie are directly linked to
imperialist interests," and based firmly in the "real
revolutionary classes"—agricultural workers,
impoverished peasants, and the expanding proletariat of
These early leaders of the communist movement were
soon replaced by a different breed of leader, ones more
willing to follow the Moscow line unconditionally.
Munck argues that Victorio Codovilla of Argentina who,
"in spite of his limited political abilities, controlled
the whole movement as head of the Latin American
Bureau;" Luis Carlos Prestes of Brazil, "who rose from a
leader of the Tenentes revolt in the 1920s to become
undisputed leader of the CP . . . until 1980;" and
Lombardo Toledano of Mexico, "for many years the CP
v front man' in the Latin American Trade Union movement,
were essential elements in the Stalinization of the
Latin American communist movement." Munck, pp. 11-13.
See also Alexander, pp. 18-44.
42Munck, p. 14.
42
large scale industries. 41 This policy was endorsed by
the Conference of Latin American Communist Parties,
meeting in Buenos Aires in June 1929, in a report by
Humbert Droz entitled "The Struggle Against Imperialism
and Problems of the Tactics of the Communist Parties of
Latin America." Robert J. Alexander argues that this
era of extreme communist isolation from other left-wing
and working-class groups, was fully experienced by Latin
American Communism, and led communist parties to oppose
left-leaning nationalist governments, labeling them
fascist, quasi-fascist or instruments of Yankee
imperialism. 44
The extreme isolation of the 1929-1935 period was
followed by the almost equally extreme collaboration of
the Popular Front period (1935-1945), which was ushered
4
'The working class in Latin America at the time
was composed largely of independent artisans; small
workshops predominated over the few large factories.
Nevertheless, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in particular
had developed a relatively solid trade union movement,
into which the Profintern (The Red International of
Labor Unions--RILU ) began to make inroads. Munck,
p. 14
.
44Alexander argues that "this period was perhaps
more appealing than some others to the Latin American
temperament and state of political organization. The
Latin American tradition of violent revolution made the
extremism [of the period] more acceptable than it was in
countries with stable political systems such as the
United States and Great Britain" (Alexander, pp. 21-22).
See also Luis E. Aguilar, ed., Marxism in Latin America ,
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 20-
27.
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in at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935. It
was argued at the Seventh Congress that
many of our comrades in Latin America
have characterized nearly all the
bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties
as fascists, thus hindering the
establishment of an anti-Fascist
Popular Front. 45
During this period Latin American Communist sought
alliances with Socialist or left-wing nationalist
parties which represented the reformist, moderate left.
The Communist Party in Argentina held out its hand to
the previously "social fascist" Radicales
; the
Brazilians offered the olive branch to dictator Getulio
Vargas in spite of the fact he was holding their most
prominent leaders in jail and had outlawed the party;
the Chileans allied themselves with the Socialists; the
Peruvians turned towards APRA; in Cuba the Autenticos
were hailed as allies of the proletariat, but when
rebuffed the Cuban Communists ultimately turned toward
Colonel Fulgencio Batista. 46
45Quoted in Aguilar, p. 27. See also "The
Situation of the Latin American Communist Parties in the
Eve of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern," The
Communist International 12 (May 20, 1935). Reprinted in
Aguilar, pp. 152-157.
46Batista was anxious at that moment to become
President through more or less honest elections, but he
lacked any wide basis of popular support. Hence he was
willing to make an alliance with the Communists, who he
thought might gain him such support. As a result the
Communist Party became legal, the Confederation of
Workers of Cuba was established, and the Communists were
put in control of it. This alliance long survived the
44
The Popular Front epoch marked the first period
during which the Communist parties of Latin America
really assumed political importance in the life of the
hemisphere. It was during this period that non-
Communist politicians in a number of countries were
willing
,
for the first time, to enter into agreements
and alliances with Communists, and that they began to
acquire serious followings among the workers and
intellectuals in the region. Alexander attributes the
Communists' success during this period to a number of
factors, including: the Communists' vociferous support
for the Allied cause during World War II; the widespread
admiration among the politically conscious Latin
Americans for the struggle which the Russians put up
against the Nazi invaders; and the Communists' leading
role in organizing committees for the support of the
allies . 47
During this period, the Communists dispensed with
talk of revolution and dictatorship. Similarly,
Communist "anti-imperialism" was forgotten during these
years
.
When Communists spoke of "imperialism"
it was only the Axis brand to which
they were referring. They attacked
those who still insisted on speaking
Popular Front period. Alexander, p. 22. See also
Aguilar, pp. 28-34 and Munck, pp. 18-21.
47Alexander, p. 25.
45
about British or American imperialism
as saboteurs of the war effort. They
discouraged all strikes and other
activities against American and
British-owned firms. 48
As a result, the Communists were able to develop
friendly relations with a number of erstwhile enemies.
Latin American Communists began to work with anti-
fascist Catholic groups, dictators like Batista in Cuba
and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (although the
Communist-Tru jillo relationship was extremely short-
lived)
,
managers of local American and British-owned
enterprises, and local allied diplomatic personnel.
These new relationships increased the importance of
Latin American Communists, so that by 1946 they were at
the zenith of their power and influence. 49
After World War II however, Latin American
Communists suffered severe defeats in virtually every
country in the hemisphere. The reasons for these
setbacks are numerous and interrelated. First, with the
end of World War II Latin American Communist parties
rejected the "Browder deviation," as the previous
48Ibid.
,
p. 26
.
49Their parties were legal or at least tolerated in
virtually every country in the hemisphere. They had
members of Congress in Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador,
Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and members
of lesser legislative bodies in several other countries.
In the latter months of 1941 they had their members in
the Chilean Cabinet, and seemed well on the way to
achieving the first Communist government of the
hemisphere in that country. Alexander, p. 27.
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emphasis on conciliation with capitalism was called due
to its association with the United States Communist
leader Earl Browder, and instead marshaled their
propaganda against United States imperialism and in
favor of international peace and the neutralization of
Latin America. According to Rodney Arismendi, one of
the most outstanding post-World War II theoreticians of
communism in Latin America:
In spite of the fact that
historicalcircumstances led the peoples of
Latin America, in their determination to save
themselves from Nazi aggression, to
collaborate closely with the Roosevelt
government . . . this particular instance does
not justify the generalconcept of Pan-
Americanism, based as it is on supposed
historical ties, as postulated by the obliging
lawyers of imperialism. There is a
fundamental incompatibility between American
monopolies and the basic tendencies of
national sovereignty and liberty of the Latin
American countries. These represent two
conflicting, in factirreconcilably
antagonistic, trends in contemporary
historical development. 50
Robert J. Alexander points out that this shift in
the Communist line was not only an attack against the
United States, but also against every government in the
hemisphere which is friendly toward the United
States. 51 Moreover, the shift in the Communist line
helped sever Communist party relations with groups which
50Rodney Arismendi , "El Fin de la Guerra y el Nuevo
Imperialismo Norteamericano ," in Aguilar, pp. 182-185.
51Alexander, p. 28.
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had been more sympathetic with them when they were
fighting the Nazis.
Second, Stalin dissolved the Comintern in 1943 as a
"gesture of goodwill" toward the West and replaced it
with the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
. In
1947 this body, "the highest organ of the international
communist movement," gave Soviet blessing to the
division of the world into "zones of influence." 52
Latin America was to be a "zone of influence" for the
United States and the Soviet Union, and by extension
Latin American Communist parties, were to take little
interest in the revolutionary struggles going on
there. 53 The Cominform line was that the Communist
parties must struggle to ensure stable and prolonged
peace and must "subordinate all their activities to this
paramount task of the day." 54 The Comintern always
maintained that the major task of the proletariat in the
oppressed countries was the national struggle against
imperialism, however.
52Munck, p. 23. See also Claudin, pp. 465-474.
53Stalin's associate Molotov had the following to
say in reply to an accusation of Soviet expansion in
Eastern Europe: "It is known that the United States of
America is also pursuing a policy of strengthening its
relations with neighboring countries--for instance
Canada, Mexico, and also other countries of America
—
which is fully understandable" (quoted in Claudin,
p. 472 )
.
54Quoted in Claudin, p. 580.
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during the ambiguous pacifism of the 1950s,
the [Latin American Communist parties] were to
oppose discussion of the problem of national
independence in the peace movement. 55
Finally, as the Cold War developed, the United
States urged Latin American states to take measures to
control the expansion of communism. Such suggestions
were taken to heart by various Latin American
governments. After 1947, beginning with Brazil, Chile
and Colombia, a number of Latin American nations broke
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1947 the
Brazilian Communist party was outlawed and its elected
senators and deputies expelled from the Brazilian
Congress. In 1948, the government of Chile declared the
Communist Party to be illegal. In that same year,
military coups took place in Peru and Venezuela and were
followed by immediate anti-communist declarations. In
Cuba, the democratic government of Grau San Martin began
a successful offensive against Communist control of the
CTC. In Argentina, Peron forced the Party into
illegality, and in Colombia the conservative reaction
reduced the Party's possibilities of action to their
lowest point. 56
55Munck, p. 23.
56Aguilar, pp. 34-42.
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Khrushchev and Brezhnev; 1953-1982
When Stalin died in 1953
,
the USSR had few
diplomatic or economic relations with developing
countries. By comparison, most of the developing
countries maintained strong political and economic ties
with the developed West.
Forebodingly for the Kremlin, the United
States had initiated preliminary contacts with
many of the countries to bring them into U.S.-
managed alliances directed against the Soviet
Union. Additionally, China already considered
itself a viable and credible alternative model
for developing-world revolutions. Indeed, at
the 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned
States, China played a central and key role in
proposing and adopting the"Five Principles of
Coexistence." None of this redounded to Soviet
advantage
.
57
However Nikita Khrushchev was to have a profound effect
on Soviet foreign affairs and nowhere more than in
relations with the Third World. Khrushchev argued that
the situation in the Third World was "ripe" for
socialism and that "progressive forces" capable of
weakening capitalism were emerging. Khrushchev
persuaded the Party that this was the opportune time for
bold action and thus
enabled the new nations to adopt policies
whose effect was to alienate them from the
West, thus carrying forward Lenin's injunction
to attack the industrial heartland of
capitalism by undermining its relationship
with the non-western world. 58
5?Papp, pp. 8-9.
58Rubinstein, p. 22.
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Soviet attitudes toward the developing world during
the late 1950s and early 1960s were optimistic.
Khrushchev believed that Nehru, for example, was "more
than just another bourgeois liberal politician—he was a
true people's democrat" even though he "wasn't a
communist." 59 Gamal Abdul Nasser and his government
"had the national interest of its people at heart and
therefore deserved our respect and support." Khrushchev
found it "difficult to define the social-political
goals" of Nasser and recognized the danger that Nasser's
government could "be a bourgeois government" but the
potential benefits were worth the risk, Khrushchev
believed. 60 Developing country leaders like Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana were "interesting, intelligent, and
highly educated," even though they did not have "a
significantly clear perspective on political and social
issues." 61 Leaders who regularly received Soviet
praise included Ben Bella of Algeria, Sukarno of
Indonesia, and Keita of Mali.
Indeed, some Soviet analysts considered conditions
in the developing world to be so favorable for
59Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The
Last Testament , (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1974), p. 306.
60Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers ,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 432.
“Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers : The Last
Testament, p. 335.
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revolution and progressive change that national
bourgeois leaders and their national democratic states
might transcend their original class identities and move
toward socialism. By December 1963, even Nikita
Khrushchev accepted the thesis that this new type of
developing-world leader, the revolutionary democrat,
could lead his state into socialist oriented paths of
development. 62 Fidel Castro's socialist revolution in
Cuba was one of the factors that influenced the more
optimistic Soviet observers to adopt this viewpoint, and
many clearly believed that revolutionary democratic
states were the wave of the future. 63
Cognizant of important changes in the international
system, and, according to Papp, less paranoid about the
developing world than was Stalin, Khrushchev forged a
foreign policy strategy inspired by Lenin's ideas. He
modernized Leninist formulations on the colonial and
national questions and operationalized them, in the
process moving the Soviet Union into the mainstream of
Third World developments. 64 Khrushchev argued that
62Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the 'Third World',"
Problems of Communism 14 ( January/February 1965): 22-31.
63Ibid. However, Ra'anan also points out that some
Soviet analysts and policymakers disagreed and argued
that only communists could lead the transition to
socialism.
64Papp, pp. 8-10. See also Rubinstein, pp. 19-21.
For a more detailed discussion of Khrushchev's foreign
policy see Harry Hanak, "Foreign Policy," in Khrushchev
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the new period in world history which Lenin
predicted has arrived, and the peoples of the
East are playing an active part in deciding
the destinies of the whole world, [they] are
becoming a new mighty factor in international
relations
.
65
Khrushchev called on these new nations "to build up an
independent national economy and to raise the living
standards of their peoples," and proclaimed that "today
they need not go begging for up to date equipment to
their former oppressors. They can get it in the
socialist countries without assuming any political or
military commitments." 66 Khrushchev proclaimed that a
"zone of peace" including socialist and non-socialist
states had arisen in Europe, Africa and Asia. Moreover,
Khrushchev "reconstructed" the national bourgeoisie in
developing countries, arguing as had Lenin, that the
socialist camp and the national bourgeoisie were once
again allies. 67 Nonalignment was accorded new
respectability, and the newly independent states were
recognized as a powerful new force in the international
arena.
and Khrushchevism , ed. Martin McCauley (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 180-194.
65Nikita S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central
Committee of the CPSU to the Twentieth Party Congress,
February 14, 1956 # (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1956), p. 26.
66 Ibid.
,
p. 27 .
67Papp, p. 10.
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These changes were added to when, in I960, the USSR
hosted the Meeting of World Communist and Workers'
Parties. Eighty-one parties attended and considered a
variety of issues that confronted the international
Communist and Workers' movement. The Soviets posited
that in developing countries "all patriotic forces,"
including that sector of the national bourgeoisie "not
connected with imperialist circles," should combine to
create a "united national democratic front" that would
be anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist. Khrushchev
described these national liberation movements in
developing countries as second in historical importance
"only to the formation of the world socialist system." 68
68See "Statement of the Meeting of the Communist
and Workers' Parties, November 1960," World Marxist
Review 3 (December 1960): 4-25; and Nikita Khrushchev,
"For New Victories of the World Communist Movement,"
World Marxist Review 4 (January 1961): 3-28.
Papp argues that the Soviet position on the
national bourgeoisie masked major disputes between China
and the Soviet Union over the ability of this group to
lead national democratic states toward socialism and
over the wisdom of fomenting communist revolutions in
the developing world. According to the Chinese, the
national bourgeoisie were not sufficiently revolutionary
and trustworthy, and therefore communist-led revolution
should be pursued throughout the developing world. To
Khrushchev and his supporters, however, the national
bourgeoisie did have sufficient revolutionary
credentials and could move toward socialism with Soviet
support
.
Papp posits that Khrushchev's position was not
universally accepted within the CPSU, and that a running
debate over who should lead revolution in the developing
world took place in two prominent Soviet journals ( Aziya
i Afrika Segodnya and Narodv Azii i Afriki ) . See Papp,
pp. 10-11.
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From the mid-1950s on, as part of a new diplomatic
activism, Soviet officials began to establish a wide
variety of contacts with liberation groups operating
abroad. The principal connections were made through
four networks: the United Nations and its many
committees dealing with colonial issues; Third World
intermediaries like Egypt's Nasser and Ghana's Nkrumah;
Western European Communist Parties, especially the
French and Italian which kept close ties to African
movements; and Soviet sponsored cultural and scientific
meetings, such as the Twenty-Fifth International
Congress of Orientalists, held in Moscow in August 1960,
the frequent gatherings of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee and other Soviet Front Organizations, and the
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, established in
Moscow in 1961. 69 However, Khrushchev moved
cautiously
.
He did not make the grand gesture that would
have brought the USSR instant acclaim in Third
World circles: he failed to make Moscow the
first power to grant diplomatic recognition to
ripening independence movements such as the
Algerian Front de LiberationNationale (FLN)
.
Nor was he freer with arms or funds in amounts
that would have had an impact. Like
Stalin, Khrushchev championed anti-colonialism
and inveighed against imperialism, but did
little. In no instance was he important to
any liberation struggle. His bark lacked
bite. 70
69Rubinstein, p. 86.
70Ibid.
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What Khrushchev did was pursue a highly visible
anti-colonialist campaign in the United Nations, one
which placed the Soviet Union in sharp contrast with the
Western powers and enhanced Moscow's prestige. Yet
while supporting radical Afro-Asian resolutions calling
for an end to colonialism, the Soviet Union shied away
from demands for direct intervention by the United
Nations Security Council.
To understand why Khrushchev's "bark lacked bite"
when it came to Soviet support for national liberation
movements seeking independence, one must recognize that
according to Soviet sources, the world revolutionary
process consists of three distinct streams. The most
important stream is the socialist commonwealth of
nations. It is headed by the Soviet Union and includes
all countries of "developed socialism." The second
stream is the international Communist and Workers'
movement, made up of all Marxist-Leninist parties as
well as non-Marxist parties sympathetic to the concepts
of scientific socialism; the CPSU heads the second
stream. The third stream is the "national liberation
movement . " 71
One must also examine the various foreign policy
goals the USSR was pursuing at the time. While aiding
socialist or anti-Western movements in the Third World
71See Papp for a discussion of these issues.
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was a valued goal of the Soviets under Khrushchev, it
was clearly subordinate to others. First, Soviet
foreign policy under Khrushchev stressed improving
relations and "peaceful coexistence" with the West.
Rubinstein argues that Khrushchev moved cautiously in
Africa "for fear of angering France and compromising the
prospects of a Franco-Soviet rapprochement." 72
Similarly, Khrushchev's refusal to give Fidel Castro an
iron-clad guarantee to defend Cuba from the United
States suggests the greater importance given to U.S.-
Soviet relations. 73 Interestingly, in an attempt to
reconcile Soviet concern for peaceful coexistence with
Soviet assistance of national liberation movements,
Khrushchev, in a major speech on January 6, 1961 at a
meeting of Party Organizations of the Higher Party
School, The Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU's Central Committee,
identified four general categories of war: world wars,
which would be nuclear and involve the superpowers;
local wars, which are limited wars fought by an
imperialist power against a Third World country, or
between two capitalist countries; wars of national
liberation, which are struggles for independence from
72Rubinstein, p. 86.
73See Cole Blasier, The Giant's Rival , (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
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foreign rule; and popular uprisings, which are internal
struggles pitting "progressive" groups against
"reactionary" groups tied to the imperialist camp. 74
It was argued that wars of national liberation, unlike
local wars, could not escalate to world war, thus
leaving the Soviet Union "free to help colonial peoples
fight against the yoke of imperialism [and] support
liberation movements and still contend they were
adhering to a policy of peaceful coexistence." 75
Similarly, the Soviet's concern with restoring some
unity in the communist world and reasserting Moscow's
leadership over the world communist movement, and thus
counter Mao's challenge to Moscow's authority, led the
Soviets to provide support to bourgeois-nationalist
leaders in the Third World. As Khrushchev's quarrel
with Mao worsened, each side felt impelled to stake out
"correct" doctrinal positions on the Third World,
74Stephen P. Gilbert argues that the difference
between a local war and a war of national liberation is
a political one. "In short, recourse to war by Western
powers or their allies is condemned as local-limited
war; recourse to arms by the newly-independent or
'colonial' peoples, or by communist states or guerrilla
forces in opposition to Western or Western-oriented
regimes, ordinarily receives Soviet approval as a war of
liberation. The same war may be labeled a war of
liberation by the Soviets when referring to the
belligerent that the USSR supports, but may be
classified as a local-limited war when reference is made
to the Western-oriented combatant" (Stephen P. Gilbert,
"Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Policy," Orbis
10 [Fall 1966]: 843).
75Rubinstein, p. 89.
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including attitudes toward liberation struggles. The
Soviet position was that the anti-imperialist
orientation of many new nations and liberation movements
was substantial and sufficient to bind them to the
socialist camp, and their opposition to colonialism and
imperialism justified Soviet assistance and friendship.
Moreover, it was argued that the Chinese had woefully
underestimated the importance of bourgeois-nationalist
movements and what they had already achieved politically
in breaking with imperialism by stressing their non-
socialist character.
All in all, Khrushchev's policy toward national
liberation movements was one of calculated caution, 76
and when Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, the
Soviet Union was only on the periphery of national
liberation struggles, in marked contrast to its
expanding relationships with Third World governments.
"Courtship of anti-American regimes, not involvement in
the efforts of non-ruling revolutionary movements,
dominated Soviet policy in the Third World." 77
Rubinstein argues that 1953 was a key year for
Moscow in its relations with the Third World, as the
76Rubinstein argues this needs to be emphasized
given the very different interpretation of Soviet
desires and actions held by the Kennedy administration
at the time. See Rubinstein, pp. 91-95.
77Ibid.
,
p. 95
.
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change in leadership brought with it a readiness to
explore new approaches to a changing Third World. In
Washington, by contrast, the election of Dwight D.
Eisenhower ushered in an administration determined to
globalize containment and foist it on countries who
neither felt threatened by Soviet attack nor saw
anything emanating from the Soviet Union that
necessitated alliance with the West.
The driving force behind this policy was
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who
sorely misread the mood in the new nations.
By uncritically extending to the Third World a
strategy designed for Europe and the Far East,
he was guilty, much like Stalin, of a rigid
and parochial application of a policy
perfectly good for one place to an environment
for which it was ill-suited. His success in
creating military pacts in the Middle East and
South Asia provided a boon to Moscow. . . .
Khrushchev could not have accomplished as much
so quickly in the mid-1950s without the
inadvertent assistance of Dulles. 78
Khrushchev's first priority was to improve diplomatic
relations with countries on the USSR's southern border:
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. The USSR's foreign
economic assistance program made its debut in
Afghanistan when, on January 27, 1954, Kabul and Moscow
signed an agreement arranging for the construction of
two large grain elevators, a bread baking plant, and a
flour mill, and a Soviet credit of $3.5 million. 79
78Ibid., pp. 40-41.
79 Ibid.
,
p. 42
.
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Soon Moscow was looking beyond its southern tier
neighbors to other Third World countries, as was evident
from the reversal of its previous stand opposing all
United Nations programs for helping less-developed
countries on the grounds that they were dominated by
Western nations and designed to perpetuate Western
investments. "Moscow hoped to publicize the benefits of
Soviet aid and convince the LDCs that Soviet aid would
not be used to subvert existing governments or promote
communist activities within the recipient countries ." 80
Khrushchev's second objective was the exploitation
of regional conflicts in the developing world. The aim
was to gain tangible advantages in areas previously
outside of Moscow's purview. In this quest for
increased influence
the USSR had the advantages of being a new
major power of the Third World scene. It came
with "clean hands," unburdened by a
colonialist past in the Arab world, Southern
Asia, Africa and Latin America; its
imperialist record toward Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan was ignored or claimed irrelevant
by most LDCs. . .
.
[T]he Soviet Union arrived
at the right moment. Its offers of assistance
enabled nationalist leaderships to explore
alternatives to reliance on the West; its
commitment to "socialism" accorded nicely with
the generally positive attitude toward
"socialism" held by most of the founding
fathers of the newly independent bourgeois -
nationalist regimes; and its immediate aims
80Ibid.
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did not conflict with those of prospective
recipients of aid. 81
By the early 1960s the USSR had aid relationships
with twenty-five Third World countries. More than $4
billion of the approximately $6 billion in credits was
allocated for economic assistance and the rest for
military purchases. 82 When Khrushchev was deposed in
October 1964 the Kremlin could look back on a decade of
accomplishment in the Third World: better relations than
ever before with important tier countries (Turkey, Iran,
and Afghanistan)
,
including their recognition that
economic assistance and political normalization depended
on prohibiting the emplacement of U.S. missiles on their
territory; diplomatic ties with all nonaligned
countries; insinuation of a presence in the regional
politics of key areas; expanded economic ties; high-
visibility development projects in countries such as
India, Egypt, and Afghanistan, which stimulated the
interest of other countries; deference of the LDCs to
Soviet policy positions on issues, such as disarmament,
European security, and Eastern Europe, that were not of
central concern to them; and a narrowing of U.S.
options. Rubinstein sums this period up by calling its
81 Ibid.
,
p. 46
.
82 Ibid.
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accomplishments "an impressive list for so short a
period and so limited an involvement." 83
Liberation struggles came to the forefront of
international attention in the mid-1960s. Within six
months after Khrushchev's deposal, the new Kremlin
leadership, headed by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei
Kosygin, was drawn deeply into the liberation struggle
in Vietnam. Pressed by considerations of intra-
communist world politics to expand their support when
the United States bombed North Vietnam and landed the
first major contingent of combat troops in South Vietnam
in March 1965, the Soviet Union promised to strengthen
the military capability of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam and enable the Hanoi government to repel the
imperialists. Similarly, they recognized the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the sole
representative of the people of South Vietnam.
While the United States waged war against a
communist country, Brezhnev and Kosygin were
not willing to stand idly by and leave the
Chinese a clear field in which to challenge
Soviet leadership of the bloc and tarnish
Soviet prestige abroad. 84
While at the Twenty Third Congress of the CPSU,
Brezhnev declared that "there can be no peaceful
83Ibid.
,
p. 47; see also Hosmer and Wolfe.
84Rubinstein, p. 96. The author argues further
that competition with China spurred the USSR's
assistance to liberation struggles in Arab East and
Southern Africa as well.
63
coexistence when it comes to the internal processes of
the national liberation struggle," behind the scenes
Soviet writers were once again faced with the task of
squaring theory with reality. 85 Khrushchev's shift of
Soviet policy away from orthodox Communists toward
bourgeois nationalists greatly improved Soviet influence
and prestige in the Third World; however, there were
critical weaknesses in the policy as well. First, many
of Moscow's Khrushchev-era allies proved highly unstable
and vulnerable to sudden shifts in political fortunes.
As the rule of many Soviet allies tended to be highly
personalistic
,
the removal or defection of a single
leader undermined the entire Soviet position in the
nation concerned. Pro-Soviet governments were
overthrown by military coups in Indonesia and Algeria
(1965), Ghana (1966), and Mali (1968). Second, even
when Soviet friends stayed in power, they tended to be
highly unpredictable and often uncooperative with Soviet
aims despite large inflows of Soviet military
assistance. 86 As Francis Fukuyama says,
85Quoted in Ibid., p. 97.
86Rubinstein points out that since the mid-1960s
the USSR has shifted its commitments away from economic
assistance to military assistance. Rubinstein, pp. 54-
57. See also Melvin A. Goodman, "The Soviet Union and
the Third World: The Military Dimension," in The Soviet
Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades , eds.
Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987), pp. 46-66, for a discussion of
the difficulties the Soviet Union has experienced in
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it would be impossible to establish all the
instances of a Soviet client acting contrary
to Moscow's wishes; every study of Soviet
dealings with particular countries or regimes
lists several. ... With the sole exception
of Cuba, not a single bourgeois nationalist
ally of the Khrushchev era adopted orthodox
Marxism-Leninism as its governing ideology.
The worse case, from the Soviet standpoint,
was Egypt, the centerpiece of Soviet Third
World policy in the fifties and sixties and
the recipient of a total of over $4 billion in
aid, which between 1972 and 1976 defected
altogether to the Western camp. 87
Third, arms transfer and economic aid proved to be an
extremely poor source of leverage over intractable
clients
.
88
As the 1960s progressed, Khrushchev-era optimism
about the likelihood of quick transition to socialism
along the non-capitalist path of development gave way to
increasing skepticism about the reliability of non-
communist Third World states. The problem, according to
Soviet theorist Rostislav U1 'yanovskiy
,
was that in too
many Third World nations progressive forces
failed to create a revolutionary-democratic
organization which would ensure the
reliability of truly revolutionary-democratic
accomplishments . .
.
[relying instead] on a
transforming military aid into political and diplomatic
influence with its allies in the Third World.
87Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third
World," in Fukuyama and Korbonski, p. 27.
88Interestingly
,
these points are made by two
authors of starkly different political and ideological
persuasion. See Fukuyama, pp. 28-29, and Fred Halliday,
From Kabul to Managua: Soviet-American Relations in the
1980s
,
(New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 97-111.
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national leader who, in turn, relied on the
army, the security organ, his clan or his
tribe
.
89
These changed perceptions were accompanied by a
reassessment of Soviet economic involvement in the Third
World and a new policy which promoted parties or
national liberation movements that explicitly based
themselves on Marxist-Leninist ideology. 90 While not
abandoning non-Marxist, bourgeois-nationalists, in
nations where no obvious Marxist-Leninist alternative
existed (Syria, India, Iraq, and Libya in the 1970s),
Soviet theoreticians recognized that, all things being
equal, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state would be
most likely to cooperate reliably with the Soviet bloc.
In the 1970s there was a great upsurge in Soviet
writings on vanguard parties and their importance to the
revolutionary development of Third World states. 91
89Quoted in Fukuyama, p. 30.
90Ibid.
, pp. 30-31.
91These writings made it clear that the Soviets had
expanded the definition of a vanguard party. Prior to
the late 1970s, the Soviet notion of a vanguard party
followed conventional Leninist lines— such a party had
to be an organization of tested cadres with its lower
levels closely subordinated to its upper ones, it also
had to have deep roots in the masses. With the growing
fragmentation of the communist movement, Moscow posited
that a true vanguard party must also accept the Soviet
version of scientific-socialism. Thus self-
classification as a Marxist-Leninist entity would not
qualify a body as a vanguard party unless it met Soviet
standards as well. See David E. Albright, "Vanguard
Parties in the Third World," in The Pattern of Soviet
Conduct in the Third World, ed. Walter Laqueur (New
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Vanguard parties were seen as a means of stabilizing
revolutionary power and institutionalizing the socialist
orientation of a government, permitting it to survive
the whims or the passing of individual Third World
leaders. Vanguard parties were seen as one way of
making local revolutions in some sense irreversible. 92
Centralization of power in the hands of a reliable
political organization was particularly important given
Moscow's declining ability to assist and control the
economic development of its client states. As Elizabeth
Valkenier points out Soviet development economists in
the 1970s increasingly concluded that the traditional
socialist formula for economic development, calling for
rapid nationalization of foreign and private property
and isolation of the economic system from the world
capitalist economy, was inadequate. Developing
countries would actually benefit from a more gradual
transition to socialism similar to that followed during
the period of the New Economic Policy in the USSR during
the 1920s. 93 Francis Fukuyama posits that
whatever the Soviet leadership thought of this
argument on its merits, the notion provided a
convenient justification for the Kremlin's
York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 208-225.
92 Ibid, and Fukuyama, p. 32.
93Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, The Soviet Union and
the Third World: An Economic Bind , (New York: Praeger,
1983) .
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increasing reluctance to foot the bill for
large-scale economic development.
. . .
[Moreover the] existence of a strong vanguard
party potentially allows Moscow to have its
cake and eat it too, with the West assisting
the economic development of Marxist-Leninist
states that remain in political terms closely
aligned with the USSR. 94
Beginning in the early 1970s Soviet theory and
practice converged, as the USSR undertook the promotion
of Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties during the intense
period of Third World activism. Soviet writers were
quite explicit about their growing list of allies in the
Third World and spoke of a second generation of states
very different from those of the Khrushchev era. The
1984 edition of the World Communist Movement , a handbook
of official Soviet positions concerning the worldwide
revolutionary process, states:
It is impossible to speak of two groups of
countries of a socialist orientation and of a
second generation of revolutionary democrats,
who are closer to scientific socialism. The
distinctiveness of the new groups of countries
of a socialist orientation (Algeria, Ethiopia,
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and others) is
that they have to build the economy virtually
from scratch, and that a working class is
springing up in them together with industry.
The political regimes of this group of
countries are distinguished by great clarity
of class positions. A process in which new
revolutionary parties are coming into being,
parties which at their congresses have
declared their adoption of Marxist-Leninist
ideology, is under way there. It is these
94Fukuyama, p. 33.
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Parties which are heading the revolutionary
development
.
95
The Soviets and their allies did not, of course,
abandon their ties with the earlier generation of non-
Marxist clients such as Syria, Libya or India. The
Soviets had invested considerable prestige in these
countries, which were in any case highly important to
Moscow by virtue of their size, wealth or geostrategic
position. Being relatively stable states, they did not
give the Soviets the option of encouraging alternative,
Marxist-Leninist leaderships. Nevertheless, where the
Soviets had a choice, their behavior clearly indicated a
preference for national liberation organizations or
parties proclaiming adherence to orthodox scientific
socialism. 96
95Quoted in Ibid. Fukuyama argues that the list of
second generation Marxist-Leninist clients is actually
longer than the one give here. "Between 1954 and 1984
the number of regimes proclaiming scientific socialism
as their guiding ideology climbed from three (North
Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba) to sixteen (those three
plus Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the PDRY,
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Laos, Kampuchea, Madagascar,
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Benin, and the People's
Republic of Congo) . In addition, Marxist-Leninists were
in power in Grenada until the American invasion in
October 1983, and there were reports of a Communist coup
attempt in Iraq in 1977" (Fukuyama, p. 33). He explains
this proliferation of Soviet allies in terms of an
expansionistic Soviet foreign policy, aided by its
socialist allies
—
particularly Cuba and East Germany.
Others, including Halliday, explained these developments
in terms of autonomous sociopolitical phenomena.
96Fukuyama, pp. 34-35; Albright, pp. 213-225.
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With the exception of the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan, none of the second-generation clients
began their existence as orthodox communist parties but
evolved out of a variety of national liberation fronts
or military juntas that only later proclaimed their
adherence to Marxism-Leninism. In these cases, the
Soviets then encouraged these groups, once in power, to
reorganize themselves as formal Leninist vanguard
parties. This occurred in Mozambique (February 1977),
Angola (December 1977), the PDRY (October 1978), and
Ethiopia (September 1984).
Latin American Communism 1953-1985
From Castro to the Sandinistas
After Stalin's death in March 1953, and with the
enunciation of Khrushchev's new doctrine of "peaceful
coexistence," there emerged a new period of search for
alliances by the Latin American Communist parties. They
offered their support to the democratic governments that
succeeded some of the fallen dictatorships, as in
Argentina with Arturo Frondizi and in Brazil with
Kubitshek. 97 These moves coincided with Khrushchev's
attempt to establish friendly relations with progressive
97See Edme Dominguez, "The Latin American Communist
Movement: Realities and Relations with the Soviet
Union," in The USSR and Latin America: A Developing
Relationship , ed. Eusebio Mujal-Leon (Boston: Unwin
Hymer, 1989), p. 126. See also Munck, pp. 25-29 for a
discussion of the Brazilian Communist Party.
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They alsoregimes in Third World countries."
coincided with a general pessimism, or "geographic
fatalism, " about the prospects for Communist revolution
in Latin America. Khrushchev's notion of a "zone of
peace" in the Third World—comprised on newly
independent nations seeking to break from the
imperialism camp—did not include Latin America, in part
because most Latin American nations had been independent
since the nineteenth century and in part because of the
area's higher level of economic development than that of
Africa and Asia. Moreover, Moscow's primary front
organization for the Third World—the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization—by definition did not
include the region." The overthrow of the Arbenz
government in Guatemala in 1954 served to confirm the
"At the Twenty-First Party Congress, Khrushchev
declared that "those countries that have gained their
national independence need and will continue to need
support from the socialist countries and from all the
progressive forces. The Soviet Union [is] giving and
will go on giving them aid" (quoted in Alberto Daniel
Faleroni
,
"Soviet Strategy in Latin America," in The
Soviet Union and Latin America , eds. J. Gregory Oswald
and Anthony J. Strover [New York: Praeger, 1970],
p. 41) .
"Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet
Penetration of Latin America , (Miami: University of
Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975),
p. 1. See also Hough, pp. 169-177.
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Soviet view of Latin America as an area where American
power severely limited communist opportunities. 100
Prior to the Cuban Revolution of January 1959,
Nikita S. Khrushchev had focused his attention on the
newly independent, ex-colonial countries of Asia and
Africa. In fact Castro's 26 of July Movement, defeated
in its initial assault on the Moncada Army barracks in
July 1953 and returned to Cuba as a guerrilla movement
in December 1956, received no active Soviet backing.
Nor did it receive support from the Cuban Communists
through the Popular Socialist Party. Initially the
Soviets saw Castro as unlikely to succeed, since they
believed that sooner or later he would either be
decimated by the United States or else accommodate to
the imperialists. As late as November 1958 Khrushchev
observed in an interview that everyone remembered the
fate of Guatemala and, even though the Cubans were
heroic in their struggle, they were doomed to fail. 101
Moreover, Castro's guerrilla struggle against
Batista violated what the post-Stalin Soviet leadership
believed was the proper way to achieve socialist
revolution. The debate over the efficacy of armed
100See Herbert S. Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in
Latin America," American Political Science Review 61
(March 1967 ) : 80
.
101Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile
Crisis: October 1962 , (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976), p. 35.
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struggle or political participation in achieving
socialism goes back to the Twentieth Party Congress in
1956, at which Khrushchev argued
In present-day conditions the working class in many
capitalist countries . . . united around itself the
working peasantry, the intellectuals and all the
patriotic forces . . . has an opportunity to defeat
the reactionary anti-popular forces, to win a firm
majority in parliament and to turn the parliament
from an agency of bourgeois democracy into an
instrument of the genuinely popular will. [This]
would create conditions for the working class of
many capitalist and formerly colonial countries to
make fundamental social changes. Of course, in
those countries where capitalism is still strong,
where it possesses a tremendous military and police
machine, a serious resistance by reactionary forces
is inevitable. The transition to socialism in
these countries will take place amid sharp
revolutionary class struggle. 102
Cole Blasier argues that since 1956 the Soviet line
has been clear, "what changes over the years is emphasis
and tone." The Soviet position is that
1) The local Communist parties may take either the
armed or non-armed road, or some combination
thereof. Local conditions determine which road is
followed
.
2) Communists should take the non-armed road if
feasible. If armed opposition appears, the
Communists will probably have to resort to arms to
defend the Revolution. 103
Castro's victory, his unexpected shift to Marxism-
Leninism, and his ability to defy the United States and
to incorporate Cuba into full membership in the Soviet-
led "community of socialist states," constituted in
102Current Digest of the Soviet Press 3
(March 1951 ) : 12 .
103Blasier, p. 76.
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Moscow's view a momentous break in U.S. dominance of
Latin America and appeared to open the way for an
upsurge of pressures for political, social and economic
change on the continent. Khrushchev, speaking in the
wake of Castro's success in repelling the Bay of Pigs
invasion, went so far as to declare the Monroe Doctrine
dead. "The only thing left to do with the Monroe
Doctrine is to bury it just as you would bury anything
dead so it will not poison the air." 104 Similarly the
tone of major programmatic speeches and documents
emanating from Moscow from 1960 onwards reflected a
steady increase in Soviet confidence.
The 1960 Declaration of 81 Communist Parties
asserted that "the victory of the Cuban
Revolution has powerfully stimulated the
struggle of the Latin American peoples for
complete national independence" and opened up
"a front of active struggle against
imperialism" in that region. At the 23rd
Congress of the Communist Part of the Soviet
Union in March 1966, Brezhnev made "special
mention" of the "courageous liberation
struggle" in Latin America and declared that
"today in every country in that continent, the
people are waging a struggle against U.S.
imperialism and its accomplices." [Similarly]
the main document adopted by the International
Communist Conference on June 17, 1969 declared
that not only had Cuba established the first
socialist state on the American continent but
that "in this part of the world, militant,
democratic, anti-imperialist movements and
104Quoted in T. S. Cheston and B. Loeffke, Aspects
of Soviet Policy Toward Latin America . (New York: MSS
Information Corporation, 1974), p. 63.
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revolutionary processes are developing which
pave the way to socialism." 105
This hopeful rhetoric notwithstanding, the early
and mid-1960s were years of disagreement between the
Cuban leadership—Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara—and
Moscow over the question of how best to bring revolution
to Latin America. 106 Castro and Guevara advocated the
export of guerrilla-style revolution while the Soviets
urged restraint. For Moscow, Castro's eagerness to
export revolution and the presence of revolution-prone
leftists in Latin America represented a real dilemma.
On the one hand, Moscow believed that the
Cuban experience was sui generis, and that
less militant tactics were apt to prove more
useful elsewhere on the continent. On the
other hand, Moscow was interested in
maintaining influence over these sundry groups
[and making certain Castro would not edge]
closer to Maoism . . . taking with him the
entire gallimaufry of Castroist parties in
Latin America. 107
Hence, in late 1964, in what has come to be called the
"Havana Compromise," Moscow gave its endorsement to the
strategy of armed struggle, albeit in only five Latin
105Goure and Rothenberg, p. 2. For similar
statements see Faleroni, pp. 40-58.
106See Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alvez, "Moscow
and the Revolutionary Left in Latin America," Orbis 28
(Summer 1984): 344-346.
107Ibid. pp. 344-345.
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American countries Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras,
Paraguay and Haiti. 108
There is, however, little evidence of direct Soviet
aid to advocates of armed struggle in this period, and
despite Cuba's support for guerrillas in Colombia,
Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru and Nicaragua, Moscow
preferred to pursue the normalization of diplomatic
relations and trade—even with the anti-Castro
governments of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and
Venezuela. 109 Moscow, in effect, denied that Latin
America was ripe for revolution and, together with its
loyal communist parties, insisted on the possibility of
a peaceful path to power. Pravda criticized Castro
repeatedly for "petit bourgeois revolutionism" and
Castro replied in kind, assailing Moscow, in a 1967
speech, for its policy of Detente and lashing out at the
Latin American Communist Parties loyal to Moscow. 110
By the late 1960s the armed struggle in Venezuela
had evaporated, the Peruvian guerrillas had been
108See Blasier, pp. 87-92.
109Ramet and Lopez-Alvez, p. 345. See also
Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," p. 80; W.
Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America: New
Opportunities and Old Constraints," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 2 6 ( May 1984) :
165-168; and, Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The
Limits of Charisma , (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974),
p. 137.
110Ramet and Lopez-Alvez, p. 346.
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destroyed, the Colombian guerrilla movement had withered
away
,
and the Brazilian leftist urban insurgency had
collapsed. 111 These developments had little impact on
Moscow as it had refused to help these insurgents.
Indeed, at the CPSU's Twenty-Third Congress in 1966, the
policy of incorporating Latin American Communist parties
into wide political fronts was reasserted. This policy
of fronts was, in turn, approved by the last Conference
of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969. 112 Moscow
blamed setbacks in several countries on "ultraleftists"
who, according to Pravda,
have completely discarded the Marxist-Leninist
theory of the socialist revolution
[since] ... in their opinion, armed struggle
can be called into being artificially at any
time in any country, regardless of conditions.
[T]hese leftist schismatic groups . .
.
[have]
nothing in common with communism and
[coincide] completely with the platform of the
Trotskyite groups. 113
Soviet optimism was stimulated in the late 1960s
and early 1970s by the rise of regimes in Peru, Panama,
Ecuador and Honduras which were favorably inclined
inSee Benedict Cross, "Marxism in Venezuela,"
Problems of Communism 22 (November /December 1973): 51-
71; and Riordan Roett, "Brazilian Communism: A History
of Failure," Problems of Communism 25 ( January/February
1976): 77-81.
112See Augusto Varas, "Ideology and Politics in
Latin American-USSR Relations," Problems of Communism 33
( January/February 1984): 38-39.
113Pravda, November 20, 1968. Quoted in Ramet and
Lopez-Alvez, p. 346.
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toward cooperation with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the
election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile in
autumn 1970 seemed to vindicate Brezhnev's gradualist
policy in Latin America. Augusto Varas argues that
despite the sparse economic support it provided to
Allende, the USSR saw in Chile's experience a model that
the Third World could follow without risking a military
confrontation with the United States.
The Chilean case seemed to show that, even in
an area so sensitive for U.S. interests, the
USSR could gain regional positions befitting
both its revolutionary expectations and its
limited capacity for providing financial or
other economic assistance—and all without
adverse effects on Moscow's relations with
Washington
.
114
In an article for the CPSU organ Kommunist, Boris
Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the
Central Committee Secretariat, argued that
the victory of the National Unity Bloc in
Chile, the progressive changes in Peru and the
serious successes achieved by the
revolutionary struggle in Uruguay and several
other countries lead us to believe that the
revolutionary process here is continuing to
develop at a pace faster than in other parts
of the non-socialist world. This is truly a
continent in upheaval. 115
Ponomarev drew several conclusions from Allende 's
accession, among them that communist collaboration with
socialists in electoral coalitions can produce electoral
114Varas, p. 42.
115
"Characteristics of the Revolutionary Process in
Latin America," in Cheston and Loeffke, p. 31.
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canvictory and that socialist-communist governments
take power by peaceful means. 116
After the military coup that removed Allende from
power
,
Moscow reasserted its position on gradualism and
armed struggle. Its conclusions were stated by
Ponomarev in mid-1974. According to Ponomarev, the
Chilean reversal was attributable in part to the Popular
Unity government's inability to "promptly change forms
of struggle" in order to "repel the counter-
revolutionary violence of the bourgeoisie." "The events
in Chile," Ponomarev argued,
are a reminder of the need to approach the
issue of the peaceful, non-armed road to a
victorious revolution from a correct Leninist
position. The peaceful development of the
revolution is guaranteed not only by an
alignment of social forces under which the
bourgeoisie would not venture to start a civil
war, but by the constant preparedness of the
revolutionary vanguard and the masses—in deed
and not in words—to use the boldest means of
struggle should the situation require it. 117
116 Ibid., pp. 33-34. Cheston and Loeffke point out
that while some Soviet experts in Moscow's Latin
American Institute were optimistic about the prospects
for Allende 's program, others—especially those in the
Institute of World Economic and International Relations-
-predicted it would be overthrown by a military coup.
Cheston and Loeffke, p. 80.
117Boris Ponomarev, "The World Situation and the
Revolutionary Process," World Marxist Review 17
(June 1974): 10-11. Similarly, Jerry Hough argues that
the general consensus among Soviet observers of Latin
America, in the wake of Allende 's overthrow, was that
the recourse to extra-legal means should not have been
eschewed. See Jerry Hough, "The Evolving Soviet Debate
on Latin America," Latin American Research Review 16
(Spring, 1981): 131-132.
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Moreover, as Jerry Hough points out, some within the
Soviet Union attributed Allende's fall to the Popular
Unity government's inability to engage in greater
political compromise, collaboration and alliances with
parties representing the peasants and the middle strata,
especially the Christian Democrats. According to Irina
Zorina, a specialist on Chile, Allende's regime was
excessively radical and thus was unable to create a
democratic transformation whose substance and
gradualness would have made it acceptable to the
political center as well as the radicals.
The participation of the Christian Democrats
would not have hindered the enactment of the
planned program of democratic transformation
but could have achieved its full realization
and made it really irreversible. 118
In assessments of the lessons of Allende's Chile
published in World Marxist Review , leading Chilean
communists did not repudiate the validity of that road
in the Chilean case by pointing out that Allende was
elected to the Presidency and important strides forward
were made during his tenure. 119 They also reaffirmed
118Hough, The Struggle for the Third World , pp. 136-
137.
119See V. Teitelboum, "Reflections on the 1,000 Days
of Popular Unity Rule," World Marxist Review 20 (January
1977): 50-62; O. Milas, "Stages of the Struggle," World
Marxist Review 20 (February 1977): 50-62; Hugo Fazio,
"New Front of the Struggle Against Imperialism, " World
Marxist Review 20 (June 1977): 84-93; Gladys Marin,
"Lessons of Chile: The Working Class and its Policy of
Alliance," World Marxist Review 20 (July 1977): 63-75.
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their policy of moderation and support for Allende
against the ultra-leftist MIR party. The Chilean
communists were equally emphatic that the Chilean
experience does not and should not indicate that the
peaceful and violent roads to revolution are mutually
exclusive. Instead they emphasize that the Chilean
experience shows the need at times to combine methods
and be prepared to switch flexibly from one to another
as circumstances dictate. 120
By the mid-1970s (before 1979) Soviet leaders
concerned with Latin America surveyed the continent and
found no attractive opportunities to come to power
either peacefully or by force, and Latin American
Communist parties were counseled to orient themselves
against U.S. imperialism in order to carry out
"democratic" revolution—that is, the achievement of
broad economic and political rights for the masses.
Such a revolution, it was thought, would provide the
Communist parties with the best opportunity of expanding
their political influence while protecting them from the
Right. "Democratic" revolution was perceived as a stage
which would precede the socialist revolution. 121 This
was to be achieved through the creation of "wide anti-
120Luis Corvalan, "The Lessons of Chile," World
Marxist Review 21 (January 1978): 34-48.
121See Blasier
,
p. 94. See also Hough, The Struggle
for the Third World , pp. 136-140.
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imperialist and democratic coalitions, popular
fronts . " 122
In describing the strategies of the various Latin
American Communist parties, the Soviet specialists
divided the countries as of 1978 into three categories:
1) where patriotic circles of the armed forces are in
power and are carrying out an anti-imperialist and
democratic transformation (e.g. Peru, Panama); 2) where
liberal reformist bourgeois circles are in power (e.g.
Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Argentina);
and 3) military dictatorships (e.g. Chile, Brazil,
Bolivia, Paraguay, Guatemala, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and
Haiti) . 123 In the first instance the Communist parties
sought the widest possible alliance of "progressive"
military, worker, and peasant forces and supported the
"progressive" measures of the government, thereby
seeking to promote the further transformation of
society. In the countries with liberal reformist
governments, communist strategy was
to unite the democratic and patriotic forces,
isolate the right and liquidate the threat of
coups d'etat, [and] preserve and expand
122M. F. Kudachkin, The Great October T Revolution]
and the Communist Parties of Latin America , p. 80,
quoted in Blasier, p. 94. Blasier argues that
Kudachkin' s work is the most authoritative treatment of
the strategies of Latin American Communist parties in
the late 1970s.
123Blasier, pp. 94-95.
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democratic freedoms and the social
achievements of the people. 124
In countries governed by military dictatorships the main
task of communists is "to promote the formation of wide
anti-dictatorial and anti-fascist fronts designed to
overthrow reactionary regimes, establish citizens'
rights, and achieve a matured socio-economic
transformation" while also supporting revolutionary
guerrilla movements wherever possible. 125
With the victory of the Frente Sandinista in
Nicaragua in July 1979, the policy of broad fronts and
the peaceful road to socialism had to be rethought. The
overthrow of Somoza and the seizure of power by the
Nicaraguan guerrillas was a pleasant surprise for the
Soviet Union in that the Sandinistas came to power
without any direct support from the Soviets or the
124Kudachkin, quoted in Ibid., p. 95.
125Ibid., p. 96 and Jiri Valenta and Virginia
Valenta, "Soviet Strategy and Policies in the Caribbean
Basin," in Rift and Revolution: The Central American
Imbroglio , ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1984), pp. 197-252.
Blasier posits that the list of military
dictatorships falls into two categories: those with
which the USSR has diplomatic relations and those with
which it does not. Focusing on Brazil, in the former
category, and Guatemala, in the latter, Blasier
intimates that Communist parties in nations that have
diplomatic relations with Moscow are more reformist
—
that is, they seek a freer political climate in which
they can reorganize and broaden their political
following—while parties in the latter group are more
revolutionary. See Blasier, pp. 96-102.
83
Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN)
,
thus showing how
wrong the Moscow-sponsored strategy of the peaceful road
had been. The PSN followed the prevailing conciliatory
line that characterized pro-Soviet Latin American
Communist parties at the time, repudiating armed
struggle as "ultra-leftist" and "Castroite" extremism.
Its policy toward the Frente Sandinista was one of self-
restraint and caution. 126
The Soviets were quick to draw conclusions from the
Sandinista victory, and in 1980 the pages of America
Latina "brightened noticeably as an aroused bureaucracy
once again could see opportunities in the Americas." 127
Sergo Mikoyan, editor of America Latina , writing in the
wake of "the gratifying surprise of Nicaragua
—
impossible to predict a year previously," argued that
armed struggle has become the path of success in Central
America. 128 Similarly, Boris Koval, in the March 1980
issue of America Latina , wrote
the Nicaraguan experience has demolished the
previous simplistic interpretation of
guerrilla actions, confirmed the justice of
many of Che Guevara's strategic principles,
126See Ramet and Lopez-Alvez, p. 351; Edme
Dominguez, pp. 134-136.
127Blasier, p. 100.
128Sergio Mikoyan, "Las Particularidades de la
Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el punto de
Vista de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina , no. 3 (1980): 103.
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and crystallized his idea of creating a
powerful popular guerrilla movement. 129
In the same issue, N. Leonov underlined the conclusion
that "the armed road ... is the most promising in the
specific conditions of most of the Latin American
countries . ” 130
In general, the lesson of the FSLN victory in
Nicaragua for many communists, was that the communists
should subordinate themselves to their one-time rivals,
the radical nationalists, in order to create
revolutionary coalitions capable of achieving guerrilla
victory. As Blasier posits, the communists have learned
that "if [they] can't beat these radical nationalists,
it is better to join them." 131 Accordingly, the
Communist Party of El Salvador, led by Shafik Jorge
Handal, opted for armed struggle and swung into line
behind the Popular Forces of Liberation Farabundo Marti
(FMLN) in late 197 9. 132 General Secretary Handal, not
wanting to be outmaneuvered as was the PSN, said "Our
decision is a bit late, but we're in time." The timing
129Quoted in Robert S. Leiken, Soviet Strategy in
Latin America
.
(New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 34.
130Ibid.
131Blasier, p. 99.
132See Edme Dominguez, p. 136-138.
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of the Party's action assured Handal a place on the
coordinating committee leading the revolt. 133
The degree to which the policy of Latin American
Communists joining radical revolutionary fronts is
applicable or desirable outside of Central America is
contentious. A series of articles in World Marxist
Review in 1982 intimate that Moscow viewed Chile,
Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Paraguay as
ripe for revolution. 134 However Blasier argues that
Soviet policy had by no means given up the peaceful
road. On the contrary, it remained the preferred
strategy, however strategies were to be determined by
"objective conditions" in the country concerned. As
Blasier says,
it is now possible to envisage at least three
models of Communist strategy in Latin America,
vis-a-vis old regimes: 1) Military
dictatorships, type 1. There will be explicit
or tacit collaboration with military
dictatorships having important economic ties
to the USSR and support for a civil-military
solution. The Communist party will have
limited opportunities to recruit, circulate
publications, and compete in certain
133See "Armed Struggle is the Only Road Left,"
Information Bulletin of the World Marxist Review , no. 14
(1980): 43-46.
134See Eduardo Viera, "The Political Climate is
Changing," World Marxist Review 25 (January 1982): 64-
67; Raul Vidal, "For the Chilean People's Freedom and
Happiness," World Marxist Review 25 (February 1982): 39-
40; "Latin America: Decade with a Hard Beginning," World
Marxist Review 25 (March 1982): 19-25; and "Dramatic
Stage in the History of a Continent," World Marxist
Review 25 (May 1982): 15-23.
86
elections. Example: Argentina before 1983.
2) Democratic reformist regimes. Communists
will follow the peaceful road. They will
accept the constitutional order, compete for
votes and popular support, and collaborate
closely with other legal leftist parties.
Example: Venezuela. 3) Military
dictatorships, type 2. There will be armed
revolutionary opposition. Communists will
collaborate with, and where possible
participate in revolutionary leadership. . . .
Example: El Salvador before 1982. 135
Similar conclusions are reached by Rodney Arismendi,
long-time leader of Uruguay's Communist party. He
argues that the FSLN victory in Nicaragua does not
invalidate the Chilean experience. On the contrary, the
real possibilities of the peaceful road to socialism
have increased despite the insurrectional triumph in
Nicaragua
.
136
135Blasier, p. 101.
136Rodney Arismendi, "La Primavera Popular en
Nicaragua ," Revista Internacional , August 1980: 30.
Quoted in Munck, p. 130.
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CHAPTER 3
GORBACHEV: PERESTROIKA AND
FOREIGN POLICY NEW THINKING
In practice, Brezhnev's promotion of Marxist-
Leninist Vanguard Parties had been a mixed blessing for
the Soviet Union.
On the one hand, such parties indeed
cooperated closely with the Soviet bloc,
signing friendship and cooperation treaties
with Moscow, permitting relatively free air
and naval access to the Soviet military,
supporting sympathetic national liberation
movements and participating in the socialist
"collective security system," voting with the
USSR in the United Nations, and so forth. On
the other hand, these regimes have tended to
be weak and narrowly based, lacking the broad
nationalist legitimacy of the first generation
of clients and heavily dependent on Soviet
bloc support for their initial rise to power
or their ability to remain in place, or
both. 1
A growing awareness of the problematic character of
their recent Third World achievements, coupled with the
increased tension and higher risk in the post-detente,
Reagan administration era, the tenacity and costs of the
Afghan problem, and serious domestic economic
difficulties led the post-Brezhnev leadership to adopt a
Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third
World," in The Soviet Union and the Third World: The
Last Three Decades , eds. Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej
Korbonski (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987),
p. 37 .
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Soviet Union-first" position in its relations with the
Third World. 2
This "Soviet Union-first" orientation will be most
clearly seen in Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy new
thinking. As detailed below, Soviet new thinking in
foreign policy reconsiders the character of national
security in the nuclear era and posits that, since
nuclear war cannot under any circumstances be won,
national security must be achieved through both military
and political means. Most important for the
revolutionary Left in Latin America, new thinking also
entails a revision of the concept of peaceful
coexistence. With the rise to power of Gorbachev,
peaceful coexistence is viewed less as a form of class
struggle and more as a long-lasting condition of states
with different social and political systems living
together peacefully. Theorists of Soviet new thinking
will posit further, that peaceful coexistence is made
more imperative by the growing interdependence of
international relations.
These positions have their roots in two
interrelated developments: a Soviet economic crisis
which could no longer be ignored; and the need to
2See Ibid., p. 38; Fred Halliday, From Kabul to
Managua
,
(New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 102-112; and,
Galia Golan, "Moscow and Third World Liberation
Movements: The Soviet Role," Journal of International
Affairs 1 (January 1987): 303-324.
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improve relations with the West. The Gorbachev
leadership hopes that improved relations with the West
will allow the Soviet Union to reduce its expenditures
on military preparedness, focus more of its limited
resources on the domestic economy, and to enjoy
increased economic assistance from Western nations.
In their search for a modus vivendi with the United
States, the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev has
engaged in a policy of "strategic retreat" from the
Third World. This policy is characterized by a lack of
interest in winning new spheres of influence in the
Third World, and by reconsidering relations with
existing Third World allies. The Soviet Union's
strategic retreat has been accompanied by a search for
conflict resolution in the Third World, especially in
areas where the USSR is in conflict with U.S. interests.
In Latin America these developments have meant that the
USSR has reconsidered its support to "anti-imperialist"
and anti-American forces and has abandoned its
confrontational attitude toward the West. 3
Soviet Policy from Andropov to Gorbachev
Soviet theorists were the first to articulate the
"Soviet Union-first" position; however with the ascent
3Sergei Tagor, Perestroika and Soviet-Latin
American Relations , (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson
Center Working Papers, 1991).
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to power of Yuriy Andropov, the changes apparent earlier
in the theoreticians' works began to emerge in
leadership pronouncements. Beginning in 1981, a number
of articles appeared which argued that by insuring the
favorable conditions for building Communism in the USSR,
and by defending the USSR's state interests, the
position of world socialism is strengthened—the Soviet
Union-first position. 4 Other articles, written by
economists, implied that the economic problems of the
Soviet bloc necessitated a rethinking of its overseas
role, and invoked Lenin's statement that "the socialist
countries would mainly influence the world revolutionary
process through their economic successes." 5
Fukuyama argues that skepticism about the viability
of Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties is especially
pronounced in the works of Karen Brutents, one of the
two Central Committee International Department deputies
responsible for the Third World. Brutents does not
criticize Vanguard Parties explicitly, "but rather damns
them with faint praise and shows a considerably greater
interest in the non-Marxist parts of the Third World." 6
4See K. N. Brutents, "A Great Force of Modern
Times," International Affairs , no. 2 (February
1981): 83-84; and A. Gromyko, "The Imperialist Threat To
Africa," International Affairs , no. 7 (July 1981): 47-
50.
5See Golan, p. 304 especially footnotes 5 and 6.
6Fukuyama, p. 40.
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In a February 2, 1982 Pravda article Brutents argues
that there exists a
solid base for the Soviet Union's cooperation
with liberated countries where capitalist
relations are developing but which pursue a
policy of defending and strengthening national
sovereignty in politics and economics. 7
Noting the "contradictions" which exist between the
liberated nations and the imperialist states, he
supports increased Soviet cooperation with nations like
Brazil, Mexico, and India, suggesting that these
nations, while not socialist-oriented nor governed by
Vanguard Parties, provide the more fertile ground for
Soviet policy. Brutents takes these themes even further
in a February 1984 article in Kommunist in which he
argues that
the development of capitalist relations in the
liberated countries does not nullify [the
contradictions between them and the
imperialist states] and does not directly
contribute to consolidating the position of
imperialism. 8
Another source of skepticism about the
inevitability of socialism in the Third World was
Secretary General Yuriy Andropov himself, who in his
June 1983 speech to the Central Committee echoed the
line of many Soviet Third World theoreticians. "It is
one thing to proclaim socialism as one's aim and quite
7 Ibid.
,
pp. 40-41
.
8Quoted in Ibid., p. 41.
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another to build it. For this," Andropov claimed, "a
certain level of productive forces, culture and social
consciousness are needed." While sympathizing with
states of a socialist orientation, he noted "the
complexity of their position and the difficulties of
their revolutionary development" and added that Soviet
help would be "to the extent of our possibilities," but
that ultimately these states had to rely on
themselves. 9 This and other statements by Andropov
suggest an unhappiness with the activist Third World
policy that characterized the late Brezhnev years in
general and a disillusionment with the socialist-
oriented countries in particular. 10 The brief
Chernenko period did witness some return in Soviet
leadership pronouncements concerning national liberation
movements and the need to assist them; however,
Gorbachev has returned to Andropov's Soviet Union-first
position
.
The Gorbachevian Synthesis in Soviet Foreign Policy
Jerry Hough argues that the rise to power of
Mikhail Gorbachev signals the start of a process whereby
an older generation of leaders whose "mental world" is
dominated by "old suspicions of Western ideas,
9Quoted in Golan, p. 306.
10Fukuyama, p. 41.
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influences
,
and markets" is being replaced by a younger
generation with a different world view.
Gorbachev's generation . . . took
industrialization for granted and did not find
urban life as upsetting as Stalin's and
Brezhnev's generations did . . . Soviet youth
since the 1950s have not seen Western ideas as
satanic. Instead they have been fascinated by
jazz and blue jeans and Western films and the
thought of travel to the West. 11
This new generation of leaders, led by Gorbachev
and working in a context characterized by the growth of
a middle class wanting change, an economic system that
does not work well, and a political leadership
increasingly frustrated by its lack of control over the
bureaucracy, has argued in favor of modernizing the
Soviet Union—moving it beyond the xenophobia and anti-
Western posture characteristic of the nation since the
Bolshevik Revolution--and opening it to the West. Since
1985, significant change in Soviet domestic politics has
occurred. Similarly, "a revolution is under way in
Soviet foreign policy greater than any in the postwar
period," one which is "altering the assumptions by which
the Soviets explain the functioning of international
politics and from which they derive the
11Jerry Hough, "The End of Russia's 'Khomeini'
Period," World Policy Journal 4 (Fall 1987): 588.
concepts underlying the deeper pattern of their
actions . " 12
Gorbachev's actions and statements, particularly
since the Twenty-Seventh Communist Party Congress in
February /March 1986, suggest that his foreign policy
perspectives differ fundamentally from those of his
predecessors and are reshaping the ways in which Moscow
deals with the outside world. A number of remarkable
statements and actions--acceptance of the U.S. "zero
option" on the INF issue, acceptance in several arms
control fora of intrusive on-site verification,
delinking the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan
from the character of the Kabul government, the quick
settlement of a decades-long boundary dispute with
Sweden in January 1988, a major declaration of support
for the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities,
as well as the announced unilateral reduction of the
Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men—suggest the scope of
change in Soviet foreign policy attitudes under
Gorbachev.
The "new political thinking" may be seen as a
determined effort by the Gorbachev leadership to
redefine the nature of the international environment
12Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1988/89): 82.
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the USSR. The key elements of Soviet new
thinking on foreign and security policy may be
summarized as follows:
1) Nuclear war cannot under any circumstances
be won; nuclear weapons therefore cannot be an
instrument of policy.
2) Security cannot be obtained through
military means alone; further, security in the
nuclear age is mutual in character and must
rely strongly on political means.
3) The rejection of nuclear deterrence as a
durable guarantor of peace. Strategic parity,
seen as an historical success for socialism,
could cease to be a factor for stability in
the face of an unregulated arms competition.
4) A revision of the concept of peaceful
coexistence, which is seen less as a form of
class struggle . . . and increasingly as a
long-lasting condition in which states with
different social and political systems will
have to learn to live with each other for the
indefinite future.
5) Increasing recognition of the multipolar
and interdependent character of contemporary
international relations. 14
A number of factors and trends converged in the
mid-1980s which led to the "Gorbachevian synthesis"
“However it would be incorrect, argue some
analysts, to assume that these new ideas were originated
by the Gorbachev leadership. Many of the tenets of new
thinking found "lucid expression by influential Soviet
policy analysts in the pre-Gorbachev era." Indeed,
according to Allen Lynch, "the emerging Soviet world
view represents a synthesis of tendencies present in
Soviet policy circles since the Twentieth Party Congress
in 1956." See Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of
International Relations
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 19; see also William E.
Odom, "How Far Can Reform Go?" Problems of Communism 36
(November/December 1987): 18-33.
“Lynch, p. xvii. See also Ye. Primakov, Pravda,
July 10, 1987, p. 4 in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 39 (1987): 1-4.
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referred to as Soviet foreign policy new thinking.
First
,
by the mid-1980s it was no longer possible for
Soviet leaders to ignore the economic crisis facing the
Soviet system. Gorbachev euphemistically called the
situation a "pre-crisis phenomenon," meaning that the
survival of socialism was probably not in danger, but
the USSR's capacity to meet its domestic and foreign
policy objectives was.
At the ideological plenum of the Central
Committee on February 18, 1988 Gorbachev said
that, omitting the sales of oil abroad and of
alcohol at home from calculations of growth as
non-productive factors, "practically over four
five-year plan periods there was no increase
in the absolute increment of the national
income, and it even began to decline in the
early eighties." That is, for nearly a
quarter century the Soviet economy suffered
from progressively decreasing growth rates and
then, in the early eighties, plunged into a
defacto depression. 15
The Gorbachev leadership has thus concluded, and has
repeatedly made explicit to both foreign and domestic
audiences, that the USSR's international relationships
are not to be a distraction from the prime task of
modernizing at home and wherever possible should be a
positive inducement to it. Foreign Minister Eduard
15Lynch, p. xxii. See also Abel Aganbegyan, "The
Economics of Perestroika," International Affairs
(London) 64 (Spring 1988): 179-185. Mr Aganbegyan is
Head of the Economics Department of the USSR Academy of
Sciences and chief economic adviser to Mikhail
Gorbachev. In this article Mr. Aganbegyan describes the
immediate and more long-term economic problems which
have prompted the need for fundamental reorganization in
the USSR.
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Shevardnadze has announced that the main requirement of
Soviet foreign policy
is that our country should not bear additional
expenditures in connection with the necessity
of supporting our defense capability and the
defense of our legitimate foreign policy
interests. That means we must seek paths to
the limitation and reduction of military
rivalry, to the removal of confrontational
moments in relations with other states, to the
clamping down of conflicts and crises. 16
Moreover, Gorbachev has been searching for structures of
stability in critical areas like arms control so as to
free scarce resources which can be devoted to the
domestic economy.
The need for such stability assumes double
importance for Gorbachev, since instability in
the USSR's foreign relations will affect not
only the politics of resource allocation but
the viability of Gorbachev's own political
position, which assumes that far-reaching
reform at home is consistent with the USSR's
geopolitical presence abroad. 17
Second, the Gorbachev leadership has concluded that
a favorable international environment can be created
only on a political basis with the leading industrial
16Quoted in David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New
Thinking," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1988-89): 78.
17Lynch, p. xxiii. Interestingly, one of the ways
Gorbachev has attempted to silence those critical of his
arms control proposals and his other actions aimed at
decreasing international militarization has been to
argue that the fundamental nature of imperialism may be
changing and that imperialism is restrained not merely
by Soviet power but also by processes internal to
imperialism. See Ibid, p. xxxiv; see also Margot Light,
The Soviet Theory of International Relations , (New York:
St Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 310-311.
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powers
,
especially the United States. According to
Gorbachev,
the character of present-day weapons leaves
any country no hope of safeguarding itself
solely with military and technical means, for
example, by building a defense system, even
the most peaceful one. The task of ensuring
security is ... a political problem, and it
can only be resolved by political means. . . .
In the context of relations between the USSR
and the USA, security can only be
mutual. ... It is vital that all should feel
equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of
the nuclear age generate unpredictability in
politics and concrete actions. 18
Lynch argues that the Reagan administration's
opposition to detente with the Soviet Union— a position
shared by many on the political right and center
—
coupled with NATO's deployment of intermediate range
nuclear missiles after November 1983, left the Soviet
leadership with no other option but to attempt
accommodation with the U.S.
Traditional Soviet ways of countering U.S.
pressure, i.e., by appealing over the heads of
governments to populations and attempting to
play both halves of NATO against the other,
were clearly not working. What was to be
done? 19
With remarkable tenacity, Gorbachev sought to a
achieve a modus vivendi with the United States. To
18
"The Political Report of the Central Committee of
the CPSU to the Party Congress of the CPSU, Moscow,
February 25, 1986," in Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Toward a
Better World
,
(New York: Richardson and Steirman, 1987),
p. 159.
19Lynch, p. xxi.
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achieve it, Soviet thinkers have revised the concept of
peaceful coexistence.
Key Soviet policy analysts now interpret
peaceful coexistence less as a form of class
struggle—the traditional Soviet viewpoint
—
and more as a long lasting condition in which
states with different social and political
systems will have to learn how to live with
each other for the indefinite future. 20
Peaceful coexistence is no longer considered a
"breathing spell" in the international class struggle,
but rather is seen as a permanent condition of
international life which allows "global problems"—the
arms race, ecological problems. Third World development-
-to be resolved on a collaborative basis.
"The time has come," Mikhail Gorbachev announced in
the Political Report to the Twenty-Seventh Soviet Party
Congress, "to realize thoroughly the harsh realities of
our day: nuclear weapons harbor a hurricane which is
capable of sweeping the human race from the face of the
earth." 21 Similarly, Americanologist Georgi Arbatov
argues that "in the past we did not realize, as we
realize now, the limited possibilities of the use of
military power," as a result, "our national security
policy overemphasized military means." 22
20Ibid., p. xxiv.
21
"The Political Report . . . , " in Gorbachev,
p. 157.
22Quoted in Legvold, p. 92.
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Since the rise to power of Gorbachev there has been
a major reexamination of security issues and an official
confirmation by Gorbachev and the Soviet military that
nuclear war cannot under any circumstances be won. 23
Security in the nuclear age is said to be mutual in
character and, given the destructive potential of modern
weapons, a common concern of all countries. Moreover,
Soviet policy analysts and Gorbachev himself reject
nuclear weapons as a durable guarantor of peace. They
claim that even nuclear parity, which they consider a
major historical achievement of socialism, could cease
to be a determining factor for stability in the face of
an unregulated arms competition between East and
West. 24 Lynch argues that
the promulgation of the Strategic Defense
Initiative in March 1983 appears to have
encouraged a reevaluation of the concept of
military-nuclear parity (and by extension of
defense sufficiency) by plausibly (to Soviet
observers at the time) threatening the
political significance of the USSR's
accumulated investment in nuclear-charged
23For a more detailed discussion of new thinking
and Soviet security, nuclear weapons and disarmament see
Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach to
Security," World Policy Journal 3 (Fall 1986): 561-599;
see also Gerhard Wettig, "New Thinking on Security and
East-West Relations," Problems of Communism 37
(March/April 1988): 1-14.
24See Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Gorbachev, The New
Thinking of Soviet Foreign-Security Policy and the
Military: Recent Trends and Implications," in
Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments , eds.
Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura (New York: Aldine de
Gruyer, 1988), pp. 128-133.
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ballistic missiles. Initially, many Soviet
observers embraced (for the first time) the
desirability of the condition of mutual
assured destruction, for the medium term, and
later began to question the relationship
between parity and stability. 25
Nuclear arms control has thus assumed priority as a
means of reducing the external threat, limiting resource
requirements for the military, and establishing a
framework of stability in East-West strategic
relations
.
26
The final factor leading to the rise of new
political thinking is Gorbachev's increasing recognition
of the multipolar and interdependent character of
contemporary international relations. 27 This view has
already reflected itself in a Soviet tendency to deal
directly with key regional actors, such as China and
Japan in the Far East, Egypt and Israel in the Middle
East, and Mexico in Central America. 28 Moreover, it
25Lynch, p. xxi.
“See "Televised Speech on Foreign Policy, Moscow,
August 18, 1986," in Gorbachev, pp. 363-372.
“Alexander Dallin points out that "for a long time
[the term interdependence] and its implications (so
alien to the belief in the victory of one world system
over the other) had been rebuffed in Moscow, indeed, at
one point it had been denounced as a subversive Western
import. Now, on the contrary, it too serves to
underscore the shared priorities that . . . are said to
come before the class struggle, class interests or the
class approach" (Alexander Dallin, "Gorbachev's Foreign
Policy and the vNew Political Thinking' in the Soviet
Union," in Juviler and Kimura, p. 102).
“Lynch, p. xxv.
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was the recognition of global interdependence,
underlined in the starkest form by nuclear weapons which
threaten "the very survival of the human race," which
led to the redefinition of the Leninist concept of
peaceful coexistence. 29
The concepts of multipolarity and interdependence
have crystallized in Gorbachev's new thinking about the
Third World and have engendered what Elizabeth Kridl
Valkenier has called a "hands-off" approach to radical
change in the Third World. 30 The party program adopted
by the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986
illustrates that new thinking regarding the Third World
is taking place. 31 The new program replaces the 1961
text that was "suffused with Khrushchev's confidence" in
29 Ibid. A rather obscure quote from an early
(1899) Lenin draft of a Party program has come to
justify the new Soviet concern with interdependence.
Lenin wrote that the common interests of mankind are
higher than the class interests of the proletariat.
Gorbachev has adopted this assertion, and he himself has
argued in favor of "the priority of the interests of
social development, of all human values, over the
interests of one or another class." See Dallin, p. 102.
30Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Soviet Thinking
About the Third World," World Policy Journal 4
(Fall 1987) : 651-674.
31Alvin Z . Rubinstein argues however that the brief
treatment of the Third World at the Twenty-Seventh
Congress— "a mere 150 words touched on Third World
issues, and two-thirds of these spoke of Afghanistan"
—
illustrates Gorbachev's greater concern with Soviet
domestic problems. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "A Third
World Policy Waits for Gorbachev," Orbis 30 (Summer
1986): 355-364.
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the Soviet Union's ability to break out of military
encirclement
,
to weaken the West, and to refashion the
world by supporting the grievances, aspirations, and
needs of the colonial peoples and newly independent
nations
.
32
In those days, the Soviets expected and
fostered a permanent revolutionary process in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The 1961
program held that political independence was a
sham. To be genuine, independence had to be
extended by the further struggle for economic
liberation and a progressive political system.
Capitalism, in all its forms and
manifestations, offered nothing but "suffering
to the peoples." Hence the future lay in
undertaking a "non-capitalist path of
development." The political power of the local
middle class was to be limited through the
establishment of a progressive national front,
the foundations of capitalism were to be
undermined by expanding the public sector and
nationalizing foreign investment, and
sovereignty was to be bolstered through close
diplomatic and economic cooperation with the
Soviet bloc. 33
Gorbachev's program, however, offers quite
different formulations of the historic role of the
developing countries, their domestic policies, and the
Soviet Union's support for these states. Its thrust is
to raise doubts about the systemic, extremely
politicized assumptions regarding the utility of anti-
Western grievances in the Third World. First, the
developing countries are not seen as an important
32Valkenier, p. 652.
33Ibid., pp. 652-653.
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revolutionary force; their role in the demise of
capitalism is not mentioned. Moreover, the emphasis on
the ongoing process of national liberation has been
dropped altogether. Instead, the 1986 program speaks of
the "liberated areas"—an expression meant to convey
that the tumultuous era of liberation is over and that
we have entered a new period in which nation building,
not combatting capitalism or imperialism, is of
paramount importance.
In terms of domestic politics, the 1986 program
does not assume that all developing countries will
eventually follow the non-capitalist path. While
mentioning nations of "socialist orientation"
approvingly, following the non-capitalist path is not
touted as providing the answer for the entire Third
World. Instead, the program acknowledges that some
states have chosen a socialist orientation while others
are "traveling the capitalist road," and makes no
prognosis about the future of either choice. It merely
accepts that each state chooses its own system.
Also absent from the program are any statements
about Moscow's "international duty" to support Third
World strivings. Only "profound fraternal solidarity
and sincere admiration" for the people who have
experienced colonial rule is offered. These general
points about Soviet relations with the Third World—all
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more non-conunittal than the 1961 program—are followed
by an explicit disavowal of close Soviet identification
with the radical states. Henceforth, the Soviet Union
will support states of socialist orientation "only to
the extent of its ability." The program insists that
"every people create their material and technical
base . . . for building a new society mainly through
their own efforts." 34
These new principles of Soviet foreign policy
toward the Third World demonstrate that Moscow has come
to accept the fact of world-wide economic
interdependence
.
Instead of hoping to dominate the world
market, the Soviets now show more tolerance
for the economic map as it is drawn and a
sober respect for the power of the advanced
capitalist states—not just the United States
but Japan and South Korea as well. They are
saying, in effect, "Hey, stop the world, we
want to get onl" 35
Such sentiments are caused by the demonstrable failure
of the original systemic approach to international
economics which saw the world as divided into two
34See Ibid.; see also "The Political Report . . .,"
in Gorbachev, pp. 83-203. Valkenier argues that these
points are exceedingly important, as they "explain,
guide and justify Soviet foreign policy." Moreover they
"were not plucked out of thin air. They had been
carefully and painstakingly phrased by reform minded
academic and political experts, often against the
acrimonious opposition of dogmatists. Gorbachev . . .
is legitimizing a way of thinking that has been maturing
for at least a decade." Valkenier, pp. 653-654.
35Ibid.
,
p. 655
.
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separated and hostile world markets. This understanding
led the Soviet Union to pursue policies in the Third
World that demonstrated the superiority of the socialist
system—charging lower interest rates than the West,
financing industrialization projects, promoting the
expansion of the public sector, and encouraging an
import-substitution development model.
Soviet rhetoric claimed that socialist
policies and development advice promoted
economic liberation, a claim borne out by
India's state steel sector and Algeria's oil
industry. In practical terms, these measures
were expected to expand the Soviet Union's
presence and influence in the Third World. 36
These politically aggressive and economically
generous policies proved to be quite successful for a
while; however, for a variety of reasons, this favorable
situation began to unravel by the mid-1970s. Faced with
an array of challenges, the Soviets began to modify
their theories about international economics and to
implement different policies.
During the 1970s . . . Moscow abandoned the
doctrine of two competing world markets,
stressing, instead, the existence of a single
world economy over and above its socialist and
capitalist components . . . [S]oviet economic
policies became less systemic as well. The
South began to be treated more openly and
purposefully as a source of raw materials and
commodities that were either in short supply
or too expensive to produce at home. Soviet
development theory changed accordingly
[and] ... a mixed economic model was
recognized as offering better prospects for
36 Ibid.
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advancement than the easing-out of private
capital in the name of socialism. At the same
time as its economic relations with developing
countries became increasingly pragmatic,
Moscow became less generous with its aid,
especially to its radical clients. 37
Under Gorbachev there are no signs of reversal of
these trends, in fact there has been an advance in de-
ideologizing Soviet theory and behavior. A concerted
effort to become part of the international community has
supplanted earlier competition with the West. There is
also a much more pronounced emphasis on extracting
maximum benefits from exchanges with developing
countries, with little regard for how this squares with
socialist principles. In fact, Soviet economic
relations with the Third World today "dispense with the
fiction of altruistic socialist aid and instead reflect
the belief that aid and trade should help to develop the
Soviet economy." 38 In general, the Third World is no
longer used as an example of the ravages of capitalism,
but rather is treated as an area contributing to
international instability. In order to create greater
stability the Soviet Union has acknowledged the value of
capitalist institutions like private trade and land
ownership, and has counseled developing countries to
open themselves to market forces. Soviet economists now
37Ibid., pp. 656-657.
38Ibid., p. 658.
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maintain that many of the countries that relied on the
free market have approached the level of development
achieved by the Soviet Union, while those that chose
socialism go hungry. 39
Just as the failure of events to conform to
projections has prompted a reevaluation of Soviet
economic theory and practice in the Third World, so,
too, it is affecting the political and diplomatic
spheres. This is evident from discussions now taking
place around three key issues: the relevance of Marxist
theory to the Third World; the appropriateness of
radical political models for developing countries; and,
the promise of the Non-Aligned Movement, once an
important component of Soviet anti-imperialist
campaigns. In each area confident activism is being
replaced by doubts that argue for creating distance,
reducing commitments, or taking new departures. 40
Current thinking about the Third World's political
future no longer revolves around the question of whether
developing countries are ready for socialism. Some
authors now are even asking whether Marxist analysis has
much validity as applied to the Third World. Experts
are now being urged to study the particular
39See Bill Keller, "Soviet Article Doubts Economic
Line," New York Times , May 9, 1987, p. 4.
40Valkenier, p. 660.
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characteristics of Third World development as opposed to
universal principles of development valid for all
countries
.
In general
,
since 1980, Third World culture has
been singled out increasingly as the prime obstacle to
the patterns of political development described by Marx.
According to Valkenier,
specialized studies and roundtable discussions
express grave doubts about the prospects of
linking the radical aspirations of developing
countries with Marxism . .
.
[noting] a lack
of congruity between the Western tradition of
Marxism and the Eastern experience. . . . 41
Moreover, other specialists argue that the unexpected
twists and turns in Third World development can best be
understood not by systemic analysis, but by coming to
terms with the diversity of Third World experience.
"From this fact these experts proceed to question
whether the traditional Marxist preoccupation with the
laws governing the life of nations is appropriate." 42
41Ibid., p. 662.
42Ibid. Valkenier continues there is no exact
counterpart in political pronouncements to such candid
thinking, but some movement in that direction is
evident, as we have seen, in the new Party program,
which, rather than proclaiming a single non-capitalist
future for all developing countries, acknowledges the
existence of both capitalist and socialist oriented
states—a distinct step toward recognizing current
realities and outgrowing the Marxist compulsion to
predict the future in conformity with a predetermined
scheme
.
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In addition to questioning the relevance of Marxist
theory to developing countries, Soviet experts are also
taking another look at traditional notions of Third
World progressive political development and raising
doubts about the utility of Third World radicalism for
Soviet diplomacy. Before the ascendence of Gorbachev,
some Soviet analysts were arguing that socialist
orientation is not irreversible and that a country can
revert to capitalism— "an admission . . . that could be
interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union was not fully
committed to the defense of socialist oriented
states." 43 Putting distance between socialist-oriented
states and the Soviet Union has continued under
Gorbachev. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, the
general secretary made no mention of socialist
orientation, rather he referred to the "unstoppable
process of socioeconomic transformation," carefully
avoiding any more explicit formulation. Together with
the fact that the new Party program acknowledges the
existence of both socialist- and capitalist-oriented
states in the Third World and pointedly calls for the
former to build socialism through their own efforts, the
43Ibid.
,
p. 667. Valkenier ' s assertion is based on
her reading of Socialist Orientation in the Liberated
Countries, (1982), with contributions by Karen Brutents,
Rostislav Ulianovsky, Eugenii Primakow, and Anatolii
Gromyko. The stature of the contributors leads her to
posit that the volume is an authoritative pronouncement
on the issue.
Ill
Soviets no longer seem to be claiming that socialism is
the wave of the future in the Third World, nor that
capitalism in the Third World is temporary and
transitional
.
Further, the Soviets are putting the Third World on
notice that they no longer wish to finance the building
of socialism in these countries. 44
Of course radical political regimes will
continue to exist—Moscow cannot and would not
hope otherwise. Some will be allied with the
Soviet Union and claim to be practicing some
form of socialism; others will seek Soviet
support and advice. But there are likely to
be fewer free lunches. 45
Valkenier also argues that evidence exists that
since the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, Soviet
leadership has reversed gears and is now sanctioning a
regression from vanguard parties to united fronts
—
arguing that socialist-oriented states are best governed
by a broad united front composed of all progressive
forces, including the petty and medium sized
44Most analysts would agree with Rajan Menon who
argues that "because of the economy's problems, the
Soviet leaders may try to avoid commitments in the Third
World. . . . The goodwill exhibited by the Soviet Union
toward states of socialist orientation and its
frequently voiced commitment to assist the spread of
socialism must not obscure a basic point: domestic
political stability, national security, and the state of
the Soviet economy are far more important in the
official Soviet scheme of things than ventures in the
Third World" (Rajan Menon, Soviet Power in the Third
World
.
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986],
p. 157 ) .
45Valkenier, p. 668.
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bourgeoisie—and from revolutionary to national
democracy. 46 While discussions of this sort may be
difficult for Westerners to decipher, Valkenier argues
that they have real practical implications as they
Provide theoretical justification for pressuring
radicals to pursue a more moderate, conciliatory
economic and political course—a course that not only
increased their chances of survival but also decreases
the likelihood of Washington's support of
counterinsurgencies and of requests for Moscow's
support
.
47
Moreover, recent reassessments of the Non-Aligned
Movement illustrate a growing dissatisfaction with the
movement and an increasing perception that its interests
are not congruent with Soviet interests. From 1979 to
1983, when the Movement was headed by Fidel Castro,
Moscow offered uncritical support of the organization.
Then, on the eve of the 1983 Non-Aligned summit, when
the chairmanship passed to India, criticism of the
Movement's lack of unity and the resulting diffusion of
its anti-imperialist efforts, appeared. 48
Dissatisfaction has become more pronounced under
Gorbachev. Just prior to the Twenty-Seventh Congress,
46Ibid
.
47Ibid.
,
p. 669
.
48Ibid. See also Light, pp. 229-233.
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Brutents noted in Pravda that anti-imperialism was
entering a new phase. He observed,
the post-colonial period of the liberation
struggle's development, when anti-imperialism
continued to draw strength primarily from the
problems, emotions, and memories of the
colonial days ... is coming to an end, [and
he warned that the] readiness of developing
countries to play an active part in the
struggle against imperialism should not be
taken for granted. 49
From the Soviet perspective, the rise of virulent
Third World nationalism and the Non-Aligned Movement's
preoccupation with economic, rather than security,
issues challenge Soviet policy in the Third World.
The Iranian revolution and the obstinate
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan have aroused
concern not just about Islamic fundamentalism
but also about the status of Third World self-
identity generally. Inasmuch as [the Non-
Aligned Movement] sees little difference
between Western and Soviet policies and does
not ascribe imperialist behavior to . . . the
West alone, it has seriously undermined the
diplomatic posture of those developing
countries that traditionally have leaned in
the direction of Moscow. 50
Karen Brutents proposes dealing with this challenge not
on the basis of old assumptions about common Soviet-
Third World aims but with an awareness that elemental
national feelings fuel today's anti-imperialism.
Brutents warns against arousing "the deep-rooted.
49Karen Brutents, "The Liberated Countries and the
Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda, January 10, 1986,
pp. 3-4. Quoted in Valkenier, p. 669.
50Valkenier, p. 670.
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spontaneous
,
anti imperialist feelings of the masses,"
urging, instead, reliance on mature "political
forces." 51 This could be a reference either to
national communist parties or, more likely, in view of
the insignificance of these parties in most developing
countries, to stable, well-established states. 52
The Soviets see the Non-Aligned Movement's
increasing preoccupation with economic grievances as
another example of Third World self-absorption and
indifference to the broader issues that concern Moscow,
especially arms control and disarmament. 53 Moreover,
Moscow no longer supports the Third World's demands for
a New International Economic Order, claiming that it no
longer corresponds with Soviet aims and interests. When
the program was first presented at the United Nations,
the Soviets endorsed it as a "progressive code of rules
by which states should be guided in their economic
relations." 54 By the late 1970s, however, the Soviets
had become openly critical of the NIEO, arguing that it
was too exclusively centered on concessional
arrangements for developing countries. "Moscow
expressed its preference for an economic order that
51Brutents, quoted in Ibid.
52Valkenier, p. 670.
53Ibid
.
54Pravda, April 12, 1974, p. 4 in Ibid.
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would 'democratize' international trade by abolishing
restrictions and trade barriers affecting the socialist
states as well." 55 Indeed, at the Twenty-Seventh
Congress, Gorbachev proposed convening a world congress
on problems of economic security where the Soviet Union
would launch a program that would compete with that of
the non-aligned states. "What is important here,"
Valkenier argues, "is not that the Soviet Union would be
promoting reforms beneficial to the bloc but that
Gorbachev's Soviet Union, in offering its own vision of
a new economic order, is not worried about aggravating
relations with the Third World." 56 Such a move is
clear indication that Soviet interests and Third World
claims against the West no longer coincide.
Perestroika and foreign policy new thinking, and
the massive changes they have ushered in—including the
fall of Eastern Europe—have altered the context in
which Latin American revolutionary movements function.
The response of these movements to perestroika and new
thinking and the implications of these Soviet policies
for the revolutionary Left in Cuba, Nicaragua and El
Salvador will be studied in subsequent chapters.
55Ibid, p. 671. See also Light, pp. 132-134.
56Valkenier, p. 671.
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CHAPTER 4
PERESTROIKA AND THE POLITICS
OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
If perestroika signals a "conceptual revolution" in
Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World, and if
former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was correct
in asserting that the main requirement of the new
foreign policy is that the Soviet Union should not bear
additional expenses in the defense of its legitimate
foreign policy interests, what will this mean for Cuba?
Cuba has been a favored ally of the Soviet Union for the
past three decades and the political and economic ties
between the two are strong. Since the enunciation of
perestroika however, a new tension has entered the
bilateral relationship as President Castro has made it
clear that he disapproves of Gorbachev's reforms and has
no intention of initiating similar policies. Castro's
harsh anti-perestroika views have led to increased
isolation of his regime, even among its erstwhile
friends and supporters, and have brought into question
the Soviet Union's continued support. Many ask how a
Soviet government engaged in momentous social, economic
and political transformation can continue to provide
subsidies, which in 1988 totaled nearly $7 billion in
hard currency, to an old-line "Stalinist" state. This
leads to the equally important question of whether
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Castro can survive without these subsidies, for in
weighing the costs and benefits for both sides in the
bilateral relationship, it is clear that Cuba is far
less important to the Soviet Union than the Soviet Union
is to Cuba.
As the Soviet Union's closest ally in Latin
America, Cuba has enjoyed a special relationship with
the USSR. Cuba's economic survival is dependent upon
the maintenance of this special relationship. Measured
in 1987, Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba
exceeded $4 billion annually or about $10 million each
day. Cuba runs a large trade deficit with the USSR; its
debt to the Soviet Union and other bloc nations exceeded
$22 billion in 1987. 1 Moreover, The Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries shelter the Cuban market from
the fluctuations of the world market by purchasing sugar
and nickel at fixed prices. The USSR also sells oil to
Cuba at bargain prices, enabling Cuba to resell some at
a profit on the world market. In 1985 Cuba earned half
of its hard currency from the resale of Soviet oil. 2
In a 1985 interview with Playboy magazine Fidel argued
that
:
XU . S . Department of State, Soviet Influence
Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda,
1986-1987
,
p. 66.
2 Ibid.
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Frankly
,
the United States has fewer and fewer
things to offer Cuba. If we were able to
export our products to the United States, we
would have to start making plans for new lines
of production to be exported to the United
States, because everything we are producing
now and in the next five years has already
been sold to other markets. We would have to
take them away from the other socialist
countries in order to sell them to the United
States, and the socialist countries pay us
much better prices and have much better
relations with us than does the United
States
.
3
In return for their extensive economic assistance,
the Soviets have acquired, in Cuba, a major military
asset in the Western Hemisphere, one which has played a
unique role in promoting Soviet political and strategic
interests especially in the Third World. Among
communist nations, only Vietnam and East Germany have
received more military aid from the USSR, and Cuba has
become a "key maritime strategic piece on Moscow's
global chessboard." 4 As Robert Pastor notes:
Cuba is a small country with a big country's
foreign policy. No other developing nation
maintains more diplomatic missions,
intelligence operatives, and military advisors
and troops abroad than does Cuba, not even
oil-producing states that can afford it. The
gap between its internal resources and its
external capabilities is filled by the Soviet
Union, not because of altruism, but because
3
"Playboy Interview," Playboy Magazine , August
1985, 179.
4Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba , (New
York: Praeger, 1985), p. 7.
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the Soviets are assured that what the Cubans
do abroad will serve their purpose. 5
Moreover
,
Soviet assistance to Castro's Cuba has
provided the Soviets with the largest intelligence
collection facility outside the USSR. The Lourdes
facility near Havana enables the Soviet Union to monitor
sensitive U.S. maritime, military and space
communications as well as telephone communications in
the United States.
The development of a special relationship with Cuba
since the victory of the Fidelistas has aided the Soviet
Union in its transformation from a continental power
whose military focus was the defense of the homeland and
whose military reach was limited to regions contiguous
to its own borders, to a global power with world-wide
naval deployments and a military position in every major
region of the globe. 6 Similarly, Cuba's economic
dependence on the Soviet bloc and the extensive military
assistance which flows from it has helped give the
Soviets extensive influence in the management and
5Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does
Cuba Act Alone?" in The New Cuban Presence in the
Caribbean Basin , ed. Barry B. Levine (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1983), p. 207.
6See Melvin A. Goodman, "The Soviet Union and the
Third World: The Military Dimension," in The Soviet
Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades , eds.
Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987), pp. 46-66, for a discussion of
the development of Soviet global military power over the
past three decades.
120
direction of Cuba's affairs. Yet, it would be incorrect
to think of Cuba as simply a Soviet-controlled surrogate
for the USSR in the Third World.
Perhaps the most important way in which Castro has
expressed his autonomy recently is through his
denunciations of Soviet perestroika and the changes it
has ushered in. Castro has argued that Gorbachev's
reforms seek to "build capitalism" in the USSR, yet
"nothing and nobody will make Cuba deviate from the
socialist path." Castro has called on the Cuban people
to defend "the ideological and military trenches of the
revolution," insisting that in Cuba it will be
"socialism or death!"
These sentiments and Castro's unwillingness to
reform at a time in world history when socialism around
the world is in retreat, has led to increased political
isolation of the regime. Erstwhile friends of Cuba in
Eastern Europe have begun to abandon Castro's regime.
In March 1990, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Bulgaria voted with the U.S. in the United Nations Human
Rights Commission to place Cuba on its list of nations
which violate the human rights of its citizens. 7
Similarly, in February 1990 the Czechoslovak government
served notice that it no longer wishes to act as Cuba's
7See "UN Votes, Local Dissenters Gaoled," Latin
American Weekly Report , 22 March 1990, p. 3.
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protecting power," and host to its interest section, in
Washington.
Cuba's relations with Spain, its most important
Western European trading partner, have also deteriorated
recently in a dispute over asylum seekers. 8 In his
speech commemorating the thirty-seventh anniversary of
the assault on the Moncada Garrison, President Castro
castigated the Spanish government for having, "through
arrogance and pride," collaborated with "U.S.
imperialist aims." 9 Finally, with the electoral defeat
of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Cuba is now the only
Marxist regime in the hemisphere and one of the few
governments whose mandate is not based on open
elections
.
This chapter will, first, examine the impact of
Gorbachev's reforms on Soviet-Cuban relations. I will
demonstrate that reduced levels of Soviet aid to Cuba
coupled with the changes set in motion by perestroika
,
especially in Eastern Europe, are increasing Cuba's
economic woes and may have political ramifications in
the not-too-distant future. Second, the Castro
8Cuba owes Spain approximately US$900 million; the
only larger creditor is the Soviet Union. In 1989
Madrid granted Havana US$260 million worth of loans and
commercial credit. See "Blowing Hot and Cold on Spain,"
Latin American Weekly Report , 9 August 1990, p. 3.
9See text of President Castro's address in Granma
Weekly Review , 5 August 1990, pp. 3-5.
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government's response to perestroika is analyzed. I
posit that the Cuban government has devised a strategy
which, through limited political reforms for pro-Castro
loyalists and increased repression of dissidents, seeks
to maintain Castro-style socialism and Cuban Leninism in
an environment increasingly hostile to both. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the likelihood
that Castro's "survival strategy" will succeed.
Soviet-Cuban Relations
Much of the analysis in Western political science
of Soviet-Cuban relations since the Cuban revolution has
portrayed Cuba as a Soviet client which unquestioningly
hews to the policy line articulated by Moscow. Such an
understanding of the relationship between these two
states has led some analysts to suggest that Castro's
harsh anti-perestroika remarks signal a new strain in
Soviet-Cuban relations which will lead the Soviet Union
to exert pressure on the Castro regime to tow the new
line.
Other analysts argue that such an understanding of
Soviet-Cuban relations is too simplistic and, in the
end, incorrect. 10 Peter Shearman argues that Soviet-
10See especially, Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, The Third
World, and the Soviet Union," in Fukuyama and Korbonski,
pp. 123-147; Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs 58 (Fall 1978): 83-108; and, Peter
Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba , (London: Rout ledge
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Cuban relations over the past three decades have been
determined by individual leaders, ideological
perceptions and geostrategic considerations. At times
the ideological perceptions and geostrategic concerns of
the Soviet and Cuban leaderships have meshed. However
for most of the past three decades they have not and
bilateral relations have been tense. The current rift
between Moscow and Havana is therefore not the first
between the two parties; however the current differences
are arguably more fundamental and of much greater
consequence than previous ones.
The previous disagreements have tended to revolve
around divergent perceptions of what constitute
fundamental issues in world politics, and, flowing from
these, differing foreign policy priorities and
strategies. Through the 1960s the questions of Latin
American and Third World underdevelopment, economic
dependency, and "imperialist domination" were the most
crucial issues in world politics for Castro. For
Khrushchev and Brezhnev the central issue was the
competition between the two superpowers. Developments
in the Third World were viewed in the context of the
shifting correlation of forces and the changing
strategic balance between East and West. Castro's
North-South perspective led to the view that there could
& Kegan Paul, 1987).
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be no compromise with imperialism: it was the duty of
the revolutionary to make the revolution, and the duty
of the international revolutionaries to assist other
guerrilla movements in their struggles for liberation.
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, on the other hand, advocated a
policy of peaceful coexistence in which some
accommodation with the U.S. was necessary in order to
avoid a direct confrontation that could lead to nuclear
war. As detailed in the previous chapter, these
differences in perceptions and strategies caused
tensions in the bilateral relationship during the first
decade of Castroism in Cuba. By the late 1960s Castro
had condemned peaceful coexistence as "an imperialist
modus vivendi" and had accused the Soviets of being an
"accomplice of imperialism." 11
In the early 1970s Castro toned down his rhetoric
of guerrilla warfare, institutionalized a Marxist-
Leninist system, changed his perspective on inter-
American relations and began to foster diplomatic
relations with Latin American states. The Soviet-Cuban
relationship became more harmonious, cooperative and
cohesive, with both states now pursuing similar policies
in different regions which served the interests of
leaders in Moscow and Havana. These changes may have
xlSee Granma Weekly Review , 7 July 1968, p. 1, and
19 March 1967, p. 1.
125
been due, in part, to restrictions emanating from the
dependent nature of the bilateral relationship with the
USSR. Castro himself, in the wake of Soviet cutbacks in
oil deliveries which forced him to institute rationing
in January 1968, acknowledged the Soviets' ability to
aPPly pressure on Cuba. 12 However, the changes were
also a response to other domestic, regional and
international factors.
Che Guevara's death in the Bolivian jungle
symbolized the weakness of the revolutionary
movement in Latin America. The emergence of a
radical leftist military regime in Peru
provided evidence of alternative challenges to
imperialism in the North-South struggle.
Domestic economic problems and the seeming
permanency of the U.S. economic embargo and
U.S. hostility to Castro's Cuba, and the
beneficial trade terms offered by the Eastern
bloc, led to Cuba's application to join the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—which
was accepted in 1972. 13
The 1970s witnessed cooperative military ventures
in Angola and Ethiopia. Cuba's participation in both
civil wars was perceived by many as an example of Cuba
acting as "Soviet puppet," or "surrogate" in Africa in
order to further the geostrategic interests of the
Soviet Union. However, this interpretation ignores
Cuba's active policy in Africa which can be traced back
to the early 1960s. Indeed, in 1960, before diplomatic
12Granma Weekly Review , 23 March 1968, p. 1.
13Peter Shearman, "Gorbachev and the Restructuring
of Soviet-Cuban Relations," The Journal of Communist
Studies 5 (December 1989): 71.
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relations had been established with the Soviet Union,
Cuba sent military and medical supplies to the Algerian
Liberation Front. Moreover, while it appears that in
Ethiopia the Soviets and Cubans, through a series of
meetings in the mid-1970s, were able to coordinate a
policy of support for Ethiopia in its confrontation with
its socialist neighbor, the same coordination did not
occur earlier in Angola. Unlike Soviet support for the
MPLA in Angola, Cuba's support was based on a sense of
revolutionary duty and international solidarity. Cuban
support never wavered, nor was it tempered by the level
of tension existing between the East and West. 14
It was the Soviet-Cuban cooperative interventions
in Angola and Ethiopia that had the greatest negative
impact on detente between the superpowers, leading to
U.S. distrust and suspicion of Soviet behavior and
intentions in other Third World theaters. With the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, an action which
served to confirm the worst fears of many concerning
Soviet behavior and intentions, detente was abandoned
for "the second Cold War."
With the advent of "the second Cold War," Castro
must have felt that the Soviet commitment to his nation
was indestructible. However, with the rise of new
14See especially Shearman, The Soviet Union and
Cuba
, pp. 33-56.
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leaders after the death of Brezhnev in 1982, the rapid
disintegration of the Soviet economy, and the radical
restructuring of Soviet domestic and foreign policies,
especially since 1985, Soviet-Cuban relations have
entered a period of uncertainty.
Since the death of Brezhnev, but especially since
1985, there have been changes in leadership, ideology,
and in geostrategic concerns in the Soviet Union— in all
the three factors that have been central in determining
Soviet foreign policy toward Cuba. As Jerry Hough
argues, the rise to power of Gorbachev and the various
personnel shuffles he has accomplished since 1985 signal
the rise of a new generation of Soviet leaders who are
most concerned with modernizing Soviet society and
increasing Soviet integration with the West. 15 In
terms of ideology, as detailed in the previous chapter,
Soviet theorists are currently questioning the
applicability of traditional Marxist notions of
development in the Third World and are even advocating
the adoption of capitalist market mechanisms. Moreover,
Soviet foreign policy New Thinking abandons the notion
of the division of the world into two hostile camps in
favor of a notion of global economic and political
interdependence. Revolution in the Third World is de-
15Jerry Hough, "The End of Russia's 'Khomeini'
Period," World Policy Journal 14 (Fall 1987): 583-604.
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emphasized, if not actively discouraged. Similarly, the
U.S. is still seen as being central to Soviet
geostrategic thinking but now as a partner rather than
an implacable adversary. In addition, when Gorbachev
came to power in 1985, his most pressing problem was the
critical state of the Soviet economy. Growth rates had
been declining yet Gorbachev was faced with rising
expectations from the Soviet population that the system
could not expect to satisfy without radical structural
reform. These economic problems were having a "ripple
effect" through Soviet society leading to increased
alcoholism, drug addiction, and crime. 16
Given Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet
Union, its tight integration into the CMEA, continued
U.S. antagonism to the Castro regime, and Castro's own
clear antipathy towards the Gorbachev phenomenon, the
fundamental changes in Soviet priorities and concerns
are certain to result in changes in the Soviet-Cuban
relationship. Glasnost and perestroika have engendered
greater public scrutiny of Soviet foreign policy, and
the Soviet press has began an unprecedented questioning
of Moscow's traditional foreign policy commitments,
including its commitment to Cuba. The pages of Soviet
publications, especially Moscow News , have served as a
16Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for
Our Country and the World , (New York: Harper and Row,
1987), p. 8.
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forum for the growing debate over Soviet foreign policy,
a debate which expresses an increasing unwillingness to
sustain the costs of empire when the Soviet economy is
experiencing severe problems.
Writing in 1989, Andrei Kortunov of the Institute
of the USA and Canada stated that Moscow had given more
than twenty-five percent of its foreign aid to Cuba in
1988-1989. He noted that the Soviet Union's total
foreign aid budget was almost six times greater, on a
per capita basis, than that of the U.S. and asked why
aid was being given to Third World countries that are
dictatorships and engage in "adventurist" foreign
policies. 17 Moscow News also quoted a Moscow deputy to
the Soviet Congress of Peoples Deputies as saying, "We
can't tolerate that sort of situation when our own
people have to get ration cards for soap and sugar and
can't find a decent cut of meat in the stores." 18
Similar concerns have been voiced by Professor
Aleksandr Sharkov of the CPSU in a roundtable discussion
of perestroika and Soviet foreign policy published in
International Affairs in July 1988. The pattern
17
"Soviet Foreign Aid Questioned," The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (February 1990): 15.
18Quoted in Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Cuba's Cloudy
Future," Foreign Affairs 70 (Summer 1990): 116. See
also "Castro: Beleaguered Champion of Socialism," The
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (November 1990):
20 - 21 .
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developed under Khrushchev and Brezhnev of exporting oil
to Cuba at below world market prices and importing sugar
at prices well above the world market price is
unacceptable, he argues, as it has "amounted to
exporting our national product without compensation." 19
Also, the New York Times reported on March 8, 1990 that
"in a striking break with the traditional courtesy shown
to other communist countries," the Soviet press has
"this week opened up on the Cuban leadership with a dose
of withering scorn." Times reporter Bill Keller points
to a feature story in the March 8, 1990 Moscow News
which describes Cuba as an "impoverished police state
mimicking Brezhnev-era Communism" and which noted with
approval the growth of a small dissident movement on the
island as evidence that pressure is growing to alter
Soviet-Cuban relations and that, in fact, highly-placed
members of the Soviet leadership desire a change in
bilateral relations. 20
19See the roundtable on "Perestroika, The
Nineteenth Party Conference and Foreign Policy,"
International Affairs , (July 1988): 3-18.
20Bill Keller, "Soviet Press Snaps Back at Castro,
Painting an Outdated Police State," New York Times ,
8 March 1990, p. 1. Keller argues that "articles
criticizing Mr. Castro would almost surely have required
high level clearance," yet one must question if in this
era of glasnost and increased internal debate, the
opinions quoted in Moscow News are indeed shared by the
Soviet leadership.
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It is clear, given Cuba's dependence on the USSR
for economic survival, that Gorbachev has it in his
power to use economic leverage should he wish to
persuade Castro to reform the Cuban economy and polity.
As of yet, however, there has not been a significant
reduction in Soviet aid to Cuba. Many Western analysts
thought that the April 1989 meeting of Gorbachev and
Castro in Havana would be a clash of communist titans in
which the reformer from Moscow would chastise the anti-
perestroika Castro. "Gorbachev appears to have another
fight on his hands . . . with one of the last living
legends of the Communist world," wrote the Boston Globe ;
"When Mikhail Gorbachev touches down in Havana on
Sunday, it will be to meet a man at the foot of the
gangway, Fidel Castro, who stands for everything
Gorbachev is against," argued the Miami Herald . 21 At
the very least, many U.S. journalists seemed to think,
Gorbachev "the smooth salesman of new Communist
pragmatism" would surely distance himself from the
"khaki-clad revolutionary." 22 Gorbachev's visit to
Havana provided little in the way of signs of the
political rift expected by many. Although there is
speculation that behind closed doors President Gorbachev
21Quoted in "Gorbachev in Havana: A Reporter's
Notebook," Cuba Update 10 (Summer 1989): 11.
22Bill Keller in the New York Times quoted in Ibid.
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had given Castro some form of stern warning, this
requires either discounting or ignoring public
statements by the Soviet leader.
In his address to the Cuban National Assembly on
April 4, 1989 Gorbachev called the Cuban experience "an
original and important part of the world experience in
building socialism." He said,
the cooperation between our countries and
Soviet-Cuban ties are of a stable nature . . .
[since] they are based on the principles of
equality of rights and emphasize respect for
independent action, understanding of mutual
responsibility and of the need for
international mutual assistance. . .
.
[The
significance of these principles] is not
diminished in the least by differences in the
approach to any of the questions related to
the particular features of our countries'
historical development and cultures nor by the
different tasks ahead of them or by their
international situation. 23
Moreover, Gorbachev continued, while in the USSR
we are condemned to achieve victory in
perestroika . . . we do not see our approaches
and solutions as a universal prescription. On
the contrary, problems may be similar but each
party solves them in an independent manner on
the basis of each country's conceptions and
peculiarities
.
24
Gorbachev reiterated this when, in a news conference
after his address, he said,
this visit was preceded by a lot of
speculation, as though instead of old friends.
23Full texts of the addresses by Castro and
Gorbachev are found in Cuba Update Supplement 1 (Summer
1989): 1-23.
24Ibid.
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we are practically enemies. This was pure
invention. We are friends. No country is
like another. Dogmatism is harmful. We agree
on socialism. No one could expect anything
else, knowing us. Each country solves its own
problems according to its own history and
experiences. Our methods in the USSR aren't
necessarily the same as Cuba's, but we all
agree on socialist principles. 25
In addition to the reassuring rhetoric, the meeting
of the two leaders also yielded a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation Between the Republic of Cuba and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the first of its
kind between the two nations. The treaty reasserts their
"fraternal and indestructible friendship and solidarity,
based on a common ideology . . . internationalism and
identical objectives. . . ." 26 More importantly, on
April 17, 1990, after a week of negotiations in Havana,
Cuba and the Soviet Union signed the largest trade
agreement in their three decades of commercial
relations. The 1990 accord is worth $14 billion, an
increase of 8.7 percent over 1989 volume. Key aspects
of this year's trade package include:
-The Soviet Union will continue to supply Cuba
with oil—annually some 13 million tons
according to Moscow—cereals and other
foodstuffs, raw materials, equipment and
replacement parts for industry.
-The level of Cuban sales to the Soviet Union
at mutually acceptable prices will be
25
" Reporter ' s Notebook," p. 12.
26A full text of the treaty appears in Cuba Update
Supplement 1 (Summer 1989): 24-25. See also Granma
Weekly Review , 29 April 1990, p. 1.
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maintained in key exports such as nickel,
sugar, citrus and chrome.
-Increased Cuban export of non-traditional
goods, especially medical equipment and
medicines
.
-The two countries have agreed to set up a
working group to prepare for the next round of
negotiations and to consider new and more
flexible trading models. 27
At a press conference before his departure from
Cuba, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, a
signatory to the agreement, said the USSR has no
intention of using its economic links with Cuba to
pressure the island's government into following the path
of perestroika . He said the Soviets intended to fully
respect the direction the Cuban leadership has taken
while admitting that the Soviet Union's decision to turn
to a regulated market economy would have implications
for its trading partners. But, in the case of Cuba,
Vietnam and Mongolia, Abalkin said, other factors also
come into play. 28
Alexander Baryshev, Deputy Editor in Chief of the
Latin American Journal of the USSR's Academy of
Sciences, has written that "Fidel Castro's concern that
the Soviet Union might discontinue aid to Cuba is
unfounded . . . the Soviet Union will never refuse help,
27See Gail Reed, "Weathering The Storm," Cuba
Update 11 (Summer 1990): 19.
28Ibid. See also "Leonid Abalkin: We Value our
Friendship with Cuba," in The Current Digest of The
Soviet Press 42 (December 1990): 20.
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within its capabilities, to those who need such help, be
they socialist or capitalist." 29 Although Soviet aid
to Cuba has not yet decreased, the odds are good that it
will be cut significantly in the coming years given the
Soviet's decreasing economic capabilities and the
increasing public pressure on the Gorbachev leadership
to reconsider foreign policy commitments. 30 Moreover,
as Susan Kaufman Purcell argues, as the cold war winds
down, Havana's value to Moscow has declined.
Technological advances have reduced Cuba's
importance for intelligence gathering and even
as a military base. In addition, because
Gorbachev's policies no longer involve active
support of "wars of national liberation" in
the Third World, Cuba's continued support of
Marxist guerrilla groups in Central America
and elsewhere directly challenges Gorbachev
and undermines his efforts to change the
Soviet Union's international image. Finally
Cuba's revolutionary foreign policy
jeopardizes the growing rapprochement between
the Soviets and the United States, since
Washington holds Moscow accountable for
Havana's behavior. 31
29Alexander Baryshev, "A Soviet View: U.S. -Cuban
Warming Overdue," The Times of the Americas ,
21 February 1990, p. 21.
30The Times of the Americas reports that the Soviet
Union is hinting it may scale back its economic and
military aid to Cuba. "Although [Bush administration]
officials warned the statements made by Soviet
representatives were vague, they said the indications
were good that the Soviets would cut back their aid to
Castro" ("Soviet Aid May Be Cut," The Times of the
Americas, July 11, 1990, p. 3).
31Susan Kaufman Purcell, pp. 115-116. See also
Wayne S. Smith, "Washington and Havana: Time for
Dialogue," World Policy Journal 7 (Summer 1990): 557-
573.
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Even without a shift in the Soviet's policy toward
Cuba, Soviet-Cuban trade has become increasingly
unpredictable since 1988 when, as part of perestroika
,
Soviet enterprises obtained the right to trade directly
on foreign markets. This has meant that Cuba has had to
deal directly with individual Soviet enterprises, which
prefer to sell to customers who pay in hard currency.
According to V. Zaikin, Head of the USSR Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations Department of Economic
Cooperation with the Republic of Cuba, "Today, if Soviet
enterprises have alternatives, they are not interested
in supplying goods to Cuba." 32
The impact of these new arrangements on Cuba was
clearly visible by the spring 1990, when a delay in a
shipment of Soviet wheat and flour forced President
Castro to cut the bread ration and increase some food
prices. The relatively short delay in the shipment of
wheat and flour— ships scheduled to arrive in December
1989 were unable to complete their deliveries until
January 22, 1990—forced the Cuban government to buy
20,000 tons of wheat from western countries for hard
currencies. 33 While some have argued that these delays
32See "There's Plenty of Experience," The Current
Digest of The Soviet Press 42 (November 1990): 26.
33See Purcell, p. 117. See also "Who's at Fault?"
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (February
1990): 26-27.
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constitute Soviet pressure on Cuba to soften its anti-
perestroika stand and abandon its "Stalinist" policies,
others attribute the delays to management decisions to
use ships for more profitable business before attending
to Cuba's needs. 34 Jorge Dominguez concurs. "The
trade breakdowns are caused by the accumulating economic
incapacities of the Soviet Union. There is no proof of
intent to pressure Cuba politically." 35 Regardless of
intent, the fact that a brief delay in the arrival of
wheat and flour was so quickly translated into
widespread shortages, rationing and price increases
highlights Cuba's extreme vulnerability to the ripple
effects of perestroika.
Similarly, even without a change in Soviet-Cuban
economic relations, the collapse of communism in East
Europe will eventually prove more destabilizing to Cuba
in the short run than will Soviet perestroika . In
January 1990 the Soviet government announced that
beginning in 1991 all of Cuba's transactions with CMEA
members would be conducted in hard currency at world-
34See Paul Lewis, "As Shipments of Soviet Grain
Lag, Cuba Reduces Daily Bread Ration," New York Times ,
7 February 1990, p. 3. See also "Problems Looming With
Old Partners," Latin America Weekly Report ,
22 February 1990, p. 4.
35See Paul Lewis, p. 3.
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prices. This development coincides with a
Soviet call for a radical restructuring of the CMEA
which would introduce market relations and "bring our
economic ties more closely in line with world
conditions." N. I. Ryzhkov, speaking at the forty-fifth
session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in
January 1990, proposed a radical restructuring of the
entire system of economic cooperation which would entail
[a] shift to economic methods, [and] . . .
market relations, [and] the use of freely
convertible currency in the settlement of
accounts, and of world market prices in
reciprocal trade. . .
.
[T]his would make it
possible to put cooperation within the CMEA on
a new economic basis and to bring its
conditions closer to those that are generally
accepted in world practice, a step that would
be in keeping with the reforms being carried
out in the CMEA countries and would make
possible their effective inclusion in the
international division of labor. 37
Given Cuba's extreme dependence on the CMEA a
restructuring which would introduce market forces could
be devastating. Cuba's Vice Chairman of the State
Council and Council of Ministers, C. R. Rodriguez, has
agreed with the need to restructure the CMEA. However,
he argues that the introduction of market forces must
36This has prompted Ramon Gonzalez Vergara, former
Cuban vice-secretary to the CMEA to ask "Will Castro
Survive if Cuba is Forced to Pay Its Bills?" Wall
Street Journal , 28 September 1990, p. 15.
37See "A Historic Rethink is Afoot in CMEA," The
Current Digest of The Soviet Press 42 (January 1990):
12-13.
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not mean that market forces usurp the principles on
which the CMEA is based. 38 Exacerbating Cuba's
economic woes is the fact that "in contrast to the
Soviet Union, the new Eastern European governments feel
no gratitude or responsibility toward Cuba." 39 In
January 1990 President Castro acknowledged this new
reality, telling the Sixteenth Congress of the Central
Organization of Cuban Trade Unions that
for decades our five-year and annual plans
were based on the existence of a Socialist
camp . . . with which we established extensive
economic relations. The socialist camp today
does not exist politically. We will not lie
to ourselves. We hope that some of the
existing trade agreements will still be
honored . .
.
[but] we have no security and
can have no security. 40
Susan Kaufman Purcell reports that the impact of
Eastern Europe's democratic revolutions is already being
felt in Cuba.
Factories have closed; transportation and
construction which depend on imports from
Eastern Europe are in decline; workers are
having difficulty getting to their jobs and,
if and when they arrive, they often remain
idle because some crucial import or spare part
is unavailable; consumer goods such as
toothpaste and razor blades are in short
38See "'New Model' CMEA Wins General Acceptance in
Principle," The Current Digest of The Soviet Press 42
(January 1990): 14.
39 Ibid.
40A full text of Castro's speech to the Sixteenth
Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade
Unions on 28 January 1990 is found in Granma Weekly
Review , 11 February 1990, p. 2.
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supply, and interminable waits for television
sets awarded to model workers have become
commonplace
.
41
Moreover, in a recent speech outlining what might lie
ahead, Castro acknowledged that an agreement with
Bulgaria for 12,000 tons of poultry had not been signed.
The same is true with an agreement with Czechoslovakia
to provide barley. Castro added that buses and spare
parts from Hungary may not arrive and that Cuba could
not count on receiving parts for their Czechoslovak
thermoelectric plants. 42
In order to cushion the economic blow, Castro has
been actively pursuing other trading partners,
especially in Latin America. In 1989 Cuba increased its
trade with Mexico (a new economic cooperation agreement
was signed in October 1988 which covered 149 projects,
including almost all economic areas as well as education
and research), Venezuela (in January 1989 Cuba signed a
three-year trade agreement with Venezuela, the first
between the two countries), Brazil (trade between Cuba
and Brazil has grown from virtually zero to $80 million
in the past two years, almost all of which consists of
Brazilian exports to Cuba) , and Peru (a one-year
renewable agreement was signed with Peru in August 1989
41Purcell, p. 118.
42 Ibid.
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which commits each nation to seek balanced trade at a
level of $10 million each). 43
Cuba has also begun to woo Japanese investors in
the hope of securing Japanese supplies of raw materials
and spare parts to reopen idle industrial plants as well
as Japanese investments in tourism. 44 And with China
the Castro regime has discovered a renewed affinity:
opposition to the reforms of the USSR and Eastern
Europe. "This is already emerging as the basis for
better trade links: over the past year Chinese goods
have been appearing more frequently on Cuban shop
shelves." 45 Moreover, in late March 1990 the PRC
agreed to provide Cuba with a ten-year interest-free
loan to aid "simple projects easily implemented." 46
Despite these moves towards economic
diversification, as long as the U.S. economic embargo of
Cuba survives it will be difficult for Cuba to end its
economic dependence on the USSR and Eastern Europe.
This means that even without a conscious Soviet policy
43See Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report:
Cuba , nos. 1-4 (1989). This process of diversification
was praised by President Gorbachev in his April 1989
trip to Cuba.
44See Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report:
Cuba, no. 2 (1989): 31-32.
45Latin America Weekly Report . 22 February 1990.
46
"China Gives Cuba Ten-Year Interest-Free Loan,"
Granina Weekly Review . 2 April 1990, p. 1.
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to alter Soviet-Cuban economic relations, the economic
changes set in motion by perestroika will increase the
economic isolation of Cuba and may increase domestic
pressures within Cuba for economic reform. History may
prove that because of the "other factors" to which
Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin referred
when in Cuba in April 1990--factors such as socialist
solidarity and, perhaps more importantly, the
institutional interests of the Soviet military in not
losing their strategic outpost in the Western
Hemisphere—the Gorbachev leadership may not
dramatically alter Soviet relations with Cuba in the
short run. 47 However, one must wonder how long a
revolutionary state convinced of its historical mission
will continue to enjoy the largess of a superpower which
no longer speaks in universal terms, seeks accommodation
with the United States, and is rapidly turning its
attention from adventurism to internal rebuilding.
47Gillian Gunn, a senior associate of the Carnegie
Endowment and a Cuba specialist, posits that "however
warm the Moscow-Washington relationship has become, it
is unlikely that Gorbachev could convince his military
to sacrifice its valuable assets in Cuba in the near
future" (Gillian Gunn, "Will Castro Fall?” Foreign
Policy 79 [Summer 1990]: 135).
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Castro's Response To Perestroika
From the perspective of the Cuban leadership, the
world has become an increasingly hostile place. Former
allie s in the socialist world are accepting reforms or
being thrown out of office; the Soviet Union is
withdrawing from its commitment to socialist
internationalism; U.S. -Soviet relations have improved
without a commensurate warming of U.S. -Cuban relations;
and Cuban-Americans are confident that the fall of the
Castro regime is imminent. 48 The Cuban perception is
that the socialist world is in crisis largely due to the
success of a long-term imperialist strategy of
undermining socialism from within. This has been
compounded by "some errors that might have been
committed which, in Cuba, [are] being eliminated through
the process of rectification of errors and negative
tendencies." 49 Castro has made it clear, however, that
while nations "[have] the right to evolve from socialism
to capitalism . . . nothing and nobody will make Cuba
deviate from the socialist path." 50 In his New Year's
address to the Cuban people in January 1990 Castro
480n this latter point see David E. Pitt, "Dreaming
of an End to Castro, Cubans in Miami are Abuzz," The New
York Times , 19 February 1990, p. 1.
49Quoted in "Developments in Eastern Europe put
Cuba's Castro on the Defensive," Latin American Regional
Reports: Caribbean , 25 January 1990, p. 1.
50Ibid.
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declared that "if fate were to decree that one day, we
would be among the last defenders of socialism ... we
would defend this bulwark to the last drop of blood." 51
In general, Fidel Castro's response to Soviet
perestroika and to the changes it has engendered has
been characterized by bravado and contempt for the
reformers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Behind this harsh rhetoric however, one can discern a
multi-faceted strategy which attempts to defuse or
repress demands for reform of the island's Castro-style
socialism and Marxist-Leninist political structures.
Castro's response to perestroika begins with the
creation of a siege atmosphere at home which is used to
both justify the refusal to liberalize politically and
to demand greater sacrifices from the Cuban people.
This is coupled with a potent mix of appeals to
revolutionary idealism and Cuban nationalism, increased
"democracy" for pro-Castro loyalists, heightened
repression of dissidents, and an active policy on the
part of the maximum leader of going to the people in
order to bolster morale and improve his image.
A common theme which runs through the public
pronouncements of President Castro, especially since
December 1989, is that his island nation is at imminent
“Quoted in Michael D. Barnes, "A Visit to Havana,"
The Times of the Americas, 21 February 1990, p. 20.
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at the hands of either the United States or the
nation s erstwhile friends and allies. This siege
atmosphere is created to justify both the refusal to
liberalize politically and the demand for greater
popular sacrifice. In late 1989, on the occasion of the
return of Cuba's dead from its African campaigns, Castro
equated their death in the service of the revolution
with the effort now required of Cubans to defend the
revolution. "They died for socialism," Castro declared.
"We will be able to follow their example. . . .
Socialism or deathl" 52
Most often the threat to the revolution is
described as emanating from the United States. At a
press conference for Cuban and foreign journalists given
on April 3, 1990 President Castro asserted that
the U.S. government ... is experiencing a
great euphoria stemming not just from the
events in Panama or Nicaragua, but stemming
from the events that took place in the Eastern
European countries. The United States can't
contain its idea at this time, its feeling of
being the master of the world. . . . They
can't hide their euphoria. That's what led
them to invade Panama. . . . The United States
is intervening everywhere. One day it decides
that Libya must be bombed, so it bombs Libya.
Another day it decides that Lebanon must be
bombed, so it bombs Lebanon. It's no longer a
matter of U.S. philosophy implying the right
to intervene in Latin America, but the right
to intervene anywhere in the world. . . . [W]e
know that as a consequence of all that, we're
now forced to confront some dangers, because
“Quoted in Gunn, p. 140.
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the U.S. policy toward Cuba has lately grown
more aggressive and more threatening. 53
On July 26, 1990, in an address commemorating the
thirty-seventh anniversary of the assault on the Moncada
Garrison, President Castro made his case even more
strongly, arguing that "Cuba is a country constantly
threatened by the imperialists. ..." For President
Bush, Cuba is "a sick obsession."
Cuba is everywhere. When Bush has breakfast
in the morning there must be a Cuba in his
coffee, in the water or the bread. He never
forgets Cuba neither awake nor asleep. It's a
sick obsession and a disgrace for the world.
Even the allies of the United States in Europe
ask how far these crazy people will go? But
their intentions are obvious. 54
With the increasing friendship between the U.S. and
the USSR, Castro believes that the U.S. "sees Cuba as
the enemy par excellence." Cuba, he argues, "stands in
the way" of U.S. plans for the hemisphere and for the
Third World in general. Cuba is "the irritating thorn,
the bone in [the U.S.] throat." Hence, "more than ever
before [the United States] harasses Cuba, threatens
Cuba. " 55
53A full text of the press conference is found in
Granma Weekly Review , 22 April 1990, pp. 2-5.
54A full text of Castro's address is found in
Granma Weekly Review , 5 August 1990, pp. 3-5.
55See the transcript of President Castro's meeting
with Christian Base Communities in Brazil 17 March 1990,
reprinted in Granma Weekly Review , 8 April 1990, pp. 7-
12 .
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U.S. battleships and aircraft carriers keep
hovering around our country. The U.S. rulers
are arrogant and have gone mad; emboldened and
euphoric, they think socialism no longer
exists which makes them more aggressive, more
dangerous. This is the beginning of a new
era, a new stage. These may be times of very
challenging tests for our people. 56
In the face of increased U.S. aggression, Castro
has called upon his people to defend "the ideological
and military trenches of the revolution."
If in the future we are given the role of
being one of the last bastions of socialism,
in a world in which the U.S. embodies Hitler's
imperialist dream, we will know how to defend
it. . .
.
[W]e prefer to die rather than be
slaves and go back to being dominated by the
United States. . . . Cowards surrender, not
revolutionaries. . .
.
[Hence] Cuba won't be
as easy to overcome as the United States
thinks
.
57
Castro has blamed the "half-hearted" condemnation
by Latin American countries of the U.S. invasion of
Panama for Washington's growing "arrogance, prepotency,
and aggressiveness." But it is not only sworn enemies
of the revolution that appear to be conspiring against
Cuba. Castro has been enraged by the "repugnant
attitude" of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even
Bulgaria in voting with the U.S. in the United Nations
Human Rights Commission to put Cuba on its watch list.
56Speech given by President Castro to the Sixteenth
Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade
Unions, January 28, 1990. Full text is found in Granma
Weekly Review 11 February 1990, pp. 2-4.
57See transcript of Castro's meeting with Christian
Base Communities, Granma Weekly Review 8 April 1990.
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He has said that these "ex-Socialist countries" will be
responsible for the bloodbath if the U.S. invades
Cuba. 58
Cuba's declining economic conditions have led the
island's maximum leader to call for increased sacrifices
by the nation's people, justifying these as necessary in
an increasingly hostile world. The government's recent
decision to conserve Cuba's fast-diminishing oil stocks
by closing the Ernesto Guevara nickel plant in Moa and
cutting by 50 percent the supply of petrol and diesel
oil to both the state sector and private consumers was
justified in light of the "[uncertain] conditions under
which we will receive oil in the future." 59 Similarly,
in August 1990 Castro warned his countrymen that
draconian austerity measures would have to be imposed if
the USSR was no longer willing or able to go on
supplying an annual 90 million barrels of subsidized
petroleum. By early August 1990 the Soviet Union was
58See "Friends Become Foes as Cuba Refuses to
Accept Moscow's sNew Thinking'," Latin American Regional
Reports: Caribbean 5 April 1990, p. 1.
59The indefinite shutdown of the Ernesto Guevara
nickel plant in Moa will cause a major disruption of
supplies of the metal to the Soviet Union, which
normally takes the entire production of the plant, some
15,000 tons a year. See "Special Measures for Fuel
Shortage," Granma Weekly Review 9 September 1990, p. 9;
and "Production Halted at Moa Nickel Plant," Latin
American Regional Report: Caribbean 4 October 1990,
p. 7 .
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already 50 percent behind the agreed quota of 13.3 tons
of oil for 1990. 60
President Castro has argued that in this period of
economic hardship Cubans "have to implement more than
ever that principle of the Three Musketeers: One for all
and all for onel" 61 Cuba's deteriorating economic
relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe
are what the imperialists are hoping for, it's
one of their great hopes. . .
.
[0]ne of the
imperialists' biggest hopes is that the
Eastern European problems or the problems of
the Soviet Union will deprive Cuba of
resources that are essential, that are
indispensable for development. . .
.
[However]
the imperialists underestimate us if they
believe that the Revolution can be defeated in
any field: in the military or the economic
field. ... I believe that seldom before,
probably never, have our people made bigger or
more resolute efforts in the history of the
Revolution
.
62
60See "Politics and Diplomacy: Blowing Hot and Cold
on Spain," Latin American Weekly Report , 9 August 1990,
p. 3. Some austerity measures already adopted include:
-asking office workers to switch off their air
conditioners
-replacing tractors with oxen in some areas of
the countryside
-extending the tours of duty for military
draftees in order to help the army become
self-sufficient in food
-ordering the halt of all housing construction
projects
.
See also "Special Measures Taken Because of Fuel
Shortage," Granma Weekly Review , 9 September 1990, p. 9.
61See speech given by President Castro at the
ceremony to present the Bias Roca Construction
Contingent with the National Vanguard flag, 3 June 1990.
Text found in Granma Weekly Review , 17 June 1990, p. 3.
62 Ibid.
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These same concerns with imminent imperialist
attack on the Revolution are used to justify Castro's
unwillingness to engage in meaningful democratic reform.
While President Castro's position traditionally has been
that elections are unnecessary in revolutionary Cuba
since "In Cuba ... we have our own type of
elections," 63 he has recently been more vocal in his
denunciations of the world-wide movement toward
increased political pluralism. In a January 28, 1990
address to the Sixteenth Congress of the Central
Organization of Cuban Trade Unions Castro lamented the
growing fragmentation in "societies that are . .
.
going
down the beaten path of western and capitalist
philosophy." 64 This fragmentation, he asserts, plays
into the hands of U.S. imperialism.
How wonderful for U.S. imperialism . . . that
our societies are fragmenting into a thousand
pieces I How wonderful to keep us backward,
oppressed, exploited and dominated 1 What
would the imperialists give to divide our
people into two, three, or 100 fragments 1 How
easy it would then be for them to land here
and then trample underfoot the hearts of our
people 1 How wonderful it would be for
Imperialism if this small country which has
opposed it in such a resolute, courageous and
determined manner for so many years could be
easily defeated and occupied 1 . . . [However]
in these times, when it seems like a crime to
talk about socialism, and even more of a crime
to talk about communism . . . there can be no
63See "Quayle Chides Castro but Fidel Gets
Limelight," Los Angeles Times , 16 March 1990, p. 2.
64Granma Weekly Review . 11 February 1990, p. 2.
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doubt about [Cuban unity] around revolutionary
ideas
,
around the most just social concept
ever known to humanity, that of socialism and
communism. . . , 65
Castro's concerns have been echoed by Carlos
Aldana, secretary of the Cuban Communist party's central
committee, who in June 1990 confirmed that multiple
political parties will not be tolerated in Cuba. "Cuba
cannot afford the luxury of opposition parties knowing
that, on our own soil, they will represent the interests
of the United States." 66 In a similar vein, the
Communist party's political bureau issued a statement on
June 23, 1990 in which it reaffirmed "the idea of a
sole, Marti-style and Marxist-Leninist party," and
rejected "the new reactionary dogma that there is no
democracy and renovation without multiple parties."
After all, a multi-party system was "used by imperialism
to apply its neo-colonial dominance" in the past. 67
In this context of increased danger President
Castro has appealed to the revolutionary idealism of the
Cuban people and has increasingly equated Castroism with
Cuban nationalism. Castro's appeals to revolutionary
idealism can be traced back to the Communist party's
65Ibid.
“Quoted in "Castro Regime not prepared to discuss
v Imperialist ' Multi-Party System," Latin American
Regional Reports; Caribbean , 26 July 1990, p. 1.
67Ibid.
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1986 decision to "rectify" the "methods and principles"
applied in the running of the economy. 68 Cuban
rectification did away with the limited market
mechanisms previously introduced into the economy and
called for movement away from the "bourgeois liberal"
tendencies of the last ten years and for a
"moralization" of the domestic economy. To this end the
politburo, meeting in emergency session, approved new
measures which include:
-The end of private construction and sales of
homes
;
-A clampdown on artists, painters, craftsmen
and tradesmen selling their work privately,
as well as on street vendors, lorry owners and
unofficial restaurants;
-A police clampdown on "anti-social" elements;
-The creation of an official ministry charged
with the elimination of corruption and
inefficiency from the economy;
-A revival of moral incentives and voluntary
work. 69
68For a detailed discussion of Cuban Rectification
policies see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s ,
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981);
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two
Decade Appraisal
,
(Albuquerque : University of New
Mexico Press, 1981); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban
Economy in the 1980s: The Return of Ideology," in
Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future
Challenges , ed. Sergio Roca (Boulder: Westview Press,
1988), pp. 59-100; Andrew Zimbalist and Susan Eckstein,
"Patterns of Cuban Development: The First Twenty-Five
Years," in Cuba's Socialist Economy: Toward the 1990s ,
ed. Andrew Zimbalist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), pp
7-21.
69See "Politics: Liberal Reforms Outdated," Latin
American Regional Report: Caribbean , 24 July 1986, p. 4
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President Castro argued that these measures were
essential if the mistaken course of the revolution,
which was leading Cuba not toward socialism and
communism but "to a system worse than capitalism," was
to be corrected. 70 Castro asked for popular support
against "people who are apparently great Marxists, well
versed in Marxism, but who have a capitalistic or petty
bourgeois soul," Marxists who have "a blind faith in
economic mechanisms and [a belief] that socialism can be
built with mechanisms" rather than trusting moral
incentives and the revolutionary spirit of the
population. 71 More recently, President Castro has been
quick to praise the revolutionary idealism of workers
and young people. In separate addresses to construction
workers in May and June 1990 Castro emphasized the need
for continued hard work in order to defend the
revolution in an increasingly hostile international
environment. 72 "All of you are like a flag flying high
in these heroic and glorious times . . . you are the
70Speech given by Fidel Castro at the close of the
Deferred Session of the Third Congress of the Communist
Party of Cuba on December 2, 1986 reprinted in Granma
Weekly Review , 5 December 1986.
71Ibid.
72See "Bias Roca Construction Contingent Awarded
High Labor Distinction," Granma Weekly Review ,
10 June 1990, p. 9; and "Fidel In The Inauguration of
the Paradiso And Sol Palmeras Hotels," Granma Weekly
Review
,
2 7 May 1990, pp. 2-3.
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proof of what socialism is, of what socialism can be, of
the superiority of socialism," said Castro in closing
the ceremony to present the Bias Roca Construction
Contingent with the 1989 National Vanguard Flag, awarded
by the construction workers' national trade union. 73
Similarly, in an address to the second meeting of the
Young Communist League on April 28, 1990, President
Castro urged young people to continue to make
ideological work their top priority, for, in the words
of General of the Army Raul Castro,
the upsetting world situation has heightened
the tension for our Revolution in all fields
and represents a great challenge that requires
of us . .
.
profound reflection and a
thoughtful, creative response. 74
Castro is also working hard to equate his version
of socialism with Cuban nationalism. In a December 1989
speech Castro argued that "In Cuba, revolution,
socialism and national independence are insolubly
linked. If capitalism returned some day to Cuba, our
independence and sovereignty would disappear forever.
We would be an extension of Miami." 75 In making his
case that "if the Revolution were defeated ... it
73See "Bias Roca... Granma Weekly Review ,
10 June 1990, p. 9; and "Fidel Speaks to Bias Roca
Contingent," Granma Weekly Review , 17 June 1990, p. 3.
74See "Young Communist League's Work Must be
Profound and Dynamic," Granma Weekly Review ,
13 May 1990, p. 5.
75Quoted in Gunn, p. 140.
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would mean the end to our country's independence
[since] ... Revolution, independence and sovereignty
are inseparable in Cuba," 76 Castro has also invoked the
images of revered Cuban nationalists.
[We are] on the eve of critical tests. If
those tests come, we can tell Marti that now,
more than ever, we need his thoughts, his
ideas and his virtues. To Marti, Maceo and
all the others like them we also say that now,
more than ever, we are proud of being their
followers, of being their faithful,
unconditional disciples, and we reaffirm two
immortal slogans which link Marx, Lenin and
Engels with Marti, Maceo, Cespedes and all the
other heroes of our independence and freedom:
Socialism or Death l Patria o Muertel
Venceremos 1 77
Another aspect of Castro's strategy designed to
ward off the political changes associated with
perestroika is to increase "democracy" for his
supporters by providing them with increased channels to
express their views while staying within the limits of
Castro's own vision of a communist order. The new
initiatives are an attempt to make the state and party
structures more efficient and responsive to the concerns
of those loyal to the existing system. They are not
designed to accommodate the concerns of dissidents or to
76See the text of the speech given by Castro during
a meeting with Brazilian intellectuals in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, on 18 March 1990, reprinted in Granma Weekly
Review , 15 April 1990, pp. 2-5.
77See Castro's speech at the closing session of the
Sixteenth Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban
Trade Unions on 28 January 1990, reprinted in Granma
Weekly Review , 11 February 1990, pp. 2-4.
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create additional space for free market mechanisms.
Evidence of this new element of Castro's strategy
appeared in January 1990 when Cuba announced that
henceforth delegates to local Communist party
organizations in workplaces would be chosen by secret
ballot from candidates to be selected by the workers
themselves. Previously delegates had been chosen from a
list drawn up by the party with a show of hands. 78 In
February 1990 the Central Committee announced it would
begin a process of "perfecting" institutions while
maintaining a "single, Leninist party based on the
principles of democratic centralism." 79 According to
Cuban sources, one of the "formalities" that may be
"eradicated" is the tendency of the National Assembly to
rubber-stamp party decisions. Also under consideration
is the direct election of Assembly delegates. 80
This movement toward limited liberalization was
furthered in June 1990 when the Political Bureau of the
Cuban Communist Party issued a long note which spoke of
the "exceptionally difficult and dangerous situation"
78Gunn, p. 141.
79
"Cubans Outline Plan to 'Perfect' Communist
Rule," New York Times , 18 February 1990, p. 9; "Hard-
Line Cubans Consider Reforms," Boston Globe ,
18 February 1990, p. 2; "Impending Change:
'Participation' with Strict PCC Control," Latin American
Regional Report: Caribbean , 1 March 1990, p. 4.
80Gunn, p. 141.
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faced by the Revolution under present circumstances of
unprecedented ideological and psychological pressure and
called for a broad national debate to achieve "ever more
democratic operations of political and state
institutions." 81 While positing that the nation's
commitment to "a single party based on Marti and
Marxism-Leninism . . . can't be questioned," the
Political Bureau's memo states that
our firmness in the defense of socialism
doesn't mean being closed-minded or resisting
an analysis of logical transformations for
which conditions have matured in the political
life of the country. We want to get different
ideas, suggestions and views which can later
be matured and enriched. . . . The debate may
cover any aspect of the internal functioning
of the Party such as recruitment, ways of
joining, methods of choosing candidates and
the election of leading bodies with the clear
purpose of finding more democratic
alternatives which assure greater support by
members for their leaders. . . . The value of
a well-founded and objective national debate
of political clarification is that it will
enable the Party to understand much more
objectively the true state of feelings,
opinions and concerns existing in the country.
Therefore, we should not express regret if
views which until now were inhibited or
repressed come to the fore, and we have the
possibility and opportunity to discuss,
provide evidence and put an end to confusion
and errors. Nor should we be surprised if
tendencies dominant in the catastrophe in
Eastern Europe emerge in one way or the other
in the debates. This . . . will help us
clarify essential concepts of democracy,
social justice, human rights and freedom. 82
81
"Communist Party Promotes Broad National Debate,
Granma Weekly Review , 1 July 1990, p. 1.
82Ibid.
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In early October 1990 the leadership of the Party
announced that it would introduce direct, secret voting
and multiple candidates in elections for municipal and
provincial party committees scheduled to be held between
November 1990 and February 1991. Arguing that it could
not wait for the coming fourth party congress in early
1991 to introduce the changes, the national leadership
also announced that it was slashing national and
provincial party posts by fifty percent and reorganizing
the powerful Central Committee Secretariat. The party
should in this way be an example of rigorous application
of the principle of not using a single employee more
than is strictly necessary. 83
Increased Castro-style "democracy" for loyalists is
being balanced by more intense repression of dissidents.
On March 12, 1989 the Cuban security police rousted at
least eleven human-rights advocates from their beds in a
series of early-morning raids, searching homes and
confiscating papers and books. The Cuban leadership
asserted that seven of the dissidents were arrested
because they sent a congratulatory letter to the United
States delegation to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee hailing the passage of a resolution that
implicitly criticized the Castro Government for acts of
83
"Cuban Communist Party is Moving to Slash its
Bureaucracy by Half," New York Times , 7 October 1990,
p. 9
.
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Cuba has also admitted thatpolitical repression. 84
approximately 30 people who testified to the UN Human
Rights Committee that visited Cuba in September 1988
have been detained or imprisoned.
Among the most notable recent detentions are
four members of Cuba's Union of Communist
Youth, who were arrested after they complained
about the lack of democracy in Cuba and
Castro's "personality cult"; the head of the
Cuban Party for Human Rights, Samuel Martinez
Lara, jailed for nine months following his
attempt to organize a demonstration in favor
of perestroika during Gorbachev's visit to
Havana in the spring of 1989; human rights
activist Elizardo Sanchez, imprisoned for two
years and two of his colleagues for one and a
half years each, after they criticized the
trial and execution of Ochoa. 85
A final element of Castro's strategy may turn out
to be the most important, but it is also the hardest to
quantify. Castro is seeking to enhance his image by
making almost frequent appearances all over the island.
"His bantering, irreverent style is well received by
some Cubans who still regard him as the revolutionary
who forced out a corrupt dictator, who guaranteed
education, health care, and basic food and housing and
who turned Cuba into a mini-power." 86 While tarnished
abroad, Castro hopes that his rule is still considered
legitimate by many at home and that Cubans are committed
84David E. Pitt, "Cuba Said to Seize 11 Rights
Advocates," New York Times , 13 March 1990, p. 3.
85Gunn, p. 142.
86 Ibid.
,
p. 143
.
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to him as maximum leader and embodiment of the
Revolution.
Conclusions
Castro's survival strategy, which combines
increased political participation for loyalists,
heightened repression of dissidents and the use of
rhetoric which harkens back to earlier periods in the
revolution's history and demands sacrifices like those
that were necessary to protect the Revolution in its
first years, attempts to maintain the island's Castro-
style socialism and Marxist-Leninist political
structures in an increasingly hostile environment. The
success of the strategy may depend upon two interrelated
factors: the extent of the hardship engendered by Cuba's
economic isolation and the severity of the austerity
measures imposed by the Castro government; and the
degree to which President Castro is able to use his
charismatic leadership to mobilize the nation in support
of the Revolution.
The Cuban economy has for years been plagued by
inefficiency and bureaucracy. Consumers have had to
contend with long lines, shoddily produced goods and
frequent shortages of items. The recent changes in the
socialist world have exacerbated these problems and
brought these long-standing shortcomings to a head.
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From the perspective of the revolutionary government,
this already bleak situation is intensified by the fact
that Cubans rarely compare their economic conditions
with those of Dominicans or Haitians. Their main point
of reference "is the United States, particularly their
relatives in Miami." 87 Another reference point is the
recent past, yet in the last few years the standard of
living has deteriorated. 88 Eugenio Balari, head of the
Cuban Institute of Internal Demand, the government
agency charged with researching consumer needs, asserts
that "we are no longer talking about increasing levels
of consumption. Our goal now is to hold the line at
1984 levels." 89 Moreover, the dramatic drop in Eastern
European trade and the new economic relations between
Cuba and the Soviet Union have required the adoption of
87Medea Benjamin, "Things Fall Apart," NACLA:
Report on the Americas 24 (August 1990): 15.
88Andrew Zimbalist attributes the decline in the
Cuban economy in the mid-1980s to "low sugar prices,
plummeting petroleum prices (Cuba's re-export of Soviet
petroleum provided roughly 40 percent of its hard
currency earnings during 1983-1985), devastation from
Hurricane Kate, several consecutive years of
intensifying drought, drastic dollar devaluation, the
tightening of the U.S. embargo and growing protectionism
in Western markets, [which] all combined to reduce
Cuba's hard currency earnings by 337.1 million, or 27.1
percent" (quoted in Ibid. ) . As of 1986 Cuba was unable
to make further payment of its debt to the West. New
loans dried up, and Cuba cut Western imports
drastically. Cuba was forced once again to depend on
the socialist CMEA.
89Quoted in Benjamin, p. 15.
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severe austerity measures which further deteriorate the
standard of living of the majority of Cubans. The Cuban
government is bracing its people for a "special period
in peacetime , " a period which will require wartime
economic measures, a period which may bring a
precipitous decline in living standards.
Juan M. del Aguila argues that the popular unrest
engendered by the economic crisis will be bolstered by
increased "social fatigue and political disillusionment
[as well as a growing sense of not] 'being on the right
side of history'" as Cubans discover the changes
occurring elsewhere in the socialist world.
Despite government efforts to censor reports
of what is happening in parts of the communist
world, information about it reaches the public
via the Voice of America's Radio Marti and
other outlets. . . . It is impossible to
determine what impact this information has on
the political elite or sophisticated
technocrats and other policy makers, but there
is no doubt that comparisons between the
situation in Cuba and transformations underway
in the communist world force individuals to
rethink why the Cuban system is stuck and
where it is headed. 90
These developments have led many within the Cuban
exile community as well as significant numbers of
commentators in the mainstream press to assert that it
is only a matter of time before Castro falls in an
90Juan M. del Aguila, "Cuba: Guarding the
Revolution," in Glasnost. Perestroika and the Socialist
Community , eds. Charles Bukowski and J. Richard Walsh
(New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 79-80.
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Eastern Europe-style popular uprising. However, the
link between economic deprivation and popular revolt may
not be so clear-cut in the Cuban case. The optimism
expressed in the popular media and among exiles is based
on the incorrect assumption that communism in Cuba is as
despised as it is in Eastern Europe. This is not the
case, in large part because while communism came to
Eastern Europe on the point of Soviet bayonets, in Cuba
communism was the result of revolution. Samuel P.
Huntington posits that
revolutionary governments may be undermined by
affluence; but they are never overthrown by
poverty. Material deprivations, which would
have been insufferable under the old regime,
are proof of the strength of the new one. The
less their food and material comfort the more
the people come to value the political and
ideological accomplishments of the revolution
for which they are suffering so much. 91
Hence the importance of economic deprivations in
creating popular anti-regime unrest is dependent upon
the degree to which the Cuban people continue to value
and support the Revolution and its charismatic maximum
leader
.
There is no doubt that the rapid changes that swept
through Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in late 1989
and 1990 have left many Cubans feeling isolated and
confused. "It's as if we spent our whole lives
91Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),
pp. 309-310.
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believing in God, then suddenly we woke up one day and
discovered that God didn't exist," explains a Cuban high
school teacher. 92 The demise of communism has also had
a sobering effect on the revolutionary leadership as
evidenced by the movement toward increased political
participation and "democracy," albeit within the
framework of a one-party system. Similarly, Castro's
hard-line position appears to have had the effect of
increasing dissent within Cuban society.
Much of the evidence employed to make the case that
anti-Castro sentiment is on the rise is anecdotal.
Gillian Gunn reports that
the U.S. Coast Guard says it picked up five
times as many refugees in the waters between
Cuba and Florida in 1989 as in 1988. Juvenile
delinquency is rising, and last year it was
reported that in a Havana cinema youths began
to hum the song "This Man is Crazy, He Thinks
He Rules The World" when a newsreel showing
Castro was shown. 93
In a similar vein, Medea Benjamin reports that "bitter
sarcastic underground jokes" are circulating through
Cuba. 94 Compounding these feelings of dissent is the
92Quoted in Medea Benjamin, p. 23.
93Gunn, p. 144.
940ne has Fidel, his brother Raul and a pilot
flying over Cuba. "I think I'll throw out a 20 peso
bill and make some Cuban happy," says Fidel. "Why don't
you throw out two 10 peso bills and make two Cubans
happy?" suggests Raul. "Or I could throw out four 5
peso bills and make four Cubans happy," responds Fidel.
The pilot turns around and says "Why don't you throw
yourselves out and make 10 million Cubans happy"
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lasting impact of the "Ochoa scandal." In July 1989
Major General Arnoldo Ochoa and three other officers
were found guilty of drug trafficking and were executed
by firing squad. "For years the United States had been
accusing Cuban officials of drug dealing, and we yelled
and screamed that it was just Yankee propaganda to
discredit the revolution," explained a Cuban who had
fought for two years in Angola under Ochoa's command.
You can imagine how we felt when we discovered
some of those accusations were truel And Cuba
is not like the United States, where you can
separate individuals from the government
because the government changes every four
years. Here those individuals are the
government, and their activities reflect on
the system as a whole. 95
Juan M. del Aguila argues that there exist anti-
Castro, pro-reform factions in Cuba's top elite however
he provides no proof that such figures exist.
Similarly, he posits that dissent within civil society
is increasing and that an "underground political
subculture," which often works through human rights
groups and associations, survives in an atmosphere of
great hostility. 96 On the other hand, the State
Department has reported few overt signs of
dissatisfaction. There are no mass anti-government
(Benjamin, p. 24).
95Quoted in Ibid.
96del Aguila, p. 74.
166
demonstrations
,
nor is there even anti-government
graffiti. The lack of overt protest can be explained by
the intense repression of dissidents and by the
ambivalence of many of Castro's critics. Even
del Aguila, in his discussion of dissent in civil
society
,
concedes that "It is impossible to determine
whether the values of this subculture reject socialism
as such, or only its blatantly dictatorial practices
under the Castro regime." 97
Indeed, Cuban society appears to be increasingly
polarized between a shrinking number of what the
government calls "revolutionaries" and a expanding
number of "counterrevolutionaries." The former take
solace in the image of David fighting the Goliath
superpowers 98
,
while the latter
are not necessarily sympathetic to democratic
capitalism . .
.
[and while] reject [ing]
Marxism-Leninism . . . do so from a
nationalistic and anti-imperialist posture,
looking to the teachings of Jose Marti for
their inspiration. 99
97Ibid.
,
p. 75.
"Medea Benjamin describes the views of "Roberto,"
a proponent of this view: "When I asked if he was
worried about a possible cut-off of Soviet trade,
Roberto laughed. "You know us Cubans, we've got more
cojones than the Soviets and the Yankees rolled
together. We thumbed our nose at both superpowers
during the missile crisis and we're still here. Our
cojones got us where we are today, and they'll see us
through the next round" (Benjamin, p. 26).
"del Aguila, p. 75.
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Caught in the middle are the majority of Cubans. They
recognize the benefits of the revolution and consider
themselves socialists, but have many complaints about
their system. The majority of Cubans are, therefore,
quite unlike Eastern Europeans and Soviet communists for
they still perceive the Cuban Communist Party led by
Fidel as legitimate, albeit in need of reform.
Will this political center hold? Will Castro
continue to benefit from Cubans who recognize the
benefits of the revolution but who are increasingly in
favor of reform and liberalization of the regime's
dictatorial rule? Much depends on which of the two
patterns now discernable in Cuba wins out: the
intransigence of "socialism or death 1"; or the gradual
political opening and liberalization? Political change
in Cuba is inevitable given the radical transformations
shaking the socialist world. The question that remains
unanswered is will this change come with the PCC in the
lead, directing a gradual Cuban-style perestroika and
glasnost
,
or will the shaky pro-revolution coalition
currently backing Fidel crumble in the face of growing
hardship and centralized political control.
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CHAPTER 5
PERESTROIKA AND THE SANDINISTA
REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, in an interview
with the official FSLN newspaper Barricada
. was asked to
discuss the influence Soviet perestroika has had on the
Sandinista revolution. "I do not see how perestroika
can exert any influence on the Nicaraguan revolution,
which has its own characteristics," he replied. 1 Vice
Coordinator of the FSLN Executive Committee Bayardo Arce
has put it more directly: "We welcome [the USSR's] new
phase of development
—
perestroika." 2
Unlike the other Marxist-Leninist regime in the
Caribbean, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, has
never adhered to an orthodox Marxism. Rather, FSLN
theorists—from Carlos Fonseca to Daniel Ortega—have
stressed the need to shape Marxism to a nation's unique
conditions. Hence, from the Sandinista perspective
"perestroika is the answer to a socialist regime 70
years after its revolution . . . [it] is the result of a
socialist regime with 70 years of experience." 3
1
"Daniel Ortega on Peace, Economy, Politics,
Plans," Barricada 31 December 1987, p. 1.
2
"Arce Hails Soviet Revolution, Assistance," FBIS-
Latin America 9 November 1987, p. 22.
3Daniel Ortega in Barricada 31 December 1987, p. 2.
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Sandinista theorists posit that no one could, or should,
expect socialism to take the same form everywhere.
As will be discussed below, Sandinista theorists
see socialism coming to Nicaragua, because of its unique
conditions, in a two-stage process. Interestingly, many
of the developments one associates with Soviet politics
under Gorbachev
—
glasnost
,
with its freedom to criticize
one's superiors and communicate with one's leaders;
economic liberalization in which private enterprise,
albeit limited, is valued and seen as a key to the
nation's development; increased levels of democracy—are
present also in the first phase of Nicaragua's
Sandinista revolution. 4 Hence, unlike Castro in Cuba,
the Sandinistas, even more pro-Soviet members of the
Frente like Minister of Planning Henry Ruiz, seem not to
be threatened ideologically by the changes in the Soviet
Union and the socialist world. 5
The assertions of President Ortega and other
members of the FSLN notwithstanding, perestroika and the
changes it has brought to the socialist world have had
serious implications for the FSLN. With "the demise of
According to Daniel Ortega: "Many of the elements
being handled within perestroika were already part of
the Nicaraguan revolution, given the character of our
process." Ibid.
5
"Foreign Cooperation Minister Ruiz on
Perestroika," FBIS-Latin America , 19 January 1990,
pp. 19-21.
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Communism" the flow of aid to the Sandinistas from the
socialist world declined, which in turn, exacerbated the
economic downturn which was crucial in the Sandinista 's
electoral defeat in February 1990. Moreover, Soviet
foreign policy "new thinking's" emphasis on the
interrelated issues of improving relations with the
United States and resolving regional conflicts, coupled
with the USSR's unwillingness to bankroll another client
state in the distant Western Hemisphere, led the USSR to
stress the limits of their support for the Nicaraguan
revolution. This increased the isolation of Sandinista
Nicaragua and had the effect of pressuring the FSLN to
pursue peace with the Contras and their U.S. backers. 6
The FSLN and the Sandinista Revolution
The FSLN was founded in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in
July 1961 by three friends and former university
students: Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomas Borge and Silvio
Mayorga. Fonseca, who had discovered the writings of
Augusto Cesar Sandino early in his student years and
would champion Sandino 's thought among his fellow
revolutionaries, and Borge were introduced to Marxism as
high school students in the provincial town of Matagalpa
6Not surprisingly, both nations deny that any
pressure was exerted on the FSLN. See "Press Club News
Conference," FBIS-Latin America . 13 November 1987,
pp. 13-20 and "Soviet Ambassador Comments on Relations,"
FBIS-Latin America , 19 December 1989, pp. 17-18.
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in the early 1950s and read Lenin as students at the
national university in Leon. Both joined the youth
organization of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)
,
Nicaragua's pro-Moscow Communist party. Fonseca later
became a member of the PSN and visited the Soviet Union
in 1957 as Nicaragua's only delegate to the Sixth Youth
and Student Festival in Moscow. Upon his return Fonseca
wrote "A Nicaraguan in Moscow," a pamphlet extolling
socialism and giving an idealized account of what he had
seen
.
7
Back in Nicaragua, Fonseca renewed his political
activism, now working to have his friend Borge, who
along with other student leftists was arrested after the
1956 assassination of Somoza Garcia, released from
prison. Fonseca was arrested several times and then in
1958 was deported to Guatemala. The victory of Fidel
Castro led Fonseca to Cuba in 1959, and thereafter
Fonseca began traveling surreptitiously among Cuba,
Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua, organizing
revolutionary opposition to the Somoza regime. The
Cuban revolution also reconfirmed to Fonseca, Borge and
Mayorga the central importance of the armed struggle in
7Sahily Tabares Hernandez, "Biografia de Carlos
Fonseca Amador
,
" in Sandino: Guerrillero Proletario ,
ed. Carlos Fonseca Amador ( Comision Evangelica Latino
Americana de Educacidn Cristiana: Lima, 1979), pp. 5-12,
and Denis Gilbert, Sandinistas . (New York: Basil
Blackwell, 1988), pp. 1-19.
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the mountains and the need to build sympathetic support
among the local peasant population. Put differently,
the Cuban revolution reconfirmed the correctness of
Sandino's guerrilla war and the incorrectness of the
PSN's cautious strategy of peaceful change. "For us,"
wrote Tomas Borge, "Fidel was the resurrection of
Sandino . . . the justification of our dreams." 8
The neophyte Sandinista guerrillas attempted to
transplant the Cuban experience to Nicaraguan soil, and
from 1962 to 1967 actually practiced Castro's "foco"
strategy. In 1963, a first, unsuccessful guerrilla
"foco" was started in the Coco and Bokay River regions
in north-eastern Nicaragua. Living conditions at the
FSLN base on the Rio Coco on the Honduras-Nicaragua
border were appalling. According to Tomas Borge:
There was nothing to eat, not even animals to
hunt. There was no salt. It wasn't just
hunger that was terrible, but constant cold 24
hours a day, because we spent all our time in
the river. We were always wet through with
the clinging rain of that part of the country,
the cold a kind of unrelieved torture,
mosquitos, wild jungle animals and insects.
No shelter, no change of clothes, no food. 9
Worse still, the non-Spanish speaking Miskito
Indian inhabitants of the region did not supply the
®Tomas Borge, Carlos. El Amanecer Ya No Es Una
Tentacion, (Managua: SENAPEP, 1979), p. 23. Quoted in
George Black, Triumph of the People , (London: Zed Press,
1981)
,
p. 76.
9Quoted in Black, p. 78.
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support the FSLN expected. "To the Miskitos, the
difference between the FSLN and Somoza's Guard was hazy.
Both wore olive green uniforms and carried guns; neither
could communicate with the sparse local population." 10
The 1963 clash between the FSLN "foco" and the National
Guard dealt the guerrillas heavy casualties and caused
them to retrench militarily for nearly three years in
order to develop better urban and rural support systems.
In 1967 another "foco" was launched in the area
around the Pancasan mountain, approximately thirty miles
east of Matagalpa. Although the Sandinistas received
active support from local peasant sympathizers, the
outcome for the Sandinistas was inevitable. At the end
of August 1967 Somoza's forces located the Pancasan
"foco" and the National Guard succeeded in decimating
much of the FSLN's rural organization, killing 13 senior
members of the leadership, including Silvio Mayorga, as
well as their peasant collaborators. Yet unlike the
1963 uprising, the fighting in 1967 spurred worker and
student solidarity protests which helped bolster the
political authority of the FSLN within Nicaragua. 11
10Black, p. 78.
nA detailed discussion of FSLN tactics at this
time is found in Donald C. Hodges, Intellectual
Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution , (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 218-224. See also
Black, pp. 80-82.
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In the wake of this defeat the FSLN abandoned its
foquismo” in favor of the Vietnamese-inspired strategy
of "protracted people's war," with its greater emphasis
on the complementary character of military action and
political work among the masses. In 1970 the FSLN's
national leadership ordered that the organization go
underground and only enter into combat as a last resort.
Between 1970 and December 1974, when the Frente began a
new offensive, the FSLN concentrated on organizing its
supporters. In urban factories, in the universities and
in the countryside, the FSLN gained new recruits and
collaborators, so that by the Managua earthquake of
December 1972 the rebels were in a stronger position to
continue their struggle against the Somoza dictatorship.
The 1972 earthquake set off a political crisis that
gathered momentum through the remainder of the decade.
Rising labor unrest, high inflation, disquiet among the
economic elite and growing political dissatisfaction
because of Somoza 's attempts to engineer his return to
the presidency characterized 1973 and 1974. Indeed, the
Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the
country's leading business organization, became one of
the regime's most tenacious critics while Catholic
Church authorities clashed with Somoza over his control
of crucial relief supplies.
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In 1974 the FSLN resumed the military offensive,
now backed by a stronger organizational network in the
cities and countryside and with a seasoned military arm.
The return to the offensive began December 27, 1974 with
an assault on a party in honor of U.S. Ambassador
Turner B. Shelton at the house of Jose Maria Castillo
Quant, a wealthy cotton exporter and former Minister of
Agriculture. At 10:50 p.m., shortly after the departure
of Ambassador Shelton, a well-drilled assault team of
thirteen Sandinistas attacked and took the entire party
hostage. Following several days of intense negotiations
mediated by Archbishop Obando y Bravo, the hostages were
released in return for a $2 million ransom, the release
of eighteen Sandinistas held prisoner by Somoza, and the
publication of lengthy communiques from the FSLN in La
Prensa, El Centroamericano . and the government paper
Novidades as well as their broadcast on Nicaraguan radio
stations
.
12
The hostage-taking of 1974 gave the FSLN a huge
symbolic victory, won the freedom of several key
Sandinista leaders (including Daniel Ortega Saavedra)
and raised a large sum of money, and in its wake the
FSLN stepped up both its urban and rural actions. The
hostage-taking was also a humiliating defeat for Somoza,
one which did not go unanswered. A state of siege was
12Black, pp. 86-88.
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declared
,
and for 33 months the nation suffered under
martial law and press censorship. "If Somoza was unable
to pull the fish out of the water," wrote a Nicaraguan
author describing the state of siege, "he would try to
empty the pond or poison it." 13
Somoza ordered the Guardia's best counter-
insurgency troops to comb every inch of the
mountains where the guerrillas operated most
freely. To accompany these "search and
destroy" missions, aircraft of the Nicaraguan
airforce bombed the area, resorting in many
cases to the use of napalm and defoliants.
Peasant huts were burned out and their crops
destroyed, women raped. Half a dozen
concentration camps were set up in Matagalpa
and Zelaya and another in Chinandega. In
April 1976, 100 peasant families disappeared
from three northern hamlets, and in November
1977 Nicaraguan and American church sources
listed a further 350 peasant disappearances.
The number of those who died in the 33 months
of the state of siege can never be calculated,
but 3000 is a frequent estimate. 14
The ferocity of Somoza 's repression kept the FSLN
pinned down in its rural strongholds, and it seemed
momentarily as if the movement might have been
destroyed. The government's suffocating pressure led to
parts of the Frente being isolated from each other as
rural guerrilla forces were cut off from urban cadres
and as much of the leadership fled the nation or was in
hiding. This in turn, engendered a splintering of the
13Quoted in Ibid., p. 88.
14Black, p. 89.
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FSLN into three distinct factions or "tendencies," each
espousing different tactics.
The Proletarian Tendency (TP) was the first to
appear, this group emerged from the urban guerrilla
front in 1975. Influenced by the intellectual Jaime
Wheelock Roman, the Proletarian Tendency sought to
broaden the movement's mass base by organizing unions in
factories, in poor neighborhoods, and among new classes
emerging from industrialization. The TP's adherence to
a "traditional Marxist line" would be criticized by the
other factions. 15
The Guerra Popular Prolongada (Popular People's
War—GPP) faction has its roots in the original FSLN
rural organization. After the defeat at Pancasan, the
GPP abandoned the "foco" strategy and preferred the
cautious accumulation of forces advocated by Mao Tse-
Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap. The other factions criticized
15For example, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, of the
Terceristas, in 1978 said of the TP: "They really don't
represent the traditions and the content that have
characterized the FSLN. . . . The [TP] doesn't transcend
propagandism" (quoted in John A. Booth, The End and the
Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution , (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1985), p. 313).
Excellent discussions of the Proletarian Tendency
are found in Hodges, pp. 233-239; Black pp. 92-94; David
Nolan, FSLN: The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the
Nicaraguan Revolution , (Coral Gables, FL: Institute of
Interamerican Studies-Graduate School of International
Studies, University of Miami, 1985), pp. 50-59;
"Interview With Jaime Wheelock Roman," Latin American
Perspectives 20 (Winter 1979): 121-127.
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the GPP as being too cautious militarily and prone to
isolate itself from the daily life of the people. 16
The Terceristas (Third Force) faction appeared in
1976-1977. The Terceristas' leaders, including former
GPP members Daniel and Humberto Ortega Saavedra, relaxed
the original FSLN's requirement for Marxist-Leninist
orthodoxy and rapidly increased their ranks with social
democratic, social Christian and bourgeois recruits,
while the leaders remained Marxist-Leninists
. The
Terceristas were bolder that the other factions in 1977-
1978 and they pressed the urban and rural insurrection
with vigor. The other tendencies criticized them for
excessive boldness if not adventurism, and for a lack of
ideological purity. 17
The FSLN was saved from splitting entirely by the
rapid escalation of popular opposition to the Somoza
dynasty. As hostility to the regime grew, the
internecine battles diminished. In early 1978 mass
protests against the killing of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
160f the GPP Daniel Ortega said, "They have gone
along proposing the accumulation of forces, [but] they
go into the jungle and isolate themselves from the daily
struggle of the masses" (quoted in Booth, p. 313). See
also Black, pp. 94-95; Nolan, pp. 32-49; "Interview With
Henry Ruiz ('Modesto')," Latin American Perspectives 20
(Winter 1979): 118-121.
17Booth
,
pp. 143-144; Black, pp. 95-97; Hodges,
pp. 239-255; Nolan, pp. 60-84; "Interview With Daniel
Ortega," Latin American Politics 20 (Winter 1979): 114-
118.
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and the spontaneous rebellion in Monimbo "revealed a
popular revolutionary animus far greater than most FSLN
leaders had expected." 18 Again in August, more
spontaneous popular uprisings occurred in Matagalpa,
Jinotepe and in other cities. By the beginning of
September 1978 Tercerista leaders concluded that the
revolt was coming with or without them and that they had
best put themselves at the head of the movement. On
September 9 Tercerista fighters launched a national
urban insurrection which was quickly joined by thousands
of lightly armed volunteers as well as GPP and TP
regulars, despite their initial resistance to the plan.
Somoza responded to the insurrection with heavy
shelling, bombing and strafing attacks which allowed the
Guard to retake each rebel controlled city. These
attacks also had the affect of confirming in the minds
of most Nicaraguans the view held by Archbishop Obando y
Bravo that Somoza "will not go accept by force." 19
This in turn, heightened the political authority of the
Sandinista rebels.
The insurrectionary activities of the Nicaraguan
people coupled with the expectation of success drew the
FSLN back together. On March 3, 1979 representatives of
the three Sandinista factions signed a formal
10Booth, p. 144.
19Quoted in Gilbert, p. 11.
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reunification agreement. Whatever reservations the
other factions may have had about the Tercerista tactics
to which the document committed them, they were not
willing to risk being left behind by history. The
agreement established a nine man National Directorate,
with three representatives from each faction. The
members, who would guide the FSLN for years to come,
were Daniel and Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado for
the Terceristas; Borge, Henry Ruiz and Bayardo Arce for
the GPP; and Wheelock, Luis Carrion and Carlos Nunez for
the TP. The Directorate functioned as a collegial body
without a single leader. 20
During the months between the September
insurrection and the Final Offensive of May-July 1979,
the FSLN was able to train and arm thousands of
guerrilla fighters. According to Humberto Ortega:
Though 150 of us took part in [the September
1978] insurrection, from that moment on we
quickly multiplied into greatly superior
numbers—three or four times that number and
with the potential to recruit thousands more.
Thus we grew in men and we grew in armament,
because we seized [weapons] from the enemy. 21
The Sandinistas also benefitted from a steady flow
of munitions donated by Venezuela and Cuba or purchased
on international markets and channeled through Panama
20Black, pp. 142-154; Gilbert, p. 11.
21Booth, p. 145.
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and Costa Rica. 22 The shipments included some heavy
arms which would later allow the FSLN to conduct
conventional warfare on some fronts. In urban barrios
the FSLN was creating a network of civil defense
committees
,
to support guerrillas and meet the emergency
needs of the civilian population. Somoza was, at the
same time, rearming and expanding the National Guard and
in guns and numbers the Guard remained superior to the
FSLN. But the odds were improving.
At the end of May the FSLN began its "Final
Offensive." The business-led, moderate opposition,
operating through the Broad Opposition Front ( FAO
)
backed the uprising with a general strike that closed
down enterprises across the country. 23 Volunteers
rapidly expanded the ranks of the insurgents and by
22Shirley Christian, Nicaragua; Revolution in the
Family
.
(New York; Random House, 1985), pp. 79-81.
23The FAO included middle and upper-middle class
reformist opponents to Somoza who called for political
democracy, an end to political corruption, freedom to
organize, a mild agrarian reform, and broadened social
welfare guarantees. The FAO actively sought a
negotiated settlement with Somoza from September 1978-
January 1979, encouraged by the U.S. and the OAS.
Internal concessions to Somoza, his Liberal Party and
the National Guard split the FAO in late 1978-early
1979. The growing military power of the FSLN and the
FAO's failure to settle with Somoza further hurt the FAO
and by early 1979 it had lost its status as the rebel's
main political front to the United People's Movement and
the National Patriotic Front. The latter, which
included unions of various sorts, student groups and
lower and middle-class Nicaraguans, were more clearly of
the radical left and their agendas were much closer to
the FSLN's. See Black, pp. 100-141.
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early June the Sandinistas controlled much of the north
and were mounting a strong attack with a conventional
army from the south. After weeks of brutal combat, the
government managed to dislodge Sandinista forces from
their stronghold in the militant, working class
neighborhoods of east Managua. But the FSLN continued
to advance from the north and south so that by mid-July
they controlled most of the country and were poised for
a final drive on the capital.
On July 17 Somoza, his son Tachito and half-brother
Jose (both Guard officers), and a few other ranking
officials boarded a plane for Miami. The caretaker
government they left in place survived for two days
before its leaders followed the Somozas into exile on
July 19, the official date of the revolutionary victory.
The demise of the FAO and the circumstances
surrounding Somoza 's departure further undermined the
political authority of Nicaraguan moderates and of the
United States. Neither had been able to move Somoza.
Their loss was the FSLN's gain. Sandinista strategy,
determination and courage had achieved what
demonstrations, prayers and diplomatic pressures could
not. An organization whose membership numbered fewer
than 20 militants in 1961 had become the core of a mass
movement without precedent in Nicaraguan history. 24
24Booth, p. 147.
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Its military forces were soon to become the national
army and its leaders the nation's top officials.
FSLN Ideology
The ideology of the Frente Sandinista has its roots
in two sources: the life and thought of Sandino, and
Marxism-Leninism. Sandino 's patriotism, his
identification with the masses, his ingenious guerrilla
tactics, his triumph over an elaborately equipped
foreign army and his martyrdom at the hands of the first
Somoza made him the subject of a powerful national myth.
It is Sandino 's image and his myth, less so his ideas,
which are important to the FSLN. 25 Years of repression
under various Somozas nourished the myth so that for
Nicaraguans of diverse ideological inclinations,
"Sandino and the dynasty became historic poles of
political good and evil, national pride and shame." 26
Only the Marxist left, misled by its own orthodoxy,
seemed indifferent to him. Fonseca was an exception
among Marxists and he spent hours convincing his fellow
25A detailed and intriguing discussion of the ideas
of Sandino is found in Hodges, pp. 1-160 especially. On
the life of Sandino see Gregorio Selser, Sandino , (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1981) and Karl Bermann, ed.
Sandino Without Frontiers . (Hampton, Virginia: Compita
Publishing, 1988) which includes Sergio Ramirez's essay
"The Lad From Niquinohomo, " pp. 13-46.
“Gilbert, p. 20.
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revolutionaries that their "National Liberation Front"
should be "Sandinista .
”
27
Fonseca and other FSLN writers portray Sandino as a
revolutionary and staunch anti-imperialist with social
ideas verging on Marxism. But the conception of Sandino
as a proto-Marxist is forced and largely based on
selective quotation. Sandino was unreceptive to
Communists like the Salvadoran Agustin Farabundo Marti,
who, in Sandino' s words,
have tried to twist this movement of national
defense, converting it into an essentially
social struggle. I have opposed this with all
my might. This movement is national and anti-
imperialist. 28
Moreover, while Sandino observed that "Only the workers
and peasants will go to the end, only their organized
force will attain victory" 29 it is often forgotten by
contemporary Sandinistas that the victory he sought was
over the North Americans, not over the bourgeoisie. The
victory sought was one of national independence, not of
socialism. 30
27Black, p. 76, and Bernard Diederich, Somoza and
the Legacy of US Involvement in Central America , (New
York: Dutton, 1981), p. 68.
28Quoted in Gilbert, p. 21.
29Augusto Cesar Sandino, "Manifesto,
February 26, 1930," in Bermann, p. 77.
30This point is abundantly clear when one reads the
selected writings compiled by Bermann, pp. 48-105. See
especially "Political Manifesto, 1 July 1927," pp. 48-
51.
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There is no doubt about Sandino 's anti-imperialism.
He was profoundly offended by U.S. manipulation of his
country's affairs, disgusted with Nicaraguans like
Somoza who staked their careers on U.S. power, and
preached Latin American solidarity in the face of Yankee
domination of the hemisphere. 31 ”[T]he sovereignty of
a people is not to be debated but to be defended with
arms in hand," he argued. 32
In defending the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan
people Sandino consistently opted for the poor against
the privileged. "His views reflected his own early
experience of poverty and his conviction that the self-
serving rich (vendepatrias
,
'country-sellers,' he called
them) were responsible for American domination of his
country." 33 Sandino condemned both the foreign company
that abused its workers and the moneylender who coveted
an indebted family's land. His army seized the
possessions of rich landowners who cooperated with the
enemy and distributed them to the poor. Sandino favored
a national program of agrarian cooperatives for landless
peasants. But he did not see the need to expropriate
existing landholdings in land-rich Nicaragua for this
purpose. Moreover, Sandino had no systematic objection
31See Bermann, pp. 48-105.
32Quoted in Gilbert, p. 21.
33Gilbert, p. 21.
186
to capitalism: "Capital can play its part and grow; but
the worker should not be humiliated or exploited." 34
Sandino 's anti-imperialism, his insistence on
defending his cause with "arms in hand," and his
populism are consistent with the thinking of the
Sandinistas. The frequent invocation of Sandino has
allowed the FSLN to connect themselves with a tradition
of popular rebellion and anti-imperialism and has also
allowed the movement to associate itself with a
charismatic figure without risking personalistic
leadership. What is missing in Sandino however, is a
systematic understanding of class conflict and the role
of the revolutionary party. For this the Sandinista
leadership turned to Marxism.
The leaders of the FSLN were Marxists before they
became Sandinistas and therefore they read Sandino
through Marx. Victor Tirado, one of the few survivors
of the movement's early years, later explained the
relationship between Marx and Sandino in the evolution
of Sandinista thought.
Marxism for the Sandinistas was a complete
revelation—the discovery of a new world. And
the first thing we learned from it was to know
ourselves, to look inside our country into our
people's heritage—toward Sandino. Through
Marxism, we came to know Sandino, our history,
and our roots. This is, among other things,
34Quoted in Ibid., p. 22.
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the teaching we received from Marx—reading
him, as Fonseca said, with Nicaraguan eyes. 35
The FSLN has not treated Marxism as a fixed canon
but as a body of insights that they can adapt to their
own needs and Nicaraguan conditions. Sandinista
ideology starts from the Marxist premise that class
conflict is inevitable in most societies and a source of
progress in human history. A pamphlet written by
Fonseca in 1968 and directed at students the FSLN
declared,
historical experience . . . teaches that there
can be no peace between millionaires and
workers . . . that there can be no situations
other than the following: either the rich
exploit the poor or the poor free themselves,
eliminating the privileges of the
millionaires
.
36
Similarly, the FSLN's "General Political-Military
Platform (May 1977)", an internal document issued by the
dominant Tercista leadership, declares that the working
class, synthesized and guided by the Sandinista
vanguard, the FSLN, "will be the leaders of the
revolution." The same document asserts that "The
dialectical development of human society entails the
35Victor Tirado Lopez, "Karl Marx: The
International Workers' Movement's Greatest Fighter and
Thinker," in Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's
Revolution , ed. Bruce Marcus (New York: Pathfinder
Press, 1985), p. 105.
36Carlos Fonseca, Obras, Volume I , (Managua: Nueva
Nicaragua, 1982), p. 69.
188
Theseprogress from capitalism to socialism." 37
statements suggest faith in Marx's Marxism. However
Sandinista thinkers from Carlos Fonseca to the current
leadership have understood that classical Marxism does
not fit Nicaraguan conditions very well.
According to the Sandinistas, Nicaragua in the
1970s was a nation whose economic and political growth
was distorted by imperialism. Imperialism distorted the
development of the economy through its emphasis on the
production of primary exports consumed by developed
capitalist economies. "Our function," observed
Sandinista agricultural minister Jaime Wheelock, "was to
grow sugar, cocoa and coffee for the United States; we
served dessert at the imperialist dinner table." 38
Similarly, U.S. intervention into the political realm
has created a bourgeois state which serves the interests
of imperialism. 39
The Sandinistas concluded that the dependent
character of the Nicaraguan economy and the imperialist
37
"General Political-Military Platform of the FSLN
for the Triumph of the Popular Sandinista Revolution
(May 1977)" in Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional
Perspective , eds. Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 301-304.
38Stephen Kinzer, "Nicaragua: The Beleaguered
Revolution," New York Times Magazine . 28 August 1983,
p. 17.
39Carlos Fonseca Amador, "Nicaragua: Zero Hour," in
Sandinistas Speak , ed. Bruce Marcus (New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1982), pp. 13-22.
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control of the state had stymied the historical
development of Nicaraguan society. The national
bourgeoisie had accepted its own subordination within a
system of imperialist domination, thereby losing the
opportunity to play a progressive role in Nicaraguan
history. 40 Sandinista theorists dated the
bourgeoisie's surrender of its historic responsibilities
precisely from the day in 1927 that the Liberal
oligarchy abandoned the fight against the American-
backed Conservative regime, leaving Sandino to confront
the American intervention on his own. The Sandinista
revolution would not be a bourgeois revolution since
"... our country's bourgeoisie—which liquidated and
castrated itself as a progressive political force by
clearly surrendering to the interests of Yankee
imperialism and by cooperating with the most reactionary
Nicaraguan forces on May 4, 1927—is not and will never
be a vanguard in the struggle against tyranny and in the
democratic-revolutionary process .
"
41
If the bourgeoisie was unequal to its historic
role, so was the proletariat. Nicaragua's dependent
capitalism did not create a substantial working class.
40See especially Chapter III of the "General
Political-Military Platform of the FSLN , " "Various
Fundamental Tenets of the Popular Sandinista
Revolution," in Valenta and Duran, pp. 302-311.
41
"General Political-Military Platform of the
FSLN," in Valenta and Duran, p. 303.
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Most of the salaried labor force in export agriculture
worked seasonally and depended on subsistence
agriculture or marginal urban employment between
harvests; there was little opportunity to develop a
sense of class identity.
Despite these difficulties the Sandinistas managed
to cling to their revolutionary optimism and to adapt
the theory of progressive classes to their needs.
Sandinista theory overcame the inadequacies of the
proletariat by stretching the definition of the class
base of the revolution and by emphasizing the vanguard
role of the party. The FSLN came to conceive of itself
as a leader of a "worker-peasant alliance," a notion
championed by the Tercerista tendency. The FSLN's 1977
"General Political-Military Platform" proposes a
coalition "composed of the worker-peasant class allied
to the petit bourgeoisie (especially students and
intellectuals)" as "the motor forces of the Sandinista
Revolution. " 42
The 1977 "Platform" also proposes
the creation of an ample Anti-Somocista Front
that will cluster in one way or another, all
the anti-Somocista sectors, parties and mass
organizations throughout the country,
including the opposition bourgeoisie . 43
42
"General Political-Military Platform of the
FSLN," in Valenta and Duran, p. 303.
43Ibid.
,
p. 315
.
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This enlargement of the movement, which proved a key
element in Sandinista strategy, did not signal a demise
in the influence of the FSLN in the revolutionary
struggle as the bourgeoisie was regarded as a partner in
a coalition in which the Frente would be "hegemonic." 44
Indeed, the "Platform" posits that the "Broad Anti-
Somocista Front ... [is a] tactical and temporary
alliance." 45 In an interview conducted a year later,
Daniel Ortega refers to the platform and employs
virtually the same language. The broad anti-Somocista
front is "tactical and temporary," and despite the
alliance with bourgeois progressives, the FSLN's program
is tied to the "proletarian, peasant, and middle
classes . " 46
Sandinista theorists posit that the same distorted
pattern of national development that required broadening
the social base of the revolution has also required that
44The Platform states that "political hegemony in
the Front will be obtained and maintained by the
FSLN. . . . The opposing bourgeoisie thereby will not be
allowed the political leadership of the Anti-Somocista
Front: the struggle will be planned and conducted
according to the guidelines set forth by the FSLN ..."
( Ibid. )
.
45Ibid.
46
"Interview with Daniel Ortega," Latin American
Perspectives 6 (Winter 1979): 117-118. For a discussion
of the role of the bourgeoisie and the middle sectors in
revolutionary Nicaragua see Orlando Nunez Soto, "The
Third Social Force in National Liberation Movements,"
Latin American Perspectives 8 (Spring 1981): 5-21.
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a historically conscious elite acting in the interests
of the oppressed classes, a vanguard party, lead the
revolution. The vanguard concept is Lenin's most
important contribution to the ideology of the FSLN
.
According to FSLN leader Dora Maria Tellez, in 1979 the
Sandinista movement was comprised of
a few men and women who . . . contain within
themselves the dignity of all the people.
They are examples to all of us. And then,
through struggle, the people as a whole
reclaim the strength and dignity shown by a
few. 47
The FSLN, as vanguard party, sees itself as acting
on behalf of an ideologically backward working class or
as a substitute or stand-in for the proletariat. In 1979
the FSLN National Directorate declared that
[the] FSLN exercises the control of power in
the name of the workers and the other
oppressed sectors, or, what would in effect be
the same, . . . the workers control power
through the FSLN. 48
The FSLN vanguard sees itself as the leader of a
two-stage revolution in which national liberation is
followed by social liberation. According to the 1977
"Platform,
"
To break the chains that bind our country to
the yoke of foreign imperialism is the
determining factor in our struggle for
national liberation. Breaking the yoke of
47Margaret Randall, Sandino's Daughters:
Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle , (Vancouver
New Star Books, 1981), p. 53.
48Quoted in Gilbert, p. 32.
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exploitation and oppression imposed by the
dominant reactionary forces over our masses
determines our process of social liberation.
Both historical enterprises will advance
together, indissolubly, if there exists a
Marxist-Leninist cause and a solid vanguard to
direct the process. . . . Our struggle should
never be left midway, even if conciliatory,
bourgeois forces should strive for such a
goal. The popular-democratic phase should be,
for the Sandinista cause, a means used for
consolidating its revolutionary position and
organizing the masses, so that the process
moves unequivocally toward socialism. 49
The first phase would focus on defeating Somoza and
freeing Nicaragua from the clutches of imperialism while
laying the groundwork for the social revolution phase.
This was to be accomplished through the Broad Anti-
Somoza front, and, after July 1979, a new government in
which the FSLN would be "hegemonic." The key objective
of the new government, the FSLN National Directorate
agreed in March 1979, would be the "neutralization" of
potential internal and external enemies, while
accumulating the military and mass forces that
"guarantee the continuity of our [revolutionary]
process . " 50
The second phase of the revolution has as its goal
the creation of socialism. " [0]ur great objective,"
49
"General Political-Military Platform of the
FSLN," in Valenta and Duran, pp. 301-302.
50FSLN-DN, "Documentos de Unificacion ," p. 108,
quoted in Gilbert, p. 37. See also Henri Weber,
Nicaragua: The Sandinista Revolution , (London: Verso,
1981 ) , pp. 61-85
.
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Sandinistawrote Fonseca in 1969, "is socialism." 51
documents and pronouncements have reiterated Fonseca's
assertion that socialism is the final aim of the
revolution. Yet, despite the FSLN's commitment to
socialism there is no consensus within the organization,
beyond the view that their actions would be dedicated to
pursuing "the logic of the majority," the interests of
society's poor and marginalized, as to what socialism
would entail.
A key party document published in 1980 asserts
that
:
The objectives of the Revolution are none
other than to fight until it guarantees the
well being of all workers. Instead of the
shack, decent and humane housing. Replace the
floor with a bed to which the producer of
social wealth has a right. 52
Others see Nicaraguan socialism grounded in the creation
of a "new man," who has overcome the self-serving values
promoted by capitalism. In 1979 Carlos Tunnermann, then
Minister of Education, observed:
The new Nicaragua also needs a new man who has
stripped himself of egotism, who places social
interests before individual interests. A new
man who knows that the contribution that each
individual can make to the community is very
important and that the individual is most
51Quoted in Gilbert, p. 38.
52FSLN-Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda y
Educacion Politica
,
"El Sandinismo no es Democrat ismo ,
"
quoted in Ibid.
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fulfilled when he works within a
collectivity
.
53
Yet Humberto Ortega appears to reject completely the
notion of a "new man." His vision of the future focuses
more on everyday essentials.
[We want to] escape underdevelopment and
create wealth so that the people will be happy
and not just further socialize our poverty.
We want to see the day when all our people can
eat ham and they can have television sets and
take vacations. 54
The second stage of the revolution would also be
one characterized by a direct, participatory form of
democracy, in which the interests of the majority would
be ensured. As is made clear in the 1977 "Platform,"
the realization of Sandinista democracy will require the
interim leadership of a conscious vanguard which will
create national institutions capable of defending the
interests of the majority. Moreover, Sandinista
democracy will emphasize democratic results over
democratic process and popular participation over
electoral institutions. Indeed, Sandinista theorists
argued that electoral democracy, which historically has
not served the interests of the majority, especially in
the developing nations, would have to await the
53Carlos Tunnerman, Hacia Una Nueva Educacion en
Nicaragua
,
(Managua: Distribudora Cultural, 1983),
p. 19, quoted in Ibid.
54Quoted in Gilbert, p. 39.
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establishment of the national institutions capable of
defending the revolution. 55
The FSLN in Power
When the Sandinistas triumphally entered Managua on
July 19 they alone enjoyed immense authority and
prestige. The Somocistas were in flight, the liberal
bourgeoisie was in significant disarray and the FSLN
enjoyed the support which could allow them to destroy
their real enemies and false allies alike. Yet the
Sandinistas proved to be generous in victory. The death
penalty was abolished. The 7,500 captured Guardsmen had
the right to a normal trial and faced a maximum of
thirty years imprisonment. The property and political
rights of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie were preserved,
and in 1980 the private sector controlled 80 percent of
agricultural production, 75 percent of industrial
production and 45 percent of the service sector. 56
Moreover, COSEP representatives and their allies even
had a majority on the new Council of State until April
55Jose Luis Coraggio, Nicaragua: Revolution and
Democracy
,
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 11-56.
56Henri Weber, "Nicaragua: The Sandinist
Revolution," in Crisis in the Caribbean , eds. Fitzroy
Ambursley and Robin Cohen (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1983), pp. 105-106.
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1980 when the FSLN expanded its size from thirty-three
to forty-seven. 57
The "generosity" of this early period of Sandinista
rule aroused some fears that the FSLN was too close to
the bourgeoisie and would mortgage "the revolutionary
future in order to cope with the immediate needs of
business and of the local treasury." 58 There were
however, good reasons for the FSLN steering clear of a
"maximum program" which would entail wholesale
nationalizations, renunciation of the huge foreign debt
contracted by the Somozas and assumption of all power.
First, FSLN commandantes realized that if the nation was
to rise from the ruin caused by years of Somoza neglect
and revolution they would need the technical, managerial
and administrative skills of the bourgeoisie, as well as
the confidence bourgeois participation would inspire in
57Sandinista Nicaragua's first constitution, the
Fundamental Statute of 22 August 1979, created the
Council of State which shared legislative functions with
the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction ( JGRN)
.
The Council was originally slated to have thirty-three
representatives, with twelve from the FSLN and its
closest political allies, but the FSLN Directorate and
the JGRN later added fourteen new delegates, twelve from
pro-FSLN groups. This decision precipitated the first
serious political crisis of the new regime as Alfonso
Robelo, leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Party,
immediately resigned from the government, followed a few
days later by Violetta Chamorro, widow of the anti-
Somoza leader murdered in 1978. David Close, Nicaragua
:
Politics, Economics and Society , (London: Pinter, 1988),
p. 122.
58James Petras, "Whither the Nicaraguan
Revolution?" Monthly Review 31 (October 1979): 15.
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Western financiers. Hence the Sandinistas sought to
reactivate the private sector through the provision of
credits, enforcing labor discipline and moderating wage
increases, and by ensuring respect for their property
and their participation in high office. 59
Second, engaging in alliance politics with the
liberal bourgeoisie also allowed the FSLN a breathing
space to consolidate its position before moving on to
the socialist phase of the revolution. During this
period the FSLN sought to extend the benefits of the
revolution to all areas of the nation and to spread the
growth of Sandinista popular movements. Third, a period
of alliance politics was seen as necessary given the
ideological underdevelopment of the Nicaraguan masses.
Since the vast majority of Nicaraguans did not have the
ideological understanding of the vanguard, and since the
bourgeoisie did play an active role in the struggle
against the dictatorship, most Nicaraguans did not see
the irreconcilable conflict of interests between the
bourgeoisie and the people that the vanguard did.
Therefore,
one key function of the FSLN alliance policy
was precisely to enable the working masses to
grasp this conflict through their own
experience of the bourgeoisie's attitude on
the transitional phase; and to make this
59Close, pp. 73-106.
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possible without endangering the process of
transition itself. 60
The FSLN strategy of alliance involved real
concessions to the bourgeoisie, however as with the
alliance politics which led to the overthrow of Somoza,
the Sandinistas were determined to maintain their
hegemony within the new society. 61 The FSLN leadership
had no illusion about the deep-seated conflict between
their own socialist perspective and the goals of the
Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. Moreover, the leadership
understood that the two were bearers of radically
different social projects which they would eventually
seek to impose on one another. In order for the FSLN
project to win out, the Frente set out to spread and
reinforce the structures of hegemony. During the period
of alliance with the bourgeoisie guerrilla fighters were
organized into a Sandinista army and police force; the
FSLN secured a majority on the Council of State, and the
Sandinistas built a system of mass organizations. The
national literacy crusade—which sent 100,000 volunteer
students and schoolchildren to the countryside in an
60Weber
,
"Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution,"
p. 108.
61FSLN comandante Jaime Wheelock summarized this
position by saying: "Let the bourgeoisie just produce
and limit itself, as a class, to a productive role. Let
it use its means of production to live, not as an
instrument of power [or] domination" (quoted in Close,
p. 74).
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e ff°rt to eradicate illiteracy— is another example of
FSLN tactics in this period of alliance with the
bourgeoisie. The volunteers' mission was to teach the
campesinos how to read, write and count, to give lessons
in the history of Nicaragua, and to help the
agricultural workers to organize unions and militias.
For six months, these 100,000 young people
shared the lives of "the wretched of the
earth." Most of them, FSLN leaders believe,
will be permanently marked by the experience,
and will know how to approach political
problems "starting from the class interests of
rural proletarians." Conversely, the
schoolchildren's arrival en masse to teach and
serve them did more than any material benefit
to convince the peasants that something
fundamental had changed "at the top," that
power belonged to them and no longer to the
senores . 62
The FSLN's hope that the bourgeoisie would be
willing to help reconstruct Nicaragua while the Frente
strengthened its political position and pursued its
social project was soon proved untenable. Class
polarization set in almost immediately after the July 19
triumph. Many members of the privileged classes were
certain that totalitarian communism was just around the
corner. Accordingly, some fled immediately to Miami
whereas others first illegally decapitalized their
industries, transferred money abroad, and then fled.
The process of class polarization was exacerbated by the
“Henri Weber, "Nicaragua: The Sandinist
Revolution," p. 112.
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resignations of Alfonso Robelo and Violetta Chamorro
from the Council of State in early 1980, the takeover of
La Prensa--the nation's largest independent daily--by a
conservative wing of the Chamorro family, and by the
election of Ronald Reagan in the fall 1980. The
election of Reagan, who had campaigned on a platform
that "deplor[ed] the Marxist-Sandinista takeover of
Nicaragua" and promised to end all aid to that country,
accelerated the class polarization as many in the
privileged classes "then apparently saw even less need
than before to accommodate themselves to the new
revolutionary system." 63 From then on, tension mounted
rapidly as the conservative Catholic church hierarchy,
the opposition political parties, COSEP and La Prensa—
"all working in obvious coordination with the U.S.
embassy"—showed less and less inclination to engage in
constructive dialogue. 64
As the Contra war began in ernest in 1982,
increased emphasis was placed on military preparedness
and certain human rights were gradually infringed upon
in the name of national security. 65 Moreover, on six
63Thomas W. Walker, "Introduction," in Reagan
Versus the Sandinistas , ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1987), p. 6.
64Ibid.
,
p. 7 .
65In December 1981 President Reagan signed a
directive authorizing the CIA to spend $19.8 million to
create an exile paramilitary force in Honduras to harass
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occasions
,
La Prensa was closed for two-day periods in
accordance with a law decreed by the original Junta (of
which La Prensa owner Violetta Chamorro was a member)
which calls for such an action when an organ of the
media is found to be disseminating material that is
false and destabilizing. La Prensa would function under
censorship until April 1986 when editor Jaime Chamorro
published an op-ed piece in the Washington Post calling
for Congress to vote $100 million worth of aid to the
Contras. Once the U.S. Congress passed the measure La
Prensa was closed. The paper's owners rejected calls
from President Ortega to reopen, subject to the
emergency law, and an offer from Xavier Chamorro, owner
of the pro-government El Nuevo Diario
.
to buy them
out. 66
Accompanying the military and paramilitary efforts
to oust the Sandinistas was an escalating program of
economic strangulation. The Reagan administration
blocked approval of Nicaraguan loan requests before the
World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank. U.S.
trade was initially drastically curtailed—the
Nicaraguan quota for exporting sugar to the U.S. was cut
by 90 percent in May 1983—and then, in May 1988,
Nicaragua. See "U.S. Said to Plan 2 CIA Actions in
Latin Region," New York Times , 14 March 1982, p. 2.
66Close, p. 131.
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embargoed completely. The Reagan administration also
made an effort to pressure its allies to follow suit. 67
These activities, coupled with a sharp decline in
world prices of Nicaragua's export commodities and the
enormous direct and indirect cost of the Contra war
meant that by 1983 Nicaragua was having increasing
problems in servicing its debt. In 1983 Venezuela
ceased supplying Nicaragua with oil. and in 1984 Mexico
drastically curtailed supplies of oil. As a result, by
1984 and 1985 the Sandinistas were forced to turn to the
USSR for most of its petroleum needs. The scarcity of
foreign exchange also meant severe shortages of imported
goods or of products manufactured in Nicaragua from
imported material or with imported machinery. "Of
course, such shortages also triggered rampant inflation
and spiraling wage demands, which could not be satisfied
given the tremendous diversion of government revenues
into defense." 68
Social services were also adversely affected. As
increased emphasis was placed on defense, government
spending on health, education, housing, food subsidies,
and the like, had to be cut back. Further, the Contras
were deliberately targeting the social service
67Michael E. Conroy, "Economic Aggression as an
Instrument of Low-Intensity Warfare," in Reagan Versus
the Sandinistas , pp. 57-79.
68Walker, p. 9.
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infrastructure and many government employees in health,
education, and cooperatives were kidnapped, tortured and
killed; schools, clinics, day care centers and grain
storage facilities were destroyed.
Both the Contra war and the U.S.-led economic
aggression against Nicaragua did not have the desired
effect of engendering sufficient discontent to overthrow
the Sandinista government. Conversely, as Walker points
out, by 1984 popular support for the government—as
measured by levels of membership in pro-Sandinista
grassroots organizations—reached its highest levels.
"By then, around half of all Nicaraguans aged sixteen or
older were in such voluntary support organizations." 69
Moreover, in the November 1984 election for President
and National Assembly the FSLN received 66.7 percent of
the presidential vote and 62.9 percent of the Assembly
vote. 70
69 Ibid.
70Susanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, "The Construction
of Democracy in Nicaragua," Latin American Perspectives
66 (Summer 1990): 7.
Ninety-three percent of eligible voters registered;
although voting is not mandatory, 75.4 percent of
registered voters voted; 70.8 percent of registered
voters cast valid ballots.
In principle, no major tendency was excluded from
the electoral process. A total of six opposition
parties (ranging from rightist to Marxist-Leninist
)
participated in addition to the Sandinistas. All
participants were guaranteed equal resources (campaign
funding, supplies, and the like) and equal access to the
mass media. A number of emergency restrictions were
lifted so that no party was prevented from carrying out
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While the Reagan administration was quick to
denounce the Nicaraguan election as a "Soviet-style
sham, " the openness and fairness of the election was
recognized by foreign observers not directly linked to
the Reagan administration. Americas Watch called it "a
model of probity and fairness" and reports in the
European press were almost uniformly favorable, as was
the report by a delegation from the European
Parliament. 71 Even U.S. observers outside of the U.S.
government, such as the Latin American Studies
delegation, as well as former diplomats and Congressmen,
judged the election most favorably. 72
In the wake of the 1984 election, the Reagan
administration explicitly threatened Nicaragua, saying
that the election constituted a "setback for peace
talks" in the region and would "heighten tensions" with
the United States and warned that it intended to
pressure Nicaragua to hold a "real election" as a
an active campaign or from holding rallies.
71Americas Watch, Human Rights in Nicaragua:
Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality . (New York: Americas Watch,
1985), quoted in Ibid. Piero Gleijeses, "The Reagan
Doctrine and Central America," Current History 85
(December 1986): 401-404.
72Latin American Studies Association, "Report of
the LASA Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General
Election of 4 November 1984," LASA Forum , Winter 1985.
Wayne Smith, "Lies About Nicaragua," Foreign Policy 70
(Spring 1987): 166-182.
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While continued U.S.condition for peace talks. 73
hostility was ostensibly aimed at pressuring the FSLN to
reform and democratize their nation, the true objective
was to overthrow the Sandinista government, or, falling
short of that, to "raise the cost" of having made a
revolution by causing the maximum amount of
destruction. 74 As a Pentagon official told the Los
Angeles Times
.
2,000 hard-core guys could keep the pressure
on the Nicaraguan government, force them to
use their economic resources for the military,
and prevent them from solving their economic
problems. 75
Similarly, according to former Contra chief Enrique
Bermudez in 1986, the aim of Contra attacks inside
Nicaragua was not to foster democratic reforms but to
"heighten repression." 76
By the end of the 1980s, the U.S. policies of
organizing and financing a counter-revolutionary war,
coupled with the economic embargo, including a blockade
of lending from the major Western multilateral agencies,
proved effective instruments of economic aggression.
73New York Times , 5 November 1984, p. 2.
74An interesting discussion of the internal debate
over Reagan's policy toward the Sandinista government is
found in Kenneth Roberts, "The United States, Nicaragua,
and Conflict Resolution in Central America,"
International Security 15 (Fall 1990): 67-102.
75Quoted in The Nation , 1 May 1989, p. 1.
76Quoted in Jonas and Stein, p. 24.
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Nicaragua's economy was in shambles: gross domestic
product per capita had fallen significantly in almost
each year of Sandinista rule, reaching in 1989 levels
below those Nicaragua knew in 1960; inflation had risen
almost every year since 1979 and had reached 33,000
percent for 1988; reported urban real-wage levels fell
to less than 10 percent of what they were at the start
of the Sandinista revolution; and international
indebtedness had grown to more than seven times the
level inherited by the Sandinista government. 77
Moreover, severe austerity measures implemented in
February 1988, adjusted in June 1988 and redoubled in
February 1989 led to a gradual elimination of virtually
all of the social programs that were the hallmark of the
revolution in its first years. 78 It was hoped that the
austerity measures, which were modeled on the "heterodox
shock" treatments that Brazil and Argentina pioneered in
1985 and 1986 as a means to halt rampant inflation,
would persuade the bourgeoisie to reactivate production,
accelerate the disarming and demobilization of the
Contras who had agreed to a cease fire in March 1988,
and better the Sandinista image outside of the country
77Michael E. Conroy, "The Political Economy of the
1990 Nicaraguan Elections," International Journal of
Political Economy 20 (Fall 1990): 5-33.
78Ibid.
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which would in turn, engender increased economic
assistance, especially from Western Europe. 79
Sandinista leaders hoped that the elections of
February 1990 would be a "final resolution" of the
debate over the legitimacy of the FSLN government led by
Daniel Ortega, raising hopes for an end to the Contra
war, peacetime reconciliation, and economic
reconstruction. However, if as Walker argues, the
Sandinistas won in 1984 because the majority of the
electorate was enjoying an improved standard of living
and because the nation was clearly under attack from a
hostile force, in 1990 the standard of living for the
majority had plummeted and the nation was tired of war.
The economic problems detailed above were exacerbated by
FSLN adjustment policies which reduced public spending,
shrunk public employment by 50,000 persons, attempted to
reprivatize some state companies, and eliminated or
reduced government subsidies on food and public
transportation. In general, it was
wage laborers, peasant farmers, and small
producers [who] had to assume the social cost
of the policies of adjustment; that is, it was
assumed by those who in the terminology of the
early years were called the driving forces of
the revolution. 80
79Carlos M. Vilas, "The Contribution of Economic
Policy and International Negotiation to the Fall of the
Sandinista Government," New Political Science , no. 18,
(Fall/Winter 1990), pp. 81-102.
80Ibid.
,
p. 88.
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Similarly, with the signing of a cease-fire with the
Contras in March 1988 at the border village of Sapoa,
public opinion began to associate economic problems more
closely with the government's strategies and less
closely with the war. 81 Furthermore, by early 1990
most Nicaraguans would concur with Esmerelda Pareda,
interviewed by the Boston Globe in a small town
southwest of Managua as she waited to vote: "I have lost
a son and a brother to the war. I have suffered enough.
I am here to vote for peace." 82 Clearly, many
Nicaraguans voted for peace; many voted against the
party which had been unable to end the Contra war and
for the UNO coalition which, because of its explicit
backing by the United States, gave the most credible
assurance of peace.
The USSR, Perestroika and Nicaragua's FSLN
The victory of the FSLN came as a surprise to the
Soviet Union. Abraham Lowenthal, who visited the Soviet
Union in 1981, reports that Latinskaia Amerika editor,
Sergo Mikoyan, told him that "few could see the
81John W. Soule, "The Economic Austerity Packages
of 1988 and Their Impact on Public Opinion," New
Political Science , no. 18, (Fall/Winter 1990), pp. 103-
129.
82Quoted in Alexander Cockburn, "Victory for
Violence," New Statesman and Society , 9 March 1990,
p. 20
.
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possibility of a Sandinista triumph even in 1979" 83
The Soviet Union played no active role in the guerrilla
war against the Somoza dictatorship and gave no direct
aid to the FSLN. Nicaragua's Moscow-oriented Communist
party, the PSN, was hostile to armed struggle and tried
to back U.S. efforts to find a replacement for Somoza
until 1979 when the FSLN was unified. Its role in the
last few months of the war was confined to propaganda
support. 84
The Soviet Union took care to contain its
enthusiasm even after the triumph of the revolution. An
article in the 19 July 1979 edition of Pravda which
reported the departure of Somoza from Nicaragua was very
low key, there was no acclamation of FSLN success and
the emphasis was heavily on the probability of U.S.
intervention. 85 However, as the Sandinistas began to
consolidate power, Soviet commentaries became more
positive. In October 1980 leading Soviet ideologist
Boris Ponomarev described the Nicaraguan revolution as a
"major success," and in his speech to the CPSU Congress
of February 1981, Brezhnev stated that the revolutions
in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua were the most
83Quoted in Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with
Latin America, 1959-1987 , (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 195.
84Black, p. 145.
85Miller, p. 196.
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important "new victories" since 19 7 6. 86 Similarly,
Soviet academic specialists noted that the FSLN had
steered clear of the mistakes made by Allende in Chile
and that the Sandinista model, with its proposed
incorporation of the private sector, is feasible and
could potentially be applied elsewhere in the Third
World. 87
Despite the enthusiasm among academic specialists,
at the official level Moscow was unwilling to grant
Nicaragua the official "socialist" status that would
command a major Soviet commitment to the Nicaraguan
revolution. 88 Indeed, even before the enunciation of
perestroika and foreign policy "new thinking," all
Soviet interactions with Nicaragua illustrate a desire
to aid the Nicaraguan revolution, thus making life more
difficult for the United States in its own "backyard,"
without turning Nicaragua into "another Cuba." By
86 Ibid.
87Sergo Mikoyan, "Las Particulardades de la
Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el punto de
Vista de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina (Moscow), no. 3 (1980): 101-
115.
88Sandinista statements of adherence to Marxism-
Leninism notwithstanding, the USSR classified the FSLN a
"vanguard party" capable of leading a developing nation
toward socialism. Such parties are seen as
substantially inferior to Communist parties in the level
of the theoretical maturity of their cadres, in the
degree of their revolutionary influence on the working
people, and in their ideological, political and
organizational experience. Miller, p. 197.
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denying the Sandinista government official "socialist"
status the Soviets were able to show their solidarity
with revolutionary forces in Central America, while
avoiding the drain on its resources which identifying
itself too closely with the revolution would entail. In
addition to avoiding the drain on material resources
which Cuba has been for over 30 years, this stance also
allowed the Soviet Union to assert that its intentions
in Central America are not offensive.
On October 18, 1979, when diplomatic relations were
restored between Nicaragua and the USSR, the Soviet
representative to the ceremony in Nicaragua, Yurii
Volskii, Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, was careful to
stress that "Soviet-Nicaraguan relations are not
directed against any third country and will not affect
anyone else." 89 Similarly, when asked in August 1982
how the Soviet Union would respond to direct aggression
against Nicaragua, Yurii Fonkin, Secretary-General of
the Soviet Foreign Ministry, replied, "We will support
Nicaragua politically in every way." 90 In private, one
Soviet official admitted that, "If the Americans invaded
89 Ibid., p. 198.
90Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet
Eyes," Problems of Communism 32 ( September/October
1983): 11.
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Nicaragua
,
what would we do? What could we do?
Nothing . " 91
While the Nicaraguan revolution is a geopolitical
problem for the U.S. and therefore is worth defending,
albeit in a limited way, there are few positive
incentives for the Soviet Union to give their full
support to the FSLN. The Nicaraguan revolution holds
out the prospect for only limited strategic and
political gains for the USSR. First, even if the FSLN
had shown a willingness to provide the Soviet Union with
bases, it is difficult to see what strategic advantage
the Soviet Union would enjoy in Nicaragua which it does
not already possess in Cuba. This has been implicitly
recognized by U.S. officials assessing their own
security needs in the Caribbean. One U.S. diplomat put
it thus:
In the event of a war in Europe where we'd
have to reinforce NATO, we'd already have to
watch Cuba to guard the shipping lanes from
the gulf ports. It's more trouble if we have
to watch Nicaragua too. That's
it. . . . Compared to Cuba, Nicaragua could
never amount to anything. 92
Second, contrary to Sergo Mikoyan's more optimistic
analysis, Soviet officials concluded that Nicaragua's
91Jonathan Steele, World Power: Soviet Foreign
Policy Under Brezhnev and Andropov . (London: Michael
Joseph, 1983), p. 220.
92Allan Nairn, "Endgame: A Special Report on US
Military Strategy in Central America," NACLA Report on
the Americas 18 (May/June 1984): 27.
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revolutionary power of example as a model of development
is almost exclusively confined to its economically
insignificant Central American neighbors. 93
The relatively more important position of Cuba led
the Soviet Union to adopt a "hands off Cuba" rather than
a "hands off Nicaragua" policy in the early 1980s. In
an International Affairs article of January 1982 there
is an explicit condemnation of Washington's attempt to
"subvert socialist Cuba, as well as other progressive
Latin American states, such as Nicaragua and Grenada,"
but the declaration of Soviet support refers only to
Cuba
:
The Soviet Union has supported and will
continue to support the Cuban people in their
struggle to protect their sovereignty. All
progressive and peace-loving forces are coming
out in defence of Cuba and its
independence
.
94
Even in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, Soviet
support for the FSLN was still expressed in terms of
"unswerving solidarity" with the Nicaraguan people. 95
Soviet military support to the Sandinista
government has followed this pattern of limited support.
Since 1981, when Contra forces began attacks against the
93Miller, p. 198.
94K. Khachaturov, "Washington's Latin America
Policy," International Affairs (Moscow) 1
(January 1982): 61.
95New York Times , 16 October 1983, p. A17
.
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FSLN, the USSR has been willing to supply the
Sandinistas with sufficient military equipment to keep
the Contras at bay but not enough for the Sandinistas to
become a potent offensive force in the region.
Throughout the 1980s the USSR confined its supplies to
defensive weapons and, moreover, allowed the U.S. to
define what it will accept as defensive. 96 Moreover,
Sandinista requests for quantitative and qualitative
increases in Eastern bloc supplies can be shown to be in
direct response to specific threats to the security of
the revolution.
Arms shipments from the socialist countries were
insignificant in 1979-1980. They were estimated by U.S.
intelligence sources at $12-13 million worth, and
included Soviet ZPU light anti-aircraft guns, SA-7
surface to air missiles, RPG anti-tank grenades and East
German trucks. 97 At the end of November 1981 Defense
Minister Humberto Ortega spent one week in Moscow
seeking increased supplies in the face of the escalating
Contra war. U.S. intelligence estimates put Soviet and
96The controversy over shipments of Soviet MIG-2 Is
to Nicaragua is illustrative. The Soviet Union has
failed to supply these aircraft, even though five
members of the Nicaraguan airforce were trained in the
USSR to use them, largely because the United States has
stated that their acquisition by the FSLN would justify
a military response.
97Marc Edelman, "Lifelines: Nicaragua and the
Socialist Countries," NACLA Report on the Americas 19
(May/June 1985): 49.
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Eastern European military aid to Nicaragua in 1982 at
$56 million, "including about 20 more T-54 tanks, 12
BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, 6 105mm howitzers and
around 48 Z152 37mm anti-aircraft guns." 98 The
worsening military situation in 1983-1984 prompted the
Sandinistas to request increased support, and U.S.
administration sources estimate Socialist military aid
to Nicaragua in 1983 at double the 1982 figure, i.e.
over $100 million. 99 The 1983 level was slightly
increased in 1984 and 1985, when shipments were valued
at $115 million. 100 Soviet aid to Nicaragua increased
considerably in 1986 with over $600 million worth of
material shipped, according to the Pentagon. An only
slightly lower level of aid was maintained over 1987 and
1988, reflecting a growing Soviet hope that U.S. policy
in Nicaragua could be defeated. 101
The Soviet Union's reluctance to be identified too
closely with the Nicaraguan revolution on a political
and military level was echoed by the slowness with which
economic relations were developed with the Sandinista
government. Moreover, Soviet economic aid to the
Sandinista government became significant only once other
98Miller, p. 202.
"Ibid.
100Ibid.
101 Ibid.
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sources of assistance were no longer available to the
FSLN. As with the provision of military aid, Soviet
economic assistance has been limited and has sought to
provide the revolutionary government with sufficient
resources to survive but little more. Emergency aid
donated by Moscow in the aftermath of the revolution was
of negligible value and far overshadowed by
contributions by Western sources. 102 No significant
contacts were made between the Nicaraguan and Soviet
governments until March 1980, following the suspension
of U.S. aid on January 23, 1980 and the cancellation of
a $15 million credit on March 2, 1980, when a delegation
of Sandinista leaders travelled to Moscow. "They
returned with a reciprocal most-favored-nation trading
agreement, a protocol on the establishment of trade
representations, an agreement on planning cooperation
and various other accords providing for Soviet
assistance in fishing, water power resources, mining and
geological surveys, along with a consular convention and
an agreement on air communications." 103
As Nicaragua's economic conditions deteriorated,
the Sandinistas stepped up the urgency of their search
102The Soviet contribution apparently consisted of
donations of 1.5 million pencils, 1.5 million exercise
books, 1,000 transistor radios, 30,000 pairs of boots
and ten cars. Ibid., p. 205.
103Ibid.
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for Soviet support. However, the fact that Nicaragua's
primary exports— sugar, coffee, cotton—are already
supplied by Cuba or other developing nations with which
Moscow wants to develop trade relations, limited the
economic activity between the two. The move toward the
USSR vindicated the position of those within the FSLN,
like Minister of Planning Henry Ruiz, who argued that
integration with the socialist bloc was the best defense
against Washington, and as ties between Nicaragua and
the USSR grew, the FSLN moved away from a mixed economy
toward a more centralized model with emphasis on the
public sector. Daniel Ortega visited Moscow in May 1982
and negotiated a $100 million Soviet credit for
deliveries of industrial machinery and equipment.
A succession of visits by Nicaraguan leaders to
Moscow in 1982-1983 yielded relatively little in the way
of economic assistance, and between 1979 and 1985 Soviet
aid to Nicaragua measured $300-400 million. 104 Soviet
aid increased in 1985 to an estimated $247 million and
in 1986 and 1987 to $250 million. 105
With the rise to power of Gorbachev and the
enunciation of perestroika and foreign policy "new
thinking," the Soviet policy of limited support to the
104Ibid.
,
p. 208
.
105Ibid., p. 209. By comparison, U.S. economic aid
to El Salvador in 1987 was $502 million.
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FSLN became more clear. On the economic front,
assistance from the socialist countries has declined
every year since 1985, a development which proved a
crucial factor in Nicaragua's economic crises in 1987
and 19 8 8. 106 Since 1987, when hard-currency shortages
made the purchase of sufficient quantities of oil
impossible, the Soviet Union has made it clear that it
cannot be counted upon to supply Nicaragua with all of
its oil needs. 107 The Soviets have also expressed
distress over Sandinista mismanagement and inefficient
use of Soviet aid, and have pressured Nicaraguan
industry "to optimize the use of existing machinery,
increasing their efficiency, instead of seeking an
indefinite increase of available machinery." 108 These
same concerns led to the creation of a limited number of
Nicaraguan-Soviet joint ventures which will employ
resources in a more efficient manner. 109
Under Gorbachev, Soviet policy toward Nicaragua has
been characterized by strong support for both the
106Conroy, "The Political Economy . . .," pp. 13-14.
107Miller, pp. 214-215.
i°8"ussr Trade Developing in 'Decisive Manner',"
Interview with Aleksandr Chirjrov, Chief Soviet
Commercial Representative. Barricada , 16 March 1988,
p. 4
.
109
"Ruiz on USSR Trade, Aid," FBIS-Latin America , 21
January 1988, pp. 23-24. "Cooperation Agreements
Signed," FBIS-Latin America , 21 January 1988, p. 23.
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Contadora process and, when the Contadora process
collapsed in January 1987, the Esquipulas II treaty
signed in August 1987. The emphasis on resolving
regional conflicts and improving Soviet-U.S. relations
found in Gorbachev's foreign policy led the Soviets to
back negotiations aimed at resolving the Contra war in
Nicaragua. Further, in the spring of 1989, in an effort
aimed at "contribut [ ing] to a total and definitive
solution to the Central American solution," the Soviet
Union suspended delivery of heavy weaponry to
Nicaragua. 110 This was followed in October by
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's assertion that his
government will ask the Soviet Union to suspend its
shipments of light military equipment to Nicaragua "when
the Contra movement completely ceases its armed actions
in Nicaragua." 111
Prior to the rise to power of President Gorbachev,
limited support for Sandinista Nicaragua could be
explained in light of "the lessons of Cuba." That is,
while the FSLN victory was an irritant to the U.S.—not
unlike Afghanistan for the USSR—and thus was worthy of
110
"USSR No Longer Sending Weapons to Nicaragua,"
FBIS-Latin America , 19 May 1989, p. 4.
m.’Ortega on USSR Weapons Shipments, GDR Visit,"
FBIS-Latin America , 6 October 1989, pp. 7-8. "More on
Ortega Statements," FBIS-Latin America , 6 October 1989,
p. 8. "Arms Shipments to Halt," FBIS-Latin America , 6
October 1989, pp. 8-9.
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Soviet support, the USSR was unwilling to identify
itself fully with this new regime. Since 1985 however,
the Soviet's less than total commitment to the
Sandinistas was intended to signal Washington that
Moscow would be prepared to negotiate a solution to the
conflict in Nicaragua. Such an action would correspond
with the logic of perestroika and foreign policy new
thinking. It may also have been a means of applying
pressure on the FSLN to be flexible on the negotiations
which resulted in the signing of the Esquipulas II
treaty and to be prompt and thorough in their compliance
subsequently. 112 It is certain, however, that Soviet
cognizance that the U . S . -Nicaragua conflict could
seriously complicate their own bilateral relations with
the U.S. has led the Soviets to stress the limits of
their commitment to Nicaragua.
112
" Commentators Believe USSR Pressured Ortega,"
FBIS-Latin America, 14 December 1989, pp. 28-29.
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CHAPTER 6
PERESTROIKA AND THE REVOLUTION
IN EL SALVADOR
El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Front for National
Liberation (FMLN) has been considered one of the most
ideologically rigid guerrilla movements in Central
America. The ideological dogmatism which prevented the
FMLN guerrillas from cooperating with certain
businessmen and progressive sectors within the Army in
order to end the country's control by a small oligarchic
group recently has been lamented by one of the FMLN's
leading military commanders and strategists. Joaquin
Villalobos, long considered one of the more hard-core
leftists within the FMLN, has written that the movement
lost "a historic opportunity" to unite the country
around its cause in the early 1980s, "and our penance
has been these 10 years of war." 1 This ideological
rigidity notwithstanding, FMLN strategic thought has
shown an ability to adapt to changing realities and the
Front has exhibited an increased flexibility in
redefining its goals in accordance with new realities.
Beginning in January 1989 the FMLN launched a new
phase in its revolutionary struggle, one which redefines
FMLN goals in light of new realities. The FMLN
^BIS-Latin America , 10 October 1989, p. 28.
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describes the "strategic counteroffensive" as a phase
in the war which combines military actions with various
proposals for a demilitarization of the nation and
negotiated settlement of the conflict. Moreover, since
1989 the FMLN leadership has been eager to discuss its
vision of a rebel-led El Salvador. "The FMLN is
proposing an open, pluralistic project, one which is
rooted in our domestic and geopolitical reality," writes
commander Villalobos.
What is fundamental is not its ideological
definition, but whether or not it resolves El
Salvador's problems. . . . In El Salvador, to
carry out an agrarian reform, parallel with
the development of a pluralist democracy which
benefits the majority, is to make
revolution. 2
Indeed, Villalobos has recently argued that his group
can no longer even be considered Marxist, and added that
one-party rule in El Salvador would be "absurd."
Instead, the FMLN now hopes to model El Salvador's
future on such prominent capitalist countries as
Germany, Japan and Costa Rica, which have no army and
are closely tied to the United States economy. 3
Similarly, in a recent article in Foreign Policy ,
Villalobos stresses that the future El Salvador is one
2Quoted in Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "FMLN New
Thinking: Rethinking Peace," NACLA: Report on the
Americas 23 (September 1989): 37.
3Mark A. Uhlig, "Top Salvador Rebel Alters His
Goals," New York Times , 7 March 1991, p. 3.
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in which the FMLN shares power with other democratic
forces, in which private enterprise plays a significant
role in economic affairs, in which democratic elections
and political pluralism thrive, and, most important of
all, which is not a threat to the vital interests of the
United States. 4
The fact that these alterations in FMLN strategy
and goals have come at roughly the same time as the
global "demise of communism" has led some to wonder if
this is just another manifestation of the world-wide
disintegration of the communist Left. Has the FMLN seen
the handwriting on the wall and reformed its ways, as
socialism has proven itself unworkable? The FMLN
leadership says no.
If our revolutionary effort coincides with
perestroika in any respect, it is in the
struggle against the kind of dogmatism and
orthodox thinking that endeavors to transfer
mechanically to our country classic models of
revolution, party systems, or strategy.
Indeed, the struggle against dogmatism with
Latin American revolutionary thought predates
perestroika . 5
Despite these denials, perestroika and the changes
it has engendered, has had an effect on FMLN thinking.
The "new thinking" of the FMLN is a result of a
confluence of important developments, or perceived
4Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for
El Salvador," Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989): 103-122.
5Ibid., p. 113.
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developments. Some of these are articulated in the
pronouncements and writings of FMLN commanders, while
others are left largely unspoken. In the former
category one can point to FMLN assertions that the
correlation of forces within El Salvador has changed and
now favors the FMLN and its allies on the left. Hence,
once the Salvadoran Right learns that the war is now a
stalemate and that its program is untenable,
negotiations leading to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict can proceed.
In the latter category, it is clear that the FMLN
has learned from the experience of the Sandinistas. The
"lesson of Nicaragua" that has been learned by the FMLN
is that new policies are required to bring change to the
nation without engendering the wrath of the U.S.
Similarly, another largely unspoken reason for FMLN "new
thinking" is the increasing popular support for
democracy and peace in El Salvador. This growing
sentiment makes it impossible for the left to continue
to advocate insurrection alone and expect large-scale
popular support.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the
composition of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front and then turns to examine the development of the
Front's strategic thought. It concludes with a
discussion of the various forces which have led the FMLN
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to alter its strategy and now advocate a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
The Composition of the FMLN
The Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation
( FMLN ) is a broad coalition of left forces composed of
five political-military organizations 6 each linked to
specific mass organizations and armed forces. The FMLN
has its roots in two main sources: radicalized religious
activists, and the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS).
Vatican II and the 1968 Conference of Latin American
Bishops in Medellin, Colombia had a powerful impact on
the Salvadoran clergy. 7 Christian base communities
6 The terminology is that of Tommie Sue Montgomery,
Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution ,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 119-157.
Formed in October 1980, the FMLN includes:
The Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS)
The Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
The Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP)
The National Resistance (RN)
The Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC)
’Vatican II elaborated Pope John XXIII 's 1961 and
1963 encyclicals concerning the human right to a decent
standard of living, education, and political
participation. Vatican II set forth two key principles:
first, that the Church was of this world, and second,
that it was a community of equals. Pope Paul VI
inaugurated the Medellin meeting, where the Latin
American bishops adapted these principles to Latin
reality, setting the stage for many clergy to move
beyond purely religious concerns to political issues.
Penny Lernoux posits that Medellin was "one of the major
political events of the century: it shattered the
centuries-old alliance of Church, military and rich
elites" (Penny Lernoux, Crv of the People , [Garden City
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were formed in many parishes and through the 1970s these
were important sources for activists and leaders of the
guerrilla-led mass "popular organizations." 8
Similarly, the political-military organizations that
split off from the Salvadoran Communist Party are also
comprised, to a considerable degree, of former
seminarians, radicalized members of the Christian base
communities, and young Christian Democratic Party
dissidents
.
In varying degrees, all of the political-
military organizations which form the FMLN are products
of a prolonged and turbulent struggle within the
Salvadoran Communist Party. The PCS was founded by
Augustin Farabundo Marti in 1930, and two years later
organized a peasant revolt in the western departments
—
the first attempted revolution by a Latin American
NY: Doubleday, 1980], pp. 31-43). Tommie Sue
Montgomery explains that "while four of the six members
of the Salvadoran hierarchy adhered to an institutional,
sacramentalist view of the Church's proper role in
society, the two remaining prelates, both in the
archdiocese of San Salvador (and Archbishop Oscar Romero
before his death) accepted and promoted the positions of
Medellin from the beginning" (Montgomery, p. 100).
8Two of the best discussions of the links between
Christian base communities and the Salvadoran "popular
organizations" are Philip Berryman The Religious Roots
of Rebellion: Christians in Central American
Revolutions
,
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1984), pp. 91-162;
and Philip Berryman, "El Salvador: From Evangelization
to Insurrection," in Religion and Political Conflict in
Latin America , ed. Daniel H. Levine (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 58-78.
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Communist Party. In the repression which followed
Farabundo Marti and most of the other PCS leaders were
executed and the party was outlawed.
Ever since 1932 the PCS has formally adhered to the
policy of armed struggle as, according to the party
general secretary Shafik Jorge Handal, this is "the most
probable means of attaining victory." 9 Yet this was
hardly the case in practice. A guerrilla uprising was
attempted in the wake of the Fidelista victory in Cuba.
It was easily suppressed by the military however, and
the party once more set itself firmly against the armed
struggle. 10 Instead, the PCS employed an electoralist
strategy which, initially, called for the party's legal
front, the National Democratic Union (UDN)
,
to
participate in elections, and after September 1971
placed it firmly behind the candidates of the center-
left National Opposition Union (UNO). 11 As late as
1980 Handal claimed that UNO "voiced the democratic
aspirations and structural changes" required by the
9Quoted in Mario Menendez Rodriguez, El Salvador:
Una Autentica Guerra Civil (San Jose, 1980), pp. 150-
151.
10James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and
Revolution in El Salvador (London: Verso, 1982), pp. 87-
89.
nThe National Opposition Union was comprised of
the PCS front organization the UDN, the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) and the Revolutionary National
Movement (MNR)
.
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great majority of the people and forced "a polarization
in the electoral confrontation," and that the popularity
of UNO in the 1972 elections vindicated the electoralist
strategy of the PCS. 12
Rebellion against this strategy came in 1970 at the
Fourth Congress of the PCS. While brewing for some
time, it was finally sparked by the party's support for
the "Soccer War" with Honduras. 13 In April 1970 then
PCS general secretary Salvador Cayetan Carpio, noting
that within the PCS there exists "a stubborn majority"
that at all costs blocked the advance toward "the
political-military strategy that the people need for
moving towards new stages of struggle," resigned from
the party, went underground with a small group of
comrades, and began building the Popular Forces of
Liberation (FPL) . Carpio, a former seminarian, argued
that while a political-military strategy was imperative,
"the armed struggle would be the main thread running
12 Ibid.
,
p. 87.
“According to Dunkerley, "Consistent with its
belief that there existed an industrially-based national
bourgeoisie which would challenge the power of the
landed oligarchy, the party leadership surmised that
this faction would head the campaign against Honduras on
the basis of defending national independence. The
oligarchy, on the other hand, which was distinguished by
its close links with imperialism and secondary interest
in inter-state feuds, would seek to avoid a conflict
which would only disrupt the rhythm of production in the
campo. The major flaw in this interpretation was, as
argued by the opposition inside the PCS, the absence of
any 'national bourgeoisie' . . ." (Dunkerley, p. 88).
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through the people ' s revolutionary fervor and would
become in the process the basic element for the
destruction of the counterrevolutionary forces." 14
In 1972 a second political-military organization
splintered from the PCS. The People's Revolutionary
Army (ERP) was established by former PCS members, young
dissidents from the Christian Democratic Party,
religious activists and students. Like the FPL, the ERP
had a strongly militaristic conception of the
revolutionary struggle. For the ERP the armed struggle
was all that mattered, and the party clung to that
belief for nearly a decade. 15 However, within the ERP
two tendencies were present from the beginning. One, as
suggested above, thought the revolution could be won
principally through military means. The other tendency,
which was led by poet, essayist and historian
14Quoted in Montgomery, p. 120.
15The reason for the split between FPL and ERP
dissidents within the PCS dates back to the Cuban
Revolution and the question of armed struggle.
According to Robert S. Leiken, "During the 1960s there
developed in the PCS currents that favored the Cuban and
Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line of 'peaceful
transition to socialism' which had repudiated armed
struggle. Sympathizers of the Cubans gravitated to the
FPL; of the Chinese to the ERP. The Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia and enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine-
-each in turn endorsed by Fidel Castro and repudiated by
the Chinese—sharpened the divisions in the party as
well as among its dissidents" (Robert S. Leiken, "The
Salvadoran Left," in Central America: Anatomy of a
Conflict , ed. Robert S. Leiken [New York: Pergamon,
1984]
,
p. 115)
.
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Roque Dalton Garcia, believed that political as well as
military action was necessary. Dalton's insistence on a
mass line that entails political and military work led
the more hardline faction to accuse him of being an
agent of the CIA, to try him in absentia, find him
guilty and condemn him to death. On May 10, 1975 Roque
Dalton was assassinated, precipitating the final split
within the ERP and the formation of the National
Resistance (RN). 16
By 1978 each of the three main political-military
organizations headed a mass organization which formed
its support base. The FPL-led Popular Revolutionary
Bloc (BPR)
,
created in 1975, was the largest, with nine
affiliated organizations and a membership of sixty
thousand. 17 Its main base was among agricultural
workers and peasants demanding wage hikes, reductions in
land rents and credits. The BPR frequently led peasant
occupations of haciendas and uncultivated land. The FPL
considered the peasantry the key element in a worker-
16According to James Dunkerley, "it is something of
a political miracle that [the ERP] was able to survive
the event. Not only did the opposition take with it a
substantial part of the organization to set up [the RN],
but the remnants of the ERP found themselves isolated
with the left and devoid of links and credibility with
the mass movement. As late as 1977 Fidel Castro
denounced the ERP as 'another arm of the imperialist
police' [and] . . . outside of the country it was not
uncommon to hear the ERP referred to as in league with
the CIA" (Dunkerley, p. 94).
17Leiken, p. 116.
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peasant alliance for a "protracted people's war," and
argued that the mass organizations should provide the
recruits for protracted war. 18
The RN-led United Popular Action Front (FAPU)
,
created in 1974, focused on forming alliances with
progressive sectors of the church and political parties,
progressive labor unions, and elements of the private
sector. This would soon become the official policy of
the FMLN/FDR. The ERP-led 28th of February Popular
Leagues (LP-28) was founded by ERP sympathizers within
the National University in February 1978. 19 LP-28, the
third largest mass organization with about ten thousand
members, was considered by others on the left as having
the least well-developed political program, and was
created as a result of "a belated recognition by the ERP
that if it did not create its own mass organization it
was going to be left in the dust by the FPL and the
RN. " 20
The fifth political-military organization, the
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)
,
developed from a different conception of struggle.
18Ibid.
19This date was the first anniversary of the
massacre that occurred when the National Police cleared
the Plaza Libertad of pro-UNO demonstrators protesting
the stolen election of 1977.
20Montgomery
,
p. 126.
233
Founded on January 26, 1976, its conception of struggle
was regional, and thus rooted in the history of Central
America. Until late 1980 the PRTC remained a regional
party. On October 29, 1980 the national units of the
party separated, although ties with each other were
maintained. In 1979, the PRTC spawned the youngest and
the smallest of the mass organizations, the Popular
Liberation Movement (MLP)
.
As the above discussion shows, a prominent
characteristic of the Salvadoran left was its
sectarianism. However by the end of 1979, in the wake
of the FSLN triumph in neighboring Nicaragua, the
differences among the various forces of the left
receded. This reduction in sectarianism had many
manifestations. For example, on January 11, 1980 a
press conference was called to announce the unification
of the mass organizations into the Revolutionary
Coordination of the Masses (CRM). Similarly, on May 22,
1980 the political-military organizations announced the
formation of the Unified Revolutionary Direction (DRU),
which, with three commanders from each of the
organizations, represented a step forward in the
development of a unified military apparatus. 21 The
creation of the DRU did not signal however an end to
21Enrique A. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition ,
(Chapel Hills University of North Carolina Press, 1982),
p. 160-165.
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ideological problems among its constituents. Indeed,
the decade-old debate over how to prosecute the struggle
continued into 1981, with the largest political-military
organization, the FPL, insisting on a prolonged people's
war while the others favored a strategy of popular
insurrection. Moreover, conflict over the DRU's
decision to adopt the Leninist principle of democratic
centralism caused the RN to withdraw temporarily from
the Directorate. 22 Yet, despite these differences the
members of the DRU announced the formation of the FMLN
on October 10, 1980, creating a unified command for the
various political-military organizations.
The movement toward unity that began in early 1980
was furthered by the unfolding political events within
El Salvador. The growing and uncontrolled repression in
the countryside, the inability of the junta to control
the security forces, and the junta's failure to carry
out reform, led to a split in the Christian Democratic
Party. On March 9, 1980 the most progressive wing of
the party, led by Hector Dada and Ruben Zamora,
splintered off and almost immediately reconstituted
itself as the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC)
.
The assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero later in
March added to the momentum toward unity of the center-
left political groups. On April 11 of the same year a
“Montgomery
,
pp. 130-133.
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coalition of political parties, professionals and
technicians, small business organizations, the National
University, six unions and union federations, and a
student association announced the formation of the
Democratic Front (FD) . Five days later this alliance
joined the CRM in creating the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (FDR), thus unifying all the opposition forces
from the center-left to left of the political spectrum.
FMLN Strategic Thought
The prehistory of the FMLN has left a legacy of
sometimes violent internal struggle as well as an
organic link to some very important mass
organizations. 23 The latter have provided not only a
reserve of guerrilla fighters and sympathizers, but also
the bulk of the militias which have played an important
part in the FMLN's military strategy and structure.
The strategic thought of the FMLN is characterized
by a remarkable ability to learn from its mistakes and
an increasing flexibility in redefining its goals in
accordance with new realities. The years from 1981 to
1991 can be divided into four strategic periods, each of
which represents an adaptation to new realities
confronting the revolutionary leadership: the short-
23An excellent discussion of the sometimes violent
internal struggles within the FMLN is found in Leiken,
pp. 111-130.
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lived general offensive; the period of rebel
concentrations and the creation of a revolutionary army;
the war of resistance; and, the strategic
counteroffensive
.
Bolstered by the victory of the Sandinistas in
neighboring Nicaragua, the FMLN in its 1980 Platform,
dedicated itself
to overthrow the reactionary military
dictatorship of the oligarchy and Yankee
imperialism, imposed and sustained against the
will of the Salvadoran people for fifty years;
to destroy its criminal political-military
machine; and to establish a democratic
revolutionary government founded on the unity
of the revolutionary and democratic forces in
the People's Army and the Salvadoran
people
.
24
With the creation of the FMLN, preparations for the
long-awaited general offensive began. At 6:30 p.m. on
January 10, 1981, units of the FMLN commandeered radio
stations in San Salvador. Salvador Cayetano Carpio, a
member of the FMLN General Command, issued the call to
battle
:
The hour to initiate the decisive military and
insurrectional battles for the taking of power
by the people and for the constitution of the
democratic revolutionary government has
arrived. We call on all the people to rise up
as one person, with all the means of combat,
under the orders of their immediate leaders on
all war fronts and throughout the national
territory. . . . The hour of revolution, the
24
"Platform of the Democratic Revolutionary Front
(April, 1980)," Quoted in Robert Armstrong and Janet
Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of the Revolution , (Boston
South End Press, 1982), p. 254.
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hour of liberation is here. The definitive
triumph is in the hands of this heroic
people. ... Revolucion o Muerte.
Venceremos 1 25
In the first hours of the offensive the FMLN had
the Salvadoran army on the run, however soon the tide
turned. The failed attempt at urban insurrection was
followed by ferocious repression and the FMLN withdrew
from the cities to the countryside. There a long and
difficult process of constructing a revolutionary army
and a defensible strategic rear guard, or "zones of
control
,
" began
.
26
The war, although never ceasing to be a guerrilla
insurgency, acquired increasingly conventional
characteristics. Starting in 1982, FMLN fighters were
grouped into larger and larger concentrations and
launched a series of spectacular actions aimed at making
the nation increasingly ungovernable. These actions
culminate in 1984 with the destruction of the country's
largest and most heavily-defended bridge, the
Cuscatlan. 27
25Quoted in Montgomery, p. 138.
26For an insightful treatment of the political
aspects of this period, see Mario Lungo, El Salvador
1981-1984: La Dimension Politica de La Guerra (San
Salvador: UCA Editores, 1985).
27Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "Rethinking War,"
NACLA: Report on the Americas 23 (September 1989): 16-
17.
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In other smaller, yet more significant actions
during the same period, FMLN forces overwhelmed
government outposts in the "zones of control." These
guerrilla victories eliminated government control in the
rebel "zones" and allowed FMLN forces to develop a new
relationship with residents of the areas. Moreover, the
elimination of fixed government positions in large parts
of the country allowed the FMLN to train new fighters
and consolidate its political and logistical
structures
.
Yet despite the rebel victories during this period,
the increasingly conventional character of the war
between 1981 and 1984 played to the strengths of the
Salvadoran military. The Salvadoran Armed Forces,
especially the air force, bolstered by escalating U.S.
aid, became ever more effective. This advantage became
decisive and in order to maintain the tempo of the
fighting,
rebel cadre were pulled from irregular
structures such as militia and guerrilla units
to fill the ranks of the larger
concentrations. The transformation of the
FMLN into an encamped, full-time force meant
losing important day-to-day contact with the
rebels' civilian base of support, and meant a
political decline. Yet it was precisely such
organizing and daily contact which were needed
to replenish the "social reserve" that was
becoming exhausted. 28
28Ibid.
,
p. 18
.
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In the end, the need to keep up with the dynamic of
escalation led to forced recruitment in some areas in
order to fill the holes left by the high casualty rate
conventional warfare entails. FMLN leaders have since
publicly criticized this practice, 29 and when the
strategy became unsustainable the FMLN was forced to
restructure completely its strategy and forces. The
result, after a difficult and prolonged period of debate
and trial and error, was the development of a new
strategic line--the war of resistance.
Beginning in 1984, the War of Resistance marked a
return to guerrilla war: military units were dispersed
and returned to a more irregular status, the "fish" were
mixed back into the "sea." In place of the emphasis on
a permanent revolutionary army, clandestine organizing
of collaborators, militia and guerrillas was renewed and
strengthened. Some fighters left the armed struggle and
returned to the city to work with the reemerging
workers' movement. Others formed underground urban
commando cells, so that the next time the guerrillas
29Francisco Jovel of the FMLN General Command has
argued that, "in 1983 and 1984 we committed errors.
Often comrades who had only joined recently, including
some who were forcibly recruited, were sent into combat
right off the bat. As a consequence we had desertions,
unnecessary deaths, people who had a very negative
psychological response to combat. We learned that the
only powerful guerrilla force is a voluntary one. We
have to involve people gradually, and never take a
guerrilla fighter away from his people" (quoted in
Ibid. )
.
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launched an offensive the regime would be forced to
divide its troops between hitting the rebels in the
countryside and defending its own strategic rear guard
in the cities. The core of the permanent forces that
remained became even more specialized. An elite reserve
of "special forces" was developed and used only for
actions of strategic importance, such as the attack on
the headquarters of the Fourth Brigade at El Paraiso in
1988.
The objective was to become a more grass-roots,
multidimensional, and political force that could again
become self-sustaining. At some future point, such a
force could launch an offensive against which the
conventional war waged by the Armed Forces would be
inadequate. Meanwhile, new military tactics were
implemented to disperse and wear down the enemy while
the revolution adjusted to the transition: mine warfare,
economic sabotage, traffic stoppages, and a constant
harassment of the Armed Forces that caused greater
government casualties than had the spectacular actions
of the previous four years. 30
30In an early 1983 communique, the ERP sought to
explain the rationale behind the FMLN's strategy of
economic sabotage. "The Salvadoran dictatorship, its
armed forces and imperialism know perfectly well that
the economy is the basic pillar of political and
military power and that in every way the basic economic
areas are military objectives. The dictatorship is
always crying about the effects of economic sabotage and
what advantages it gives to the revolutionary movement.
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Political organizing became the crux of the rebel
plan during the 1984-1988 war of resistance. The Armed
Forces moved in a similar direction, in line with the
"hearts and minds" approach pushed by U.S. advisors as
part of the low-intensity conflict strategy. 31
In the countryside, poder de doble cara (literally,
"double faced power" ) emerged as the principal form of
revolutionary organizing: the fostering of grass-roots
organizations which show a legal "face" to the regime
while also showing a clandestine, collaborative "face"
to the revolution. 32 Doble car
a
developed as a
response to several factors: the increasing ability of
the Armed Forces to bring the war to the guerrillas, the
1. Sabotage has a strong impact on the economy, which
reduces the dictatorship's capacity for continuing the
war. Therefore, it reduces the offensive potential of
the armed forces.
2. It forces the army to disperse widely, deploying many
units to guard highways, bridges, transportation routes,
communications media, electrical wires and
installations, estates, etc. Thus we are also reducing
the army's offensive potential in this way.
3. The army's inability to control the situation is
demonstrated, and thus the state apparatus of the
dictatorship is destabilized.
Sabotaging the economy within the framework of a war is
not terrorism. It is a weapon used in any military
confrontation" ( FBIS-Latin America , 15 March 1983,
p. 15).
31For a discussion of the development of the "low-
intensity conflict" strategy on the part of the Armed
Forces and their U.S. advisors see Sara Miles, "The Real
War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," Report
on the Americas 20 (April/May 1986): 16-23.
32The analysis which follows is based primarily on
Miles and Ostertag, "Rethinking War."
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dispersion of guerrilla forces, and an internal FMLN
debate on how to relate to its civilian supporters
(masas , in Salvadoran political jargon)
.
The local masas served, in theory, as the rear
guard for the guerrilla army, providing them with food,
logistics, and intelligence. In practice, they often
became a burden on the fighters, who were obliged to
care for and protect hundreds and even thousands of
people against army incursions, which grew increasingly
destructive as the government forces became more adept
at prosecuting the war. These problems confronted the
FMLN in all its rear guard areas, but they were
particularly severe in the zones where "local popular
powers" had been organized. "Local popular powers"
—
civilian governing bodies formed by some FMLN member
organizations during the period of guerrilla
concentrations—were intended as an open, formal
expression of dual power in the rural areas where the
Armed Forces had lost permanent control. 33 But the
particular characteristics of this form of organizing
33A comprehensive description of the structure and
functioning of local "popular powers" can be found in
Jenny Pearce, Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in
Chalatenanqo El Salvador , (London: Latin American
Bureau, 1986). See also Francisco A. Alvarez,
"Transition Before the Transition: The Case of El
Salvador," Latin American Perspectives 15 (Winter 1988)
78-91.
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exacerbated many of the difficulties the revolutionary
movement faced.
According to Mercedes del Carmen Letona ("Commander
Luisa"), one of the principal architects of the doble
cara strategy, in an FMLN paper on the topic,
the FMLN, by openly declaring its relationship
with these people, made them illegal, which
put them into confrontation with the
enemy. . . . But the masas were unarmed and
only had the options of running or hiding,
which in turn made them even more illegal. 34
Friction developed between rebel combat units and masas
in some areas, and
the masas became isolated from the rest of the
civilian population, who did not want to turn
themselves into military targets and who
preferred to maintain their subsistence
activities without being forced to live on the
run
.
35
Furthermore, the FMLN was now dispersing its
fighters throughout the country. Instead of massing
combatants in a zone of control, where they would have
to be supplied by overt collaborators, the FMLN broke
its fighters up into small groups to carry out political
and military work on a much broader and more clandestine
basis. Towns which had formerly seen a regular rebel
column pass through a few times a year now had a
34Mercedes del Carmen Letona, ("Commander Luisa")
"El Poder de Doble Cara," internal FMLN manuscript,
Morazan, 1987. Quoted in Miles and Ostertag,
"Rethinking War," p. 21.
35Ibid.
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continuing guerrilla presence. These units, operating
in zones controlled by the Armed Forces, could not rely
on support structures which functioned only in areas of
rebel control.
In some areas, "popular power" structures had never
been developed. There, the FMLN experimented with
different forms of organization to define a more
flexible relationship between the rebels and their
civilian supporters. As military pressure and political
problems threw the popular power structures into crisis,
these experiments gradually formalized into doble cara.
By working simultaneously above ground as legal
entities and underground as FMLN collaborators, doble
cara organizations are both more overt and more covert
that the "popular powers." Doble cara is an ambitious
effort to develop more autonomous, self-determining mass
organizations which are not dependent on FMLN combatants
for political direction or military protection. Unlike
the "popular powers," doble cara organizations involve
many people who are not sympathizers of the FMLN but who
nevertheless feel the organizations fight for their
interests. Commander Luisa writes:
Our line is participation, in which the masas
debate ideas, and conduct, organize and decide
on their own actions. This means the real
practice of democratic liberties, and we have
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to make an effort to have people understand
this. 36
While doble cara was emerging in the countryside,
the FMLN moved to create urban militia and "urban
commando cells." In 1985 unions began to mobilize again
and the mid-1980s saw one of the largest strike waves in
Salvadoran history. Moreover, with its reopening the
National University, closed since 1980, resumed its role
as an anti-government organizing center. FMLN advances
came slowly, however, and urban organizing lagged behind
the rural insurgency.
Though most of the FMLN's clandestine organizing
remained invisible from the outside, by the end of 1986
FMLN commanders believed that the correlation of forces
were such that the revolution could be moved to the next
stage, the strategic counteroffensive.
An FMLN General Command strategy paper captured by
the Armed Forces shows how clearly the guerrilla
leadership, as early as 1986, discerned the path ahead:
1988 seems to be the best or most appropriate
moment for launching the strategic
counteroffensive. By that time, the party
structure of the FMLN will have developed
considerably, the experience accumulated by
the mass movement will be great, the
accumulation of insurrectional forces will
have isolated the regime, and elections will
have been shown to be unable to offer any
solution to even the most backwards elements.
36 Ibid.
,
p. 22 .
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ownThe enemy will be encircled by its
internal contradictions and hegemonic
disputes, exacerbated by the 1988 elections
for mayors and deputies and the search,
through the 1989 presidential elections, for a
new partner for the North American
government. . . .
If the masses spontaneously move to more
decided struggles and show a willingness to
insurrect we must not hold them back. But we
must guard against provoking any artificial or
voluntaristic explosions. The situation is
entirely favorable and we must bring together
all the people, in the most widespread and
simultaneous way possible. . . . 37
In early 1989, the FMLN announced that it had
entered the strategic counteroffensive phase in the war.
The first actions of the strategic counteroffensive—the
enunciation of a peace proposal in January, accompanied
by various military actions—are indicative of how the
FMLN conceives of this new phase in the civil war.
Leaders of the FMLN see the counteroffensive as a
process of insurrection which entails "civic rebellion,"
or popular violence of various kinds which challenges
the authority of the Salvadoran state and its ability to
govern. This will lead to either the military defeat of
the Salvadoran government by the rebels or a state of
ungovernability in the nation which will force the
government to negotiate with the FMLN.
37
"Fase Preparatoria de la Contraofensiva
Estrategica," identified as a document prepared for the
November 1986 meeting of the FMLN General Command.
Quoted in Miles and Ostertag, "Rethinking War,' p. 22.
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On January 23, 1989 the rebels, in a move which
repudiated earlier FMLN policy' 8
,
committed themselves
to accept the results of the presidential election
scheduled for March 19, as long as the elections were
postponed to September 15. The six month delay, it was
argued, would provide the time necessary for the FMLN
and the government to begin a dialogue leading to the
demilitarization of the nation. In addition the FMLN
requested: the creation of a committee, which would
include foreign observers, to oversee the elections;
guarantees that the United States would "remain removed
from the electoral process, without backing any of the
political parties;" that Salvadorans abroad be able to
vote; and that the military immediately cease the
repression. In return the FMLN pledged to respect the
government of Jose Napoleon Duarte until the elections,
to observe a five-day truce beginning two days before
38The FMLN has traditionally rejected the electoral
process describing it as part of the government's
counterinsurgency plan. "The FMLN is not against
elections in principle," says Joaquin Villalobos, "it is
against elections which are carried out under a state of
war and when the country is under the control of the
United States. It is the United States which in reality
makes decisions about the future of El Salvador. There
will be no real elections in El Salvador until national
sovereignty is guaranteed and there is a national
solution to the war" (Joaquin Villalobos, "Popular
Insurrection: Desire or Reality?" Latin American
Perspectives 62 [Summer 1989]: 25).
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and ending two days after the elections, and to accept
the legitimacy of the vote. 39
While President Duarte rejected the rebel plan,
claiming that the guerrillas must lay down their weapons
without conditions 40
,
the rebels have continued to
propose plans which seek to end the war through
negotiations and power sharing. 41 According to PCS
general secretary and FMLN commander Jorge Shafik
Handel
:
This is the time to search for a national
consensus to give substance to what will be
the rules of the game in El Salvador. The
FMLN does not believe at all that this is the
exclusive task of this organization. The FMLN
does not believe that it must impose its ideas
on the nation. The FMLN makes contributions
in the form of efforts and programs. 42
These "efforts and programs" have gone hand-in-hand
with increased insurrection in the cities and the
countryside. Indeed, FMLN strategists posit that the
39See FBIS-Latin America , 25 January 1989, p. 9 for
the full text of the rebel plan.
40Salvadoran Defense Minister Vides Casanova also
weighed in. Citing the inviolability of the Salvadoran
Constitution which required elections on March 19, the
Defense Minister threatened a military coup should the
rebel plan be adopted. See FBIS-Latin America , 14
February 1989, p. 15.
41While these proposals and the responses they have
engendered are too numerous to discuss in detail here,
the FBIS-Latin America reports for the years 1989 and
1990 are excellent sources of the texts of these
proposals as well as the Salvadoran government
responses
.
42FBIS-Latin America , 16 November 1989, pp. 18-22.
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increased violence will beget peace since it is
imperative to correct "the arrogant and boastful
attitude of the government and military because of an
alleged weakness shown by the FMLN, which obstructs the
negotiation process." 43 Similarly, FMLN commander
Nidia Diaz has said that while the rebels favor
negotiations, "if the government does not want to
negotiate, then El Salvador could become another Beirut.
No one wants that. No one would benefit from that."
Yet if the government does not accept negotiations "the
struggle will continue." 44
The strategic counteroffensive is also
characterized by an attempt to form what the Left refers
to as the frente amplio—a broad, multi-class coalition
in favor of a progressive political platform in which
the revolutionary Left can set the general direction but
not all of the content. This aspect of the
counteroffensive has been the slowest to emerge and,
according to rebel leaders, the momentum of their
actions has to give sufficient urgency to the demand for
a negotiated solution before such a coalition could come
together
.
The initial outlines of a future pluralist alliance
began to emerge soon after the enunciation of the
43FBIS-Latin America . 3 May 1990, p. 9.
44FBIS-Latin America . 30 November 1989, p. 5.
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January peace plan. The Christian Democratic-oriented
National Worker-Peasant Union (UNOC) and the leftist
National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) formed a
coalition to support the proposal. It was quickly
endorsed by the Permanent Committee of the National
Debate for Peace, a forum of civic organizations called
together by Catholic Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas to
search for ways to bring the conflict to an end. The
National Debate is a broad formation which brings
together 59 different organizations ranging from radical
unions, to religious, and pro-PDC groups.
With the electoral campaign in full swing no
candidate could afford to oppose the idea of peace.
Despite the strong opposition of the Armed Forces, all
13 of El Salvador's political parties flew to Mexico for
a highly publicized meeting with the rebel leadership.
For over a month, the Christian Democrats and the
National Republican Alliance (ARENA) kept the proposal
alive, as each vied to saddle the other with
responsibility for killing it. 45
45The FMLN appears to have anticipated this, and
designed its strategy accordingly. In the words of FMLN
representative Ana Guadalupe Martinez, "Obviously we
knew ARENA would at first say no, since the polls gave
them a virtual certainty of victory. We thought the PDC
would speak of unconstitutionality, but would search for
a formula that would make them appear to be at least
considering it. ... And this is what happened. ARENA
said no, the PDC, without saying no, did not say yes,
and this facilitated the electoral game the other
parties played, which gave us the space to make another
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ARENA'S electoral victory on March 19, 1989 was a
blow to the FMLN attempt to create a frente amplio, and
since the FMLN has attempted, through insurrection, to
demonstrate that the ARENA project is not viable.
Again, this underlines a central hypothesis of FMLN
strategy: the two lines of insurrection and negotiated
solution are intimately connected. The pursuit of
negotiations and a multi-class alliance can only develop
to the degree than an insurrectionary victory becomes a
realistic possibility, and is perceived as such by other
social and political actors. At the same time, should a
broad consensus for a negotiated settlement acquire
actual political form and be frustrated by the Armed
Forces and ARENA, that very frustration will feed the
insurrectionary project.
The FMLN and the Demise of Communism
The transformation of FMLN strategic policy which
attempts to move the struggle from the battlefield to
the political arena has corresponded with the "demise of
communism,
"
prompting many to speculate about the
significance of the latter for the former. While
perestroika and the changes it has engendered,
especially the increased pressure that has been put on
procedural proposal to keep the debate alive" (quoted in
Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "Rethinking Peace," p. 38).
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Cuba, have had an impact on the guerrilla's strategic
thinking, these may not be the most important in
expla inin9 the FMLN ' s "new thinking." More germane for
the FMLN are: the perception of a shifting correlation
of forces within El Salvador; the "lessons" of
Nicaragua; and the growing public demand for peace and
democracy
.
In their public pronouncements leaders of the FMLN
have stated that perestroika
,
per se, has had little
impact on their strategic thinking or on the prosecution
of the war. Paralleling the analysis of Fidel Castro,
FMLN commandantes have posited that there are numerous
ways of implementing socialism, and while perestroika
may be appropriate for the USSR, it is not for El
Salvador. In this vein Joaquin Villalobos has argued
that "the pattern of our political strategy is in line
with our own model, irrespective of the crises and
whatever problems may exist in the socialist camp." 46
Villalobos has also written that, far from being
detrimental to the revolutionary left in Central
46FBIS-Latin America , 10 October 1989, p. 29.
Similarly, FMLN commander Ana Maria Guadalupe Martinez
in an interview published in La Republica (Italy):
"Question: You used to talk about revolution, now
you talk about democracy. How much has the crisis of
communism influenced your decisions?
"Guadalupe: The Front, as such, has never had direct
relations with the USSR. Obviously the new U.S.-USSR
relations have helped us to reflect also on the
significance of revolution in Latin America" ( FBIS-Latin
America, 21 November 1989, pp. 18-19).
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America
,
perestroika and the changes it has ushered in
are positive developments. Perestroika, he argues, has
furthered an ongoing decline in U.S. militarism and a
reduction in the U.S. capacity for aggression.
Since America's defeat in Vietnam, U.S.
strategists have adopted the option of low-
intensity warfare, which is an effort to
maintain a policy of intervention by other
means. They recognize that using U.S. troops
in El Salvador is not effective or in line
with political realities within the United
States. In short, administrations running the
Vietnam War had a freer hand than those now
running the war in Central America. The
reduction in militarism and the shift from
policies of direct intervention permit
revolutionary movements formerly threatened
with siege and attrition, and facing
reversals, to receive more space to act in the
political arena. 47
While noting that "it cannot be said that interventions
are over and will not be repeated," Villalobos concludes
the conditions that enabled the United States
to intervene in -the Dominican Republic in 1965
and Grenada in 1983 or to isolate Cuba from
Latin America from the early 1960s on no
longer exist. 48
Perestroika has also hastened the development of
multipolar geopolitics, making it "impossible to reduce
today's world to capitalism versus socialism." 49 It is
Villalobos' expectation that these new conditions may
lead the U.S. to abandon its anti-communist ideology and
47Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for
El Salvador," Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989): 109.
48Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 111.
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its tendency "to see one's own society as a universal
model and to reject totally other models in a world of
great complexity among societies, each with distinct
historical determinants, each with its own pattern of
development .
"
50
These upbeat public assessments of crucial changes
in world politics must be taken with a grain of salt.
FMLN commanders have been asked by the Soviets to modify
their militarism. Moreover, FMLN commanders know that
if victorious they are unlikely to get much of a Soviet
subsidy. 51 However the FMLN assertion that Soviet
perestroika will not have a direct effect on the
guerrilla forces is correct. What is of greater concern
for the FMLN is the impact of Soviet perestroika on
Cuba. Since 1980 the Soviet Union has been restrained
in providing support for the FMLN, and Cuba and
Nicaragua have been the primary external sources of
support. 52 The economic crunch being felt by Castro's
50Ibid.
51James Le Moyne, "El Salvador's Forgotten War,"
Foreign Affairs 69 (Summer 1989): 105-125.
52
" [ T ] he Soviet Union agreed to give practical
assistance to the FMLN at a meeting in Havana in
December 1979, organized by Castro. However, Moscow did
not switch completely to support tactics until the
spring and summer of 1980, which then amounted only to
the training of a few dozen recruits. Salvadoran
Communist Party leader Shafik Handal travelled to the
.
USSR and Eastern Europe in June-July 1980, but was said
to be disappointed with the low level of his reception,
particularly in the Soviet Union, where he met only
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Cuba has bolstered Castro's position that a political
settlement of the war is imperative. 53
Even more important than the counsel of Castro in
moving the FMLN to a strategy of negotiations is their
perception of a shifting correlation of forces within
the nation. According to FMLN theorists, the economic
crisis that has devastated El Salvador throughout the
1980s coupled with the repression perpetrated by the
Armed Forces has proven the failure of the "pseudo-
reformism" of the PCD and ARENA. The severity of the
crisis, which has been exacerbated by an expanding
Mikhail Kudachkin, deputy chief of the Latin American
section of the Central Committee's International Affairs
department. Handal apparently negotiated deliveries of
U.S.-made weapons from Ethiopia and Vietnam, and some
East European countries agreed to provide communications
equipment, uniforms and medical supplies. The only
commitment made by the Soviet Union was to help in
arranging the transfer of these supplies to Cuba"
(Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America
1959-1987
,
[New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989],
p. 189 )
.
53Miller argues that Cuba, at least since 1984, has
been pressing the FMLN to negotiate an end to the civil
war. "Cuba . . . because of its own security
considerations and because of its identification with
the Sandinista regime and the Salvadoran guerrilla
movement, is keen to promote a political settlement of
the region's crisis as rapidly as possible. Havana is
acutely aware that any military v solution' can only
involve an escalation of the U.S. role to the point of
defeat for the revolutionary forces" (Ibid., p. 120).
For a more up-to-date discussion of the USSR, Cuba, and
Central America see Howard J. Wiarda, "The Soviet Union,
the Caribbean, and Central America: Towards a New
Correlation of Forces," in The Limits of Soviet Power in
the Developing World , eds. Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger
E. Kanet (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1989), pp. 94-120.
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external debt, natural disasters, and corruption, is so
great that "Even if there had been no war . . . war
would inevitably have broken out, and even if the FMLN
had not existed, such a crisis would have spawned armed
struggle . ” 54
The revolutionary potential engendered by the
objective conditions of poverty and repression are
furthered by the high level of mass organization
throughout El Salvador. Villalobos posits that "The
Salvadoran people have a tradition of organization and
struggle, [and] an ability to conspire," and during the
War of Resistance (1984-1988) trade unions, community
organizations, human rights groups, and the like, took
advantage of every political space available to them to
further their organization. These groups, which are
often autonomous and genuinely representative of their
constituencies yet sympathetic to the aspirations of the
FMLN, have become a major force which highlights the
weak mass base of both ARENA and the Christian
Democrats
.
55
Therefore, Villalobos argues, by 1989 the concrete
reality was such that change would come to El Salvador
either through a popular insurrection or a negotiated
54Villalobos, "Popular Insurrection," p. 8.
55For further discussion, see Ibid, and William
Bollinger, "Villalobos on Popular Insurrection," Latin
American Perspectives 62 (Summer 1989): 38-47.
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settlement, and while the latter was preferable, the
former could not be forsaken until the government had
agreed to negotiations and a demilitarization of
society. In effect, Villalobos has argued that it is
now time for the Salvadoran Right and its allies in the
United States to take off their ideological blinders and
develop a more realistic assessment of the war, and
consider entering into negotiations which would end the
conflict
.
The strategic thinkers in the FMLN stress that the
strategic counteroffensive illustrates the victory of
pragmatism and concern with objective realities, over
blind dogmatism. "Each revolution must adapt to the
realities it faces and build on this basis its own
thinking." 56 Certainly the most significant
geopolitical reality confronting the FMLN is the
hostility of the United States to revolution in Central
America, and the strategic counteroffensive must be
understood as an attempt to bring revolutionary
transformation to El Salvador without engendering years
of U.S. hostility and economic sabotage. While the FMLN
downplays the significance of low intensity conflict,
and claims that its offers to negotiate a settlement
that will safeguard vital U.S. interests stem from a
deep-seated commitment to democracy, what is clear is
56Villalobos
,
"Popular Insurrection," p. 106.
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that the FMLN does not want Salvadoran "contras"
attacking from Honduras, forcing the revolutionary
regime to squander scarce resources on military defense.
To achieve a military victory only to face an economic
catastrophe similar to that faced by the Sandinistas is
seen by the FMLN leadership as a Pyrrhic victory. The
"lesson" of Nicaragua has been learned and has led the
Salvadoran guerrillas to rethink the proper means of
revolutionary transformation.
A final objective reality which is at the root of
the new policy of the FMLN is the growing popular
sentiment behind peace and the growing approval among
the majority of Salvadorans for the democratic character
of the regime, if not the performance of the government
itself. Survey data gathered in late 1989 and published
in El Diario De Hoy shows solid support for the
Cristiani government, a rejection of violence and the
damage inflicted by terrorism, and strong support for a
negotiated settlement of the conflict. 57 Polls
57FBIS-Latin America , 13 November 1989, p. 39. A
portion of the findings are reported below:
When asked how would you rate the armed forces, 37%
of the respondents said excellent; 44% good; 9.3%
average; 2.7% bad; 0.3% very bad; 6.7% did not respond.
When asked how would you rate the job done by the
government, 21.3% said excellent; 54.3% said good; 15%
said average; 2.7% bad; 0.3% very bad; 6.4% did not
respond.
When asked how would you describe President
Cristiani 's performance, 29% said excellent; 51.3% good;
11% average; 1.3% bad; 7.4% did not respond.
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conducted by the Jesuit-run Central American University
(UCA) confirm these findings. In a series of polls
taken in 1988 and 1989, the UCA found that while
disillusionment with the current government is
widespread, only some 30 percent of the population has
adopted explicitly "radicalized" politics. 58
Spokespeople for the UCA dismiss the FMLN's plans
for insurrection as wishful thinking. "People are very
conscious of their misery, of their hunger, even of who
is exploiting them, " asserts UCA Vice-Rector Ignacio
Martin-Baro.
Still this doesn't lead them to think of
insurrection. This is not to say that [the
FMLN] doesn't have the sympathy of the
majority
—
perhaps they do. But insurrections
do not spring up by chance, much less after
nine years of civil war. 59
Equally problematic for rebels desiring popular
insurrection is that democratic roots are beginning to
take hold in El Salvador. Clearly, Salvadoran elections
When asked who is responsible for breaking the
dialogue toward peace, 63% said the FMLN; 5.7% the Armed
Forces; 4.3% the government; 22.7% did not know; 3.9%
did not respond.
When asked who is responsible for the massacre of
the Jesuit priests, 26% said FMLN; 7% said Armed Forces;
5.3% said the government; 53.3% did not know.
When asked should the dialogue continue, 80% said
yes; 14% said no; 5.7% did not know; 0.3% did not
respond
.
58Miles and Ostertag, "Rethinking War," p. 23.
59Quoted in Ibid.
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throughout, the 1980s were part of a counterinsurgency
strategy aimed at defeating the FMLN. Elections that
were free of fraud were seen as essential to legitimize
the government in the eyes of Salvadorans, a necessary
first step before aggressive military actions against
the guerrillas could be taken, and to ensure the
maintenance of military assistance from the United
States. It was also assumed that free and fair
elections would result in the coming to power of a
popular, centrist government that could survive long
enough to build a lasting support base that would permit
future governments to consolidate the program of middle-
class reform. That is, elections would curtail the
extreme right while helping secure aid to defeat the
guerrillas
.
60
While the latter assumption has not proven correct-
-the election of ARENA in 1989—the first two have.
Democratic roots are beginning to take hold in El
Salvador, as evidenced by the successful completion of
several rounds of national elections which selected the
first civilian governors in over half a century, major
improvements in government respect for human rights, and
60Jose Z. Garcia, "Recent Elections in El
Salvador," in Elections and Democracy in Central
America, eds. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson
(Chapel Hills University of North Carolina Press, 1989),
pp. 60-92.
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the tentative emergence of a competitive party
system. 61 Hence, the FMLN peace proposal of 1989 and
their recent vow not to interfere with the municipal and
legislative elections of March 10, 1991 signal a growing
recognition of the changing environment in which the
FMLN works. 62
The "demise of communism" and the development of the
"post-Cold-War order" have played an important part in
altering the environment in which Central American
revolutionaries must work. Soviet perestroika
,
the
defeat of the Sandinistas in February 1990 elections,
and the growth of a consensus behind democratic
practices within El Salvador, all signal the need for
the FMLN to rethink its more traditional ways of
attempting to achieve state power. Indeed, taking state
power outright has become unfeasible, and Salvadoran
revolutionaries have been forced to seek new routes for
realizing popular demands. Negotiations, power-sharing,
even competing in elections if their integrity could be
guaranteed, all are currently seen as more viable means
to pursue social transformation in the developing "new
world order."
61 Ibid.
62Mark A. Uhlig, "Salvador Guerilla Leaders To Stop
Subverting Election," New York Times , 2 March 1991, p.
3.
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CHAPTER 7
PERESTROIKA AND THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
IN LATIN AMERICA
This concluding chapter will examine the impact of
perestroika and the changes in the socialist world it
has ushered in for the revolutionary Left in Latin
America. The chapter begins with a discussion of
perestroika's implications for the Left in Cuba,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and ends with reflections on
the fate of the Latin American revolutionary Left in the
era of "the demise of Communism."
Cuba
If Cuban-style perestroika is in the cards, then
many speculate that the 1991 Communist Party Congress
will set the process in motion. One of the main topics
of discussion at the congress, which was originally
scheduled for March 1991 but has been postponed until
October, is the role of the party in Cuban society under
the prevailing circumstances. Yet, if recent comments
by high-ranking members of the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC) are any indication of what one can expect from the
congress, then plans for a Cuban-style restructuring
will not emerge from the meeting.
According to Ambassador to Nicaragua Fernando
Ravelo Renedo, the upcoming PCC congress "will not
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encourage changes that transgress socialist principles,"
ai"id instead will be charged with "perfecting socialist
democracy." 1 While admitting that the congress will
seek to renovate the party, Ravelo categorically rules
out the possibility that the congress will introduce
political pluralism and scoffs at the notion that
renovation may require replacing the party's top
leadership, including Fidel.
The people think of Fidel as their guide in
the renewal, and it has not cross [sic] their
minds that he could be removed from the
revolution's leadership. Were he to leave,
the people would feel as if they had been
orphaned. 2
Ramon Suarez Vega, a PCC Department of Ideology
official concurs with Ravelo 's analysis of the upcoming
congress. While positing that the party's "renovation"
will require that more young people (between the ages of
28 and 40) be integrated into important leadership
positions, he argues that
Cuba will not renounce any of its fundamental
socialist principles. The PCC is a Marxist-
Leninist party and is not going to renounce
any of those principles. 3
These assertions give greater credence to the
position of Juan M. del Aguila who, in 1990, wrote that:
lM Envoy to Nicaragua Views Upcoming Party
Congress," Barricada . 7 February 1991, p. 6.
2Ibid.
3
" Ideology Official on Congress, Other Issues,
FBIS-Latin America . 15 March 1991, p. 1.
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As was the case when medieval monks preserved
Catholicism against pagan doctrines, Cuba's
ideologues seek to invigorate Marxism-Leninism
against foreign and domestic heretics. A
theory whose failures are evident not only in
the communist world but also in underdeveloped
societies ... is revived in Cuba at a time
when regional if not global trends threaten to
dismiss it altogether as an organizing
principle. The country could well become the
communist world's monastery in the late
twentieth century, an isolated shrine in a
world besieged by ideological confusion. 4
As was illustrated in Chapter 4, President Castro's
harsh anti-perestroika views have the religious
character of the "true believer's" defense of orthodoxy
against various heresies. Ostensibly, Castro is
defending genuine socialism in a world where erstwhile
allies have "sold out" to capitalism and "bourgeois
democracy." Moreover, the rhetorical defense of
socialism is coupled with Rectification policies which
harken back to the early years of the revolution and
which are contrary to the economic liberalization seen
throughout the rest of the socialist world. While
Castro perceives his response to the changes taking
place around him as a sign of socialist Cuba's strength
in an increasingly hostile world, a more correct
4Juan M. del Aguila, "Cuba: Guarding the
Revolution," in Glasnost, Perestroika and the Socialist
Community , eds. Charles Bukowski and J. Richard Walsh
(New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 70.
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interpretation is that Castro's response is a sign of
the weakness of the revolution. 5
A thorough Cuban-style perestroika is unlikely.
Such a restructuring would profoundly destabilize the
nation and threaten the PCC leadership. Bringing Cuba
into the mainstream of world politics would require
Castro to allow other political actors to function free
of his control. This in turn, would engender the rise
of potential rivals to his leadership. Such potential
challenges to Castro's complete authority have never
been allowed by the maximum leader; Castro has never
allowed anyone to gain the personal base and acquire the
kinds of skills necessary to be a credible successor.
Moreover, to embrace perestroika would be to renounce
the two defining principles of the Cuban revolution:
socialism and hostility to the U.S.. To implement
Cuban-style restructuring would, in effect, be an
admission that Castro had made serious mistakes in
charting his revolution on a socialist and anti-U.S.
course. Such an admission would undermine the
legitimacy of the revolution and deny that Cuba's
transformation signals the "wave of the future" for the
Third World.
5Howard J. Wiarda, "Is Cuba Next? Crises of the
Castro Regime," Problems of Communism 40 ( January-April
1991): 84-93.
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If Cuban perestroika is not in the cards, one must
ask whether President Castro can realistically maintain
his nation's position as "the communist world's
monastery." The answer is no; change in Cuba is
inevitable. Castro's government probably will not fall
in the near future. Castro still has control of a
potent and loyal security apparatus, his survival
strategy of increasing "democracy" among the
revolution's supporters, and Castro's still considerable
moral legitimacy all point to the fact that those who
envision a quick demise of the PCC are mistaken.
However, storm clouds loom on the horizon for
revolutionary Cuba. A number of interrelated problems
can be identified which will make it more and more
difficult for the Cuban leadership to maintain the
status quo. First, support for Fidel is to a large
extent generational. As those older Cubans who remember
life under Batista, the revolutionary struggle or the
early years of the revolution and are especially
supportive of President Castro die off there will be a
parallel decline in the intensity of popular support for
the revolution and its maximum leader. This is not to
say that Cubans in their 40s and younger are opposed to
Fidel, rather these Cubans lack the same strong ties to
the maximum leader found among the older generation.
Most of the younger generations of Cubans are patriotic
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and quite likely would fight to defend the revolution.
However these groups of citizens, in part because of
their interest in the West and Western styles--including
increased freedom and democracy—are more likely to see
Castro as an anachronism and obstacle to Cuba's economic
health and political development.
Second, as the Cuban economy continues to decline
and material hardship grows, discontent with the status
quo is bound to grow. While President Castro recently
implored Cubans to be proud of their position as "the
sole standard-bearer of socialism" in a world where
"former allies have capitulated" to the forces of
imperialism6
,
the government has also announced that it
is suspending all investment "of a social nature," save
those related to the completion of some works and for
agriculture. 7 Cuba's limited resources are now being
employed to produce adequate food supplies for the
population, to develop tourism and to further the
production of medicinal goods. The decision to
terminate investment "of a social nature" will have
important implications for the Cuban leadership. Not
only will it make material hardships worse for the
6
"Castro Addresses Federation of University
Students Congress Closing," Havana Cubavision Network 22
December 1990. In FBIS-Latin America , 28 December 1990,
pp. 3-18.
’"Betting on Tourism as Exchange Earner," Latin
American Weekly Report , 13 June 1991, p. 8.
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majority of Cubans, but it will have the effect of
diminishing the credibility of the PCC's claim that the
revolution has benefitted the majority.
Third, recent visitors to the island posit that the
PCC is increasingly elitist and out of touch with the
populace. 8 The upper echelons of the Cuban leadership
are most concerned with holding on to their power and to
the considerable privileges it brings. Moreover, within
the PCC old-guard communists (who are in their 60s and
70s) monopolize most of the important positions,
freezing out the younger generation of leaders. This
younger cadre of leaders, mostly in their 40s, are
bureaucrats and technicians, not ideologues and are
growing more and more impatient with the old leadership
and their inefficiencies. This younger cadre is also
growing increasingly eager to enjoy the privileges that
important leadership positions bring. Wiarda reports
that Castro is seen by his subordinates as increasingly
out of touch, and while he is still honored and deferred
to, he is also ignored more and more often. 9
Castro's rejection of perestroika and his
unwillingness to bring Cuba into the mainstream of world
politics at a time when democracy is on the march and
communist regimes are falling has important implications
8Wiarda, pp. 86-87.
9 Ibid.
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for the Central American Left. The growing isolation of
Castro's Cuba and Castro's steadfast refusal to adapt
the revolution to changing circumstances has reduced
Castro's appeal to the Latin American Left. The case
studies of Nicaragua and El Salvador have shown that the
Cuban model of revolution has been eschewed by both the
FSLN and FMLN
,
and, as will be detailed below, both
revolutionary groups have rejected Castro's
intransigence and have rethought what it means to be
"revolutionary" in Latin America in the late twentieth
century.
Nicaragua
The FSLN out of power is a political party in
crisis. In the 18 months since their electoral defeat,
the Sandinistas have been regrouping and have begun a
search for a new identity. Among Sandinista loyalists
there is a widespread feeling that change is necessary.
However, no consensus exists as to what these changes
should be. Many internal debates should be aired at the
FSLN's first Party Conference to be held July 19-21,
1991. Leading up to the conference, the FSLN has held
numerous regional and local meetings and has encouraged
public debate as to the future of the party.
One issue that was raised early in the process of
debate before the July conference was the low level of
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internal democracy within the FSLN
. An article in
Barricada complains that
the FSLN functions like a fiefdom, wherein
negotiations are made on behalf of the
"grassroots." From the fiefs emerges a class
that refuses to be replaced. We see the same
faces in different posts. Before they were in
the government; today they are in the party.
The FSLN seems to be divided . . . into those
with "connections" and rights and those
without connections and rights. . . . The FSLN
cannot function as a political party or be a
political option as long as that situation
prevails. . . . New faces are needed for the
new era as well as persons without any
disgraces that could elicit criticism. 10
These concerns have engendered a FSLN restructuring
of its internal workings aimed at democratizing the
party. For the first time Sandinista district leaders
are being elected by the rank and file instead of being
named by party higher-ups. Working commissions have
drawn up documents on Sandinista philosophy and bylaws
which have been debated in urban barrios and rural
communities throughout Nicaragua. An ethics committee
charged with investigating allegations of corruption has
been established. Finally, the delegates to the party
congress, who will be elected directly by FSLN members,
will have the opportunity to elect top party leaders,
including the party's National Directorate. 11
10Augusto Zamora, "The Sandinist Relief,"
Barricada , 8 February 1991, p. 3.
uThe test of the FSLN's sincerity in proposing a
democratization of the party will be whether the "old-
guard" leaders allow themselves to be voted out of power
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Since their electoral defeat in February 1990,
internal FSLN debates have occurred between two party
factions: the "pragmatists" (also sometimes identified
as Social Democrats) and the "orthodox" (or Marxist-
Leninists). The debates between the two factions are
not exactly new. The issues of contention--the utility
of broad class alliances, and what constitutes proper
revolutionary strategy—echo the debates among the three
revolutionary tendencies prior to their unification.
Current battlelines are drawn over how closely to
collaborate with the UNO coalition of Violeta Chamorro
as it attempts to bring stability and economic recovery
to the nation. Implicit in this discussion is the basic
question: should the FSLN see itself as the vanguard of
a popular, working class movement, or should it strive
to build a multi-class, nationalist party capable of
winning the 1996 election. Pragmatists have advocated
working with moderates in the UNO coalition, arguing
that the Nicaraguan people are sick and tired of
conflict and that stability will give the FSLN room to
maneuver in order to protect what is left of the
revolution. Rafael Solis, the former secretary of the
legislative assembly, has even suggested that the
and replaced with those they consider inexperienced.
See " 'Sandinists Militants' Group Issues Proclamation,"
Barricada , 18 June 1990, p. 5. See also Julie Light,
"Nicaragua: Speaking Bitterness," NACLA Report on the
Americas 24 (May 1991): 4-7.
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Sandinistas "co-govern" with more moderate elements of
the UNO alliance and enter the 1996 elections in
alliance with UNO moderates. Co-governing would not
entail sharing cabinet posts, Solis maintained, but
would be a process of finding common ground.
The Sandinista leadership has to put it to
workers bluntly: If the government falls, we
are not the ones who will take power, but
rather Vice President [Virgilio] Godoy and the
UNO extremists. And that would lead to
another civil war. 12
Similarly, former Sandinista cabinet minister
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca argues that the FSLN should
strive to unite different nationalist currents in favor
of development with social justice. Sandinismo should
defend the rights of the poor, but from a "multi-class,
pluralistic perspective." 13 Former Sandinista
ambassador to the Organization of American States Carlos
Tunnerman agrees. The FSLN should promote a social pact
that would be "the heart of a new national, multi-class
project. " 14
The orthodox see such a strategy as an unwise
accommodation to U.S. interests and the Nicaraguan
business class, the very interests which championed the
12Quoted in Light, p. 5. See also Xavier Reyes
Alba, "Sandinist Ramirez: Possible Alliance Unsuitable,"
Barricada 22 January 1991, p. 6.
“Quoted in Carlos M. Vilas, "What Are They
Saying," NACLA Report on the Americas 24 (May 1991): 6.
14 Ibid
.
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FSLN's demise. They argue that the only way to
safeguard the people's interests is to work from below,
even if this puts the FSLN on a collision course with
UNO moderates. What is needed, argues sociologist
Orlando Nunez Soto, is "a revolutionary alliance of
urban workers and campesinos .
"
15 According to
Sandinista Jurist Augusto Zamora: "Instead of suicide
accords with the oligarchy, we need a national popular
and anti-imperialist revolutionary front ... to win
back power." 16
Another point of debate between the two factions
concerns proper revolutionary strategy. More
specifically, should the FSLN maintain its traditional
anti-imperialist stance which pits the party against the
U.S. and with the socialist world, or should this be
updated and altered given changed circumstances.
FSLN Commander Victor Tirado, who is a member of
the FSLN National Directorate, has been an eloquent
spokesman for the pragmatist position. In an article
published shortly after the FSLN's electoral defeat he
argued that, with the fall of the socialist bloc and the
decline of Soviet support for the Third World, the era
of anti-imperialist revolutions has come to an end.
15Quoted in Villas, p. 6.
16 Ibid.
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M°reover"/ anti-imperialist movements end up in economic
disaster
.
If we understand anti-imperialist struggles to
mean a total military and economic
confrontation with imperialism, then the cycle
of these kinds of revolutions is ending. We
have to look for new options. . . . The
worldwide trend can be summed up in two
phrases: market economy and free elections. 17
Finally, should the FSLN continue to define its mission
as "a perpetual struggle against U.S. imperialism, then,
of course, we [are] going to be struggling
eternally . " 18
Orthodox Sandinistas, including the only surviving
founder of the FSLN, Tomas Borge, have argued that
despite global changes the FSLN must remain anti-
imperialist. According to Borge,
Statements that imperialism doesn't exist or
that it doesn't merit a confrontation, a
political or ideological war, are . . .
historically false. 19
FSLN National Directorate member Luis Carrion concurs:
Anti-imperialism is the flip side of our
defense of Nicaraguan sovereignty, and of our
commitment to the peoples of the Third
World. 20
17Sergio Ferrari, "Tirado Outlines Post-Election
Plans," Barricada , 20 March 1990, p. 3.
18Ibid.
19Quoted in Vilas, p. 6.
20Ibid
.
275
Since last year, the pragmatists within the FSLN
have gained a clear edge. The pragmatist position is
stronger among the upper reaches of the party than at
the base, hence orthodox Sandinistas emphasize
democratization and renovation within the party while
refusing to revise their positions on class alliances
and the anti-imperialist nature of the party. 21
Evidence of the pragmatists' advantage is found in the
FSLN's response to the labor protests of the summer
1990. Violent clashes between Sandinista trade
unionists and strike breakers in July 1990 threatened to
plunge the country into civil strife. Fears of a power
play by the Right brought Sandinista leaders and UNO
moderates together to resolve the conflict before it
escalated out of control. According to National Workers
Front leader Damaso Vargas, during the July strikes
"there were actions in Managua that the [FSLN]
departmental commission opposed, and, I should point
out, even tried to dismantle." 22 The strikes were also
a litmus test of the army's working relationship with
the government. Defense Minister General Humberto
Ortega ordered troops to dismantle barricades, but vowed
the Sandinista army would never turn its guns on
21See footnote number 10. Augusto Zamora is a
member of the orthodox faction.
22Quoted in Vilas, p. 7.
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protesters. Ortega has since pledged to depoliticize
the armed forces and has complied with instructions to
slash the size of the army by more than half. The
pragmatist position is also dominant in the FSLN '
s
Principles and Program which will be debated at the July
party conference. According to Jaime Wheelock, member
of the FSLN's National Directorate and head of the
commission charged with drawing up the draft of the
FSLN's Principles and Program, the document stresses
that the FSLN is committed to the development
of a Nicaragua where all of its citizens, from
the peasants to the business owners, have
equal rights and both may play a part in the
sacrifices for the benefits of the nation's
wealth. 23
The document does not define the Front as a
revolutionary and anti-imperialist party, nor does it
describe the FSLN's goal as the creation of socialism.
We are for a non-capitalist alternative; we're
even supportive of the socialist development
of society, but in a suitable, politic and
realistic way . .
.
[and] according to
international rhythms and conditions. 24
El Salvador
The FMLN's two-track policy of negotiating while
keeping military pressure on the ARENA government
23Jaime Wheelock, "Socialism is an Ideal Not a
Dogma," Barricada International , June 1991, p. 24.
24Ibid.
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continues. As described in Chapter 6, FMLN strategists
view continued military actions primarily as a means of
impressing upon the Salvadoran government and its U.S.
supporters that the war is unwinnable, that the FMLN is
a political force that cannot be ignored, and therefore,
that serious negotiations aimed at resolving the
conflict are imperative. 25 Reports from government
ministers and guerrilla commanders alike indicate that
these negotiations, aided by a United Nations mediator,
are making progress toward a military truce and eventual
national reconciliation.
A major impediment to progress in the negotiations
has been the issue of the Salvadoran military. The FMLN
has demanded that the military demobilize before a
ceasefire. The guerrillas have also called for the
subordination of the military to civilian powers and for
the establishment of a commission to investigate abuses
allegedly perpetrated by the military and paramilitary
groups. The ARENA government, on the other hand, has
25See "FMLN Vows to Continue Downing Planes," San
Salvador Radio Cadena, in FBIS-Latin America , 7 December
1990, pp. 10-11.
The FMLN ' s decision in early February 1991 to
return 17 of the 28 surface-to-air missiles acquired
from the Sandinista army was described by the
clandestine Radio Farabundo Marti as a "political
victory" for the guerrillas. "Politically speaking, the
return of the missiles has been the most overwhelming
expression of the dual power which exists in El
Salvador, given the FMLN's existence, its territorial
control, and its army" ("Rebels View Missile Return,"
FBIS-Latin America, 5 February 1991, p. 9).
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been unwilling to demobilize the Army until a ceasefire
is reached, arguing that if the FMLN is genuine in its
calls for peace then it should simply lay down its arms
first
.
Important progress on this issue came at the UN-
mediated Mexico City negotiations between the FMLN and
the Salvadoran government held April 4-27, 1991. The
"Mexico Declaration" issued at the conclusion of the
negotiations called for constitutional amendments which
would: subordinate the armed forces to civilian power;
create a "truth commission" charged with investigating
alleged abuses perpetrated by the military and
paramilitary groups; and, create a Civilian National
Police to replace the public security corps, which will
operate under civilian control independent from the Army
in urban and rural areas. 26 Early on the morning of
April 30, 1991 the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly
approved the reforms and soon thereafter the FMLN
announced that it has set up a political committee to
prepare for their incorporation to legal political
26A full text of the "Mexico Declaration" is found
in FBIS-Latin America , 29 April 1991, pp. 7-10. For the
ARENA response to the declaration see "Arena President
'Optimistic
'
,
" FBIS-Latin America , 29 April 1991, p. 10.
For the FMLN response see "Rebel Commanders View Talks,"
Notimex (Mexico City) , in FBIS-Latin America ,
29 April 1991, p. 10-11.
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activity. At a press conference on the northern
outskirts of San Salvador, FMLN commander Gerson
Martinez asserted that
the future of this country will be civilista—
must be civilista
.
All social forces and
political society must fight to build a
country where the authority of the civilian
society prevails over any military
authority. 28
The Demise of the Socialist Paradigm and the
Revolutionary Left
This work has examined how revolutionary movements
have adjusted, or failed to adjust, to the enormous
changes in the socialist world—changes set in motion by
Soviet perestroika and foreign policy new thinking. As
detailed in Chapter 3, perestroika and foreign policy
new thinking have engendered a Soviet "strategic
withdrawal" from the Third World. This new posture
toward Third World nations and revolutionary movements
corresponds with new Soviet understandings about the
revolutionary potential of the Third World, and is
motivated by the related desires to reduce the costs of
defending the USSR's vital interests, devote more of the
nation's scarce resources to the domestic economy, and
27
"Details on Approval of Constitutional Changes,"
FBIS-Latin America , 1 May 1991, p. 11. See also
"Getting Ready for the Ceasefire," Latin American Weekly
Report , 11 July 1991, pp. 2-3.
28Quoted in "Getting Ready for the Ceasefire,"
p. 2
.
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improve relations with the West, especially the United
States. As the Soviet Union has distanced itself from
erstwhile allies in the Third World, and as the USSR has
allowed the nations of Eastern Europe to chart their own
political and economic course, the revolutionary Left in
Latin America has lost a number of important potential
allies and sources of assistance.
Perestroika and the transformations in the
socialist world has also made the Cuban model of
revolutionary change irrelevant. The Cuban model is
increasingly seen by the Left as not viable. This is a
crucial development for the revolutionary Left. The
Cuban experiment, along with the Soviet, made up the
socialist paradigm in Latin America; by the early 1960s
each new revolutionary movement added, subtracted or
altered aspects of the Cuban and Soviet models in order
to fit their own particular circumstances. With the
demise of the socialist paradigm the Left's point of
reference for conceiving of an alternative to Latin
America's current state of affairs is no more. Under
these new circumstances, it is impossible for the Left
to think outside of the parameters of the current
reality in Latin America.
In a Latin America in which socialism, especially
in its anti-democratic, Stalinist form, is in severe
crisis and in which the market economy and electoral
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democracy are seen as the waves of the future, the idea
of revolution has faded. This is not because the crises
that were thought to be the foundation for both its
inevitability and desirability have changed; if anything
they are more and more present. 29 Rather, the idea of
revolution has faded because the outcome of revolution
has become unattractive or unimaginable and because,
after the 1990 elections in Nicaragua, it has become
reversible. The defeat of the FSLN was a rejection of
the revolution by the people themselves, albeit one
delivered under duress.
Under these new conditions only those like Castro
—
who knows that Cuban-style perestroika would lead to his
fall from power and probably the rolling back of most of
the revolution—and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso—who
are isolated from the rest of the hemisphere—can adhere
to traditional revolutionary formulas. Hence, one sees
the Nicaraguan FSLN rethinking its revolutionary
strategy and project and working to build electoral
democracy.
It is likely that any future Sandinista government
will look much like the People's National Party (PNP)
29Cuban President Castro often declares that while
the crisis in socialism gets full media attention, what
goes unnoticed is that capitalism in Latin America is in
crisis too. He has a point. Many nations in the region
struggle under increasing debt burdens and declining
economies and have seen their standard of living fall to
the level of the 1960s.
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government of Michael Manley in Jamaica. Manley first
governed Jamaica between 1972-1980, when he championed
the replacement of capitalism with "democratic
socialism, " lectured his citizens on the dangers of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the larger
world system of imperialism, challenged U.S. foreign
policy, and formed close ties with Cuba's Castro. The
nation suffered severe economic problems and grew
increasingly isolated internationally during Manley's
tenure and in 1980 he was defeated in elections which
brought the conservative Edward Seaga to power as Prime
Minister. Manley's second opportunity to govern Jamaica
came in 1989 when his PNP defeated the Jamaican Labor
Party (JLP) of Seaga. Since 1989, Manley has been
candid about the "mistakes" he made in the 1970s and his
government has dropped its harsh anti-imperialist
rhetoric, distanced itself from Castro, developed a
better relationship with the United States, and entered
into a working relationship with the IMF. Explaining
his government's new posture Manley concedes that "The
world has changed. Jamaica has changed. And I think I
have changed." 30
These new conditions have also led the Salvadoran
guerrillas to rethink the taking of power through
30Quoted in Saul Landau, "Lonely Manley," Mother
Jones, March/April 1991, p. 26.
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violent revolution. This traditional revolutionary path
to power is rejected in favor of a more peaceful
strategy which may allow FMLN leaders to share power
with those forces against whom they have battled since
the early 1980s.
The last years of the twentieth century are clearly
a time of renovation for significant segments of the
revolutionary Left in Latin America. Old notions of
what it means to be a revolutionary are being rethought.
This does not signal any so-called end of history,
rather it means only that certain historically important
ideas are fading away. In fact, the current situation
for the revolutionary Left in Latin America could be the
best thing that has ever happened to it. The demise of
largely anti-democratic paradigm may provide the Left
with the opportunity to democratize itself. Such a
transformation could allow Left movements to create
strategies and programs that link their struggles more
closely with the burgeoning desire for freedom and
democracy sweeping the hemisphere.
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